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The theology and ethics of Karl Barth have, over many decades, proven to
be provocative. Barth's dialectical methodology in approaching questions of
theology emphasized the gap that exists between a holy God and a fallen humanity.
However, Barth's Christology bridges the gap between a transcendent and
imminent God.
In this work, the author seeks to examine the ethics of Karl Barth, with
special reference to his doctrine of revelation and theological ordering of gospel
and law. This thesis intends to discuss the link between Barth's theology and
ethics; a link we believe was established as early as 1924 with the anhypostasis-
enhypostasis Christological formula. By establishing a bridge between the 'wholly
otherness' of God through the anhypostasis-enhypostasis formula and therefore a
fully divine-fully human Christ, Barth found a means by which to bring God into
history, and thus into the affairs of humanity, including ethics.
Because Barth's doctrine of revelation elucidates the God who is gracious
from eternity, Barth re-defines the inversion of law and gospel: gospel and law for
Barth, symbolizes the YES of God to humanity — a YES that will impact Barth's
entire approach to ethics.
As all of humanity is under the realm of redemption, so too, is ethics. This
placing of ethics within the sphere of redemption creates problems for Barth such
as absolutism and subjectivism. Reinhold Niebuhr provides a helpful launching
point for our own critique of the Barthian ethic, as seen through its response to
communism in Hungary in the 1950s. This work will, therefore, not only examine
the development of Barth's doctrine of revelation and ordering of gospel and law,
but will also discuss the implications of these two subjects for Barth's ethics. In
so doing, we will conclude that while interesting, Barth's ethic falls short in daily
affairs because of Barth's view of history, church and state, his rejection of norms,
and his neglect of the role of the Spirit within ethics. Had Barth been willing to
accept a revised form of norms held under the sovereignty of God, we believe his
ethics would have had the possibility of making a greater impact on humankind.
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Several years ago, a fellow divinity student offered me the following
advice: "Don't waste your time with Barth's ethics. After all, he has nothing
relevant to say." This divinity student is not the first to make such a remark.
Criticisms of Barth's ethics abound in both conservative and liberal theological
circles; opponents level a similar complaint: Barth simply does not provide us with
a relevant ethic.
My fascination with this critique has provided the impetus for this study.
Why does there seem to be such vehement criticism of or apathy towards Barth's
ethics? Does Barth really provide us with an ethic that, while congruent with his
theological 'system,' is irrelevant when it confronts the complex and perplexing
issues we face within theological ethics today? Perhaps, and perhaps not.
The field of ethics is a huge multi-faceted enterprise. Therefore, in order
to effectively analyze issues within ethics, we must first define the type of ethic we
intend to discuss. When we speak of theological ethics, a myriad of notions
may enter ourfminds. At its most basic level, we define the Christian ethic as that
which deals with the "whys" of human behavior. Christian ethics asks questions
such as, "Why should we do right?" and "How do we know which criteria
determine good and right?" It examines what is good and right, that is, what
virtues and beliefs humanity "ought" to cultivate and how these virtues and beliefs
"ought" to manifest themselves in our actions. Unlike other types of ethics,
theological ethics examines moral questions from a God-centered perspective.
Presupposing the existence of God and God's involvement in the world, theists
address moral problems by looking to God first. Despite the variations within
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various theological approaches to ethics1 and their frequent willingness to take into
consideration the contributions of other types of ethics, the approach of theological
ethics' is unique: it reflects upon the question, "What am I as a child of God to
do in this world as I seek to love God and my neighbor?"
What this study seeks to achieve is a critical assessment of the development
of the ethics of Karl Barth during the period leading up to the ethical work found
in the Church Dogmatics. In undertaking the task of addressing these questions,
we find that far less has been written about Barth's ethics than about his theology.
And little has been said of his ethics before what has been termed the 'mature
ethics' of the Church Dogmatics.2 It is our position that Barth had developed a
solid and concrete ethical system before he wrote the Church Dogmatics. Although
tradition has placed the Church Dogmatics in the time period in which Barth's
mature ethical thinking is to be found, we would argue that the exposition of ethics
articulated within the Church Dogmatics is not completely new thought but an
elaboration of his earlier work. More specifically, Barth's placing of Gospel and
Law occurs, albeit inchoately, as early as 1913, more clearly in 1922 within the
second edition of Romans and finally, quite firmly with his adoption of the
'For the purposes of this study, we will assume a prior knowledge of the
various types of Christian ethics-i.e. teleological, deontological, etc.
2RobertWillis, in his study of Barth's ethics, The Ethics ofKarl Barth (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 1971), states that the Church Dogmatics "represents the culmination of
the methodological revision which engaged Barth's attention after the publication
of the first volume of the Christian Dogmatics." (66) While Willis gives some
helpful insights into the ethics of the Church Dogmatics, we believe he discounts
the earlier work ofBarth, particularly the Christology of the Gottingen Dogmatics,
as the base for Barth's theology and ethics. Therefore, we believe Willis is
incorrect in his statement that the Church Dogmatics represents the culmination of
revisions from the Christian Dogmatics. Although the Church Dogmatics do
represent, to a large degree, a culmination of thought, the base for this thought was
established by 1924 in the Gottingen Dogmatics.
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anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology of the Gottingen Dogmatics in 1924.3
Therefore, we believe that an examination of Barth's doctrine of revelation and his
theological ordering ofGospel and Law provides the key to understanding the basis
of his ethics. Consequently, part of this dissertation will argue that in order to
understand the ethics of Karl Barth, we must look to his early work and
comprehend his treatment of the doctrine of revelation and its bearing on the
theological ordering of Gospel and Law. With this goal accomplished, we believe
we will show how Barth's ethic of command functions and why he chooses to
approach ethics in such a fashion.
In order to assert the relevance of Barth's ethics, we must show how
Barth's theology of revelation forms the framework for his ethics, with particular
attention given to the issue of natural theology. Barth's understanding of revelation
purely as "self-revelation" in Jesus Christ disallows any form of natural theology
(and therefore middle axioms and norms) and places the theological primacy of
Gospel over Law. This ordering results in an ethic as expressed in what Barth
terms the Command of God. Within this phase of our study, we intend to ask
questions of Barth: how do we hear God speak to us? Can an ethic of command
really serve as a workable ethic? We believe that as we perform this task of
analysis and critique, we will shed light on Barth's position and show how, without
3It is important to note at this early stage our indebtedness to the work of Dr.
Bruce McCormack of Princeton Theological Seminary in his Ph.D. dissertation,
A Scholastic of a Higher Order. In it he details a genetic study of Barth's
theological development from 1921-1931. In our opinion Dr. McCormack's
uncovering of Barth's use of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology, as found
in the Gottingen Dogmatics of 1924, successfully challenged the argument that
Barth's shift in his theological position was to be found in the 1931 Anselm work.
Dr. McCormack's position has thus deeply influenced our treatment of Barth's
ethics.
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an adoption of a revised type of norms, Barth's ethic falls short in providing a
means by which to approach everyday issues within ethics. Barth's ethics do in
fact, provide a means by which to deal with ethical issues, but we are suggesting
that without a modified form of norms, these means are difficult to put into
practice.
Before we give a description of the proposed structure of this study, we
believe it necessary to briefly discuss the terms 'Gospel' and 'Law,' as defined by
Barth, and to explain how they will be used within the parameters of this study.4
For Barth, the Gospel is encapsulated in the doctrine of election: the God who
lives in freedom, the God known to humanity in Jesus Christ (the electing God and
elected man) chooses and invites humanity to join in a relationship of grace. This
election of grace, Barth suggests, is the whole of the Gospel, the very essence of
all good news. Yet the Gospel has a counterpart: the Law. Here Barth is much
more difficult to pin down in terms of definition, for the Law is not the Decalogue
or the Sermon on the Mount. It is a form of the Gospel intertwined with and
unable to stand independently of the Gospel:
The Law is wholly enclosed within the Gospel: not a
second (Law) beside and outside the Gospel, nor a
strange (Law) that preceded the Gospel, or that
followed it, but the claim that the Gospel itself
and as such directs to us: the Gospel itself, in so
far as it has the form of a claim which has been
directed to us.5
"Because we will be treating Barth's ordering of Gospel and Law in great detail
later in this work, the following definitions serve only to familiarize us with the
terms at their most fundamental level.
5Karl Barth, Die KirchlicheDogmatik II\2, 564.
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Barth develops this idea of the Law as a form of the Gospel by basing the
interrelationship between the two on his doctrine of election: from the first it is
Gospel - in God's decision to create humanity comes the initiation of grace,
electing grace. The Law is that which claims humanity: just as God creates, so
too is God responsible for humanity, and humankind is responsible to God. As the
grace of God is actualized and revealed, humanity is claimed; it is this claiming
which Barth terms the Law. The Gospel provides humanity with its freedom; the
Law places a claim on this freedom — not a claim that imposes bondage, but one
that stands within the boundaries of an unoppressive Gospel of grace. The Law
regulates and judges the use made of the freedom of the Gospel. Just as the
Gospel, the revelation of God's grace to humanity, "disposes" humanity, so also
does the Law as the form of the Gospel impel humanity to a future congruent with
its "disposing."
According to Barth, Gospel and Law cannot be separated. Yet he is
adamant that Gospel is first and that Law becomes what it is because it is a part
of the Gospel. Law is found within the freedom and grace of the Gospel, the same
Gospel which encloses the Law as the ark of the covenant and tables of Sinai. In
this ordering we find the roots of Barth's ethical system and begin to understand
the relationship between the command of God and the actions of the ethical agent.
Our examination of Barth's ethics will begin with an analysis and critique
of his theological/ethical development. This first section will contain a chapter on
Barth's early theological and ethical development, with specific attention given to
those events and ideas which most strongly influenced Barth's theology and ethics.
We understand that the topics covered in this chapter could constitute an entire
dissertation. However, we will not deal exhaustively or give a genetic history of
5
factors facilitating our analysis.
The second section will contain two chapters that focus on Barth's method
and its relationship to his ethics. We will examine Barth's doctrine of revelation
as defined in four phases:6 revelation as experience (1909-1915); revelation as
revolutionary eschatology (1915-1922); revelation as resurrection within the locus
and authority of the cross (1922-1924); and revelation as incarnational eschatology
(1924). We will follow the major development in his doctrine of revelation: from
experience to eschatology, from revelation as an unhistorical event to revelation as
containing historical content with the adaptation of the new Christological formula.
We will endeavor to show how Barth's doctrine of revelation provides the
framework for his ethical stance. After discussing Barth's doctrine of revelation,
we will turn to his theological ordering of Gospel and Law. There we will find
that Barth's ordering of Gospel and Law was set before the Church Dogmatics,
paralleling the development of his doctrine of revelation, and that this ordering of
gospel and law relates to Barth's refusal to accept middle axioms and norms within
ethics.
Our final section will examine the implications of Barth's doctrine of
revelation and his interweaving of Gospel and Law in his ethics. We will deal
with the question of Barth's negation of natural theology, the idea of insuring the
freedom of God within his ethics, and the parallels between the Command of God
and the role of the imperative in Barth, with reference to the impact of Immanuel
Kant.
6While helpful in determining stages of Barth's development, these phases are
not to be considered definitive.
6
Any discussion of Barth's ethic must include a critique. Therefore, our last
two chapters will present an assessment of Barth, using Reinhold Niebuhr as a
paradigm: Niebuhr's harsh critique of Barth's response to communism in Hungary
became a focal point for Niebuhr's criticism of Barth's eschatologically-absolutist
based ethic. As a vehement opponent of Barth's ethics, Niebuhr acts as a
launching point for our own critique.
We affirm Barth's starting point for theology — God's gracious election of
humanity in Jesus Christ. However, we do not agree with Barth that there cannot
be a place for norms within a theology 'from above.' Certainly Barth's theology
results in a command based ethic, but does this mean that there can be no
involvement from humanity in determining how this command might be
implemented? We think not. If Barth's doctrine of sovereignty is as central as he
suggests, then God must be able to use the efforts of humanity, no matter how
marred they might be. We would suggest that these efforts are best reflected in
a modified type of norm that falls under the authority of God and God's command,
but acts in such as way as to reflect flexibility and adaptability to new ethical data.
We believe that the marriage of these two concepts might provide a satisfactory
compromise between an ethic from above and an ethic from below.
7
CHAPTER ONE
Restlessness and Reform: Developments in Karl Barth's Theology and Ethics
An examination of the ethics of Karl Barth must have as its base, an
understanding of the main concepts prevalent within his theology. Therefore, in
this chapter we will establish those themes and ideas that we believe are most
important for our study of Barth's ethics.
Inspired by Wilhelm Herrmann's Ethik1. Karl Barth's deep personal interest
in theology burgeoned2 so that by 1908, he arrived in Marburg, determined to
"soak up" as much of Herrmann as possible.
Herrmann's thought addressed the relationship between religion and
morality, whose synthesis was to be found in the person of Jesus.3 This
Christocentric emphasis was the root of Herrmann's idea of the essential experience
of life: the foundation of humanity's life is the experience of meeting the person
'Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922) was professor at Marburg from 1879. His
major works include: Dogmatik (Stuttgart: Friedrich Andreas, 1925); Ethik
(Tubingen: JCB Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1901); Geschichte der Protestanischen
Dogmatik von Melanchthon bis Schleiermacher (Leipzig, 1842); Die Gewissheit
des Glaubens und die Freiheit der Theologie (Freiburg: Verlag von JCB Mohr,
1889); Offenbarung und Wunder (Giessen: Alfred TjSpelmann, 1908); Systematic
Theology (London, 1927); Der Vekehr des Christen mit Gott im Anschluss an
Luther dargestellt. 6th ed. (Stuttgart/Berlin: J.G. Gottasche, 1968); Die
Wirklichkeit Gottes (Tubingen: JCB Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1914).
2See Barth's article, "The Principles of Dogmatics According to Wilhelm
Herrmann," in Theology and Church, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962), 238. In this article, Barth states that "In my own case,
I let Herrmann say to me one essential truth. This truth, followed out to its
consequences, later forced me to say almost everything else quite differently and
finally led me even to an interpretation of the fundamental truth itself which was
entirely different from his. And yet it was he who showed me that truth." (239).
3Wilhelm Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott im Anschluss an
Luther dargestellt. 6th ed. (Stuttgart/Berlin: J.G. Gottasche, 1908) ET: The
Communion of the Christian with God. 102.
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of God in the person of Christ.4 The moral consciousness of humanity only
submits to the perfect moral personality in which its members discover the
revelation of God, and although at this point humanity finds itself morally alive,
through its relationship with God, humanity discovers its own failure that can be
purified and refined only in an encounter with Jesus.5
Despite his close association with Martin Rade6, Barth was most
significantly influenced in Marburg undoubtedly by Herrmann. Throughout Barth's
early writings, the theology of Herrmann is apparent, as is that of the "Marburg"7
school: "the inwardness and individualism of true religion, the distinction between
faith and the idea of faith, the contrasting ideas of assensus and fiducia, criticism
of Protestant orthodoxy, the practice of seeing Luther and Schleiermacher together
in the same perspective."8 However, we must not ascribe to Barth the title, even
/ *
at this early stage in his theological studies, a critical student of Herrmann. From
the beginning, Barth was an independent thinker. And while he adhered to much
of the 'Marburgian' theology, he was not limited by it throughout his life. This
"Wilhelm Herrmann, Systematic Theology (London: 1927), 64.
5The Communion of the Christian with God. 32, 103.
6Martin Rade was the Professor of Systematic Theology at Marburg and editor
of Die Christian Welt. Barth studied under him from 1908-1909 and also assisted
in the editing of Die Christian"Welt.
7The Marburg school refers to the type of theology espoused by the theological
faculty at Marburg in the early 20th century.
8Hendrikus Berkhof, Two Hundred Years of Theology, trans. John Vriend
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989), 181-
182.
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quality of independence would mark much of his work.
II. New developments in Barth's thought: the break from liberalism, religious
socialism, dialectical thinking, eschatology and revelation.
In this section of our work, we will examine those developments in Barth's
thought which impact our study and aid in setting the framework for the role of
revelation and the function of Gospel and Law in Barth's ethics.
A. The disillusionment of World War One and Liberal Theology.
In 1911, Barth began work in the farming and industrial town of Safenwil,
where he confronted the demands of the pastorate and began to challenge the
teachings to which he had once adhered. Much of the impetus for this transition
came as a result of the outbreak of the war in 1915. Disillusioned by his
theological teachers' sanctioning of the actions of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Barth began
fyv6W
amidjieirvideswei
'"...to my dismay, among the signatories I discovered
the names of almost all of my German teachers...it was
like the twilight of the gods when I saw the reaction of
Harnack, Herrmann, Rade, Eucken and company to the new
situation...they seemed to me to have been hopelessly
compromised by what I regarded as their failure in the face
of the ideology of the war...their exegetical and dogmatic
presuppositions could not be in order...a whole world of
exegesis, ethics, dogmatics and preaching which I had
hitherto held to be essentially trustworthy was shaken to
the foundations, and with it all the other writings of
German theologians.'"9
This critical moment in Barth's development forced him to see the inadequacy of
9Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth. trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1976), 81.
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19th century theology — a "culture religion" could not survive or give hope to
society. Consequently, Barth sought for a theology which, without compromise,
could contend with the crises of life. He was aware he was striving for something
new: "...it has come increasingly clear to me that what we need is something
beyond all morality and politics and ethics. These are constantly forced into
compromise with 'reality' and therefore have no saving power in themselves."10
Barth was aided in his search for 'something new' by Christoph
Blumhardt11 whom he met with Eduard Thurneysen in April of 1915. Blumhardt
and his ideas, particularly those relating to Christian hope and the kingdom ofGod,
intrigued Barth. Blumhardt had argued for a close alignment between hope and
knowledge of God. Furthermore, his combination of the active pursuit of God's
A>*\
A
kingdom with "waiting on the patient God" impacted Barth, who assimilated
Blumhardt's ideas and combined them with his own new understanding of God as
the primary reality who calls humanity into question. This new beginning for
Barth was significant: we see the initiation of his move from liberalism in his
10Letter to W. Spoendlin, January 4, 1915. In Busch, 84.
"Christoph Blumhardt (1842-1918), son of Johnann Christoph Blumhardt,
espoused a theology of the kingdom of God whose hope was found in the
resurrection of Christ. Blumhardt stated the following regarding this concept:
"What precisely is the center of gravity of the Kingdom of God? The resurrection,
God's revelation in the resurrection!... .1 know nothing that alarms me in the world
when I consider that Jesus lives!....Jesus lives, and he lives...as the Resurrected
One." From Eduard Thurneysen, Christoph Blumhardt (Zurich/Stuttgart: Zwingli
Verlag, 1962), 47. For further interest see Blumhardt's Christus in der Welt
(Zurich, 1958); Predigten und Vortrage. gehalten in der Schweiz, 1886 (Zurich,
1886); Vom Reich Gottes (Schltichtern, 1922); Von der Nachfolge Jesu Christi. aus
Predigten und Andachten (Berlin, 1923).
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questioning of both religion as experience and of the kingdom of God as that which
is built by human efforts.
The encounter with Blumhardt, coupled with Barth's commitment to
concentrate more intensely on studying academic theology with Thurneysen, led
to Barth's deliberate focus on the Bible.12 Although tenets of Herrmann's
theology were still apparent in Barth's thinking, by 1916 his initial separation from
liberalism13 was apparent as he sought a "radically new theological relationship
between 'theory' and 'praxis,' such that the sole foundation of both would be the
12In discussing his study with Thurneysen, Barth said, "We tried to learn our
theological ABC's all over again, beginning by reading and interpreting the
writings of the Old and New Testaments more thoughtfully than before....I began
to ready it as though I had never read it before." From: Karl Barth, "Concluding
Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher," in The Theology of Schleiermacher
(Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982), 264.
13When discussing the liberalism that Barth espoused, we are referring to the
line of thought within nineteenth century theology that sought to find a common
denomination of religious experience, self-evident to humanity. Ideas such as
religious experience, the moral righteousness of Jesus, historical relativism, and
inwardness were some of the themes Barth inherited that had been proclaimed by
theologians such as Johann Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-
1834), GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889),
Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922), and Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923). For further
discussion on the genesis of nineteenth century liberalism see H.R. Mackintosh,
Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1937); John
Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (London: SCM Press, 1963);
Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, vol. I: 1799-1870
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
Although steeped in liberal theology, Barth always was reluctant to embrace
it in its totality: "One thing, however, is certain, that even before 1910 I was a
stranger in my innermost being to the bourgeois world of Ritschl and his
pupils....even the 'historicism' by which Ernst Troeltsch and the historians of
religion of that time thought they could outbid the Ritschilians (and thus also the
teacher whom I still regard so highly, Wilhelm Herrmann) struck me as being too
sterile, and at any rate was not what I was looking for." From: "Concluding
Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher," 262.
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sovereignty of God."14
B. The move from liberalism continues: The first edition of Romans.
One fruit of Barth's return to the Bible appeared in his commentary on
Romans. In 1916, Barth had begun a study of Paul's letter, taking notes on his
discoveries, which resulted in the publication of the commentary in 1918. In the
preface to the first edition, Barth summarized his purpose for undertaking such a
vast and ambitious task:
...my whole energy of interpreting has been expended in an
endeavour to see through and beyond history into the spirit
of the Bible, which is the Eternal Spirit.15
For Barth, the question of giving God a place of centrality in theology and
life was becoming more and more essential. The interaction with Blumhardt forced
Barth to take this question of centrality and intertwine it with questions of
eschatology and Christian hope. No longer was Barth satisfied with an eschatology
that was merely a progressionistic form of optimism, that had been upheld by
liberal theology: eschatology had to be grounded in more. As Barth reflected on
this issue of eschatology and embarked on his study of Romans, he approached it
as a sojourner in an unknown and potentially dangerous land, finding himself
asking and seeking to answer the question: in a world hostile to God, how could
the kingdom be seen to be at work?
14George Hunsig&er, "Towards a Radical Barth," in Karl Barth and Radical
Politics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), 204.
15Karl Barth, "Preface to the first edition. (1918)," in The Epistle to the
Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933) B.
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Barth's study of Romans was significant because it provided him with the
material he needed to stress the idea of the absolute primacy and priority of God.
The study of Romans, and the writing of the commentary, became that which
helped Barth to proclaim the superiority of God in an alienated world. The main
theme of the commentary was:
...divine eschatology, the irreversible movement from a
doomed temporal order to a new living order ruled by God,
the total restoration (apokatastasis) of the original,
ideal creation in God. This movement of a doomed world,
which still knows its origin but cannot get back to it on
its own, is due solely to God, who shows His mercy in
Christ. In Christ He implants a seed which will sprout
and spread overpoweringly until everything is transformed
back into its original splendour. All this will not take
place in plain view but will work itself out eschatologically.16
Particularly significant for our study is the development of Barth's view of
revelation. Previously, Barth had, like so many other theologians of the liberal
tradition, equated revelation with experience. Much of this belief emanated from
the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher who viewed Christianity as both a
historical phenomenon subject to higher criticism and an inner experience
(aesthetically and spiritually) whose content consisted of questions of dependence.
Furthermore, Schleiermacher viewed the certainty of God — revelation - as
resting upon a specific experience characterized by absolute dependence, and he
described revelation in his "Addresses on Religion to its Cultured Despisers" as
!6Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth. trans. John Drury
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 48.
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"every new and original communication of the universe to man."17 Hence,
revelation began not from an eschatological standpoint, but from the standpoint of
human experience in all times and places, fluctuating and developing with each
new experience.
With the first edition of Romans in 1919, Barth drew away from the idea of
revelation as experience and moved toward the concept of revelation as
eschatology.18 This shift is important for two reasons. First, this new way of
looking at revelation placed Barth outside the traditional liberal circle. Clearly, he
was not orthodox in the sense of the Reformers, yet he was not classically liberal.
The challenging of his presuppositions forced Barth to stand alone. Second,
revelation as viewed eschatologically bore heavily on Barth's approach to ethics.
The interconnection between the two arose in the form of a dialectic. For Barth,
the concept of the dialectic had strong ties to the philosopher Sjfren Kierkegaard
(1813-1855). In the most general sense, Kierkegaard used the dialectic "to denote
the activity of that type of thought which reaches its goal by moving between
17Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Addresses on Religion to its Cultured Despisers,"
in H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd.,
1937), 44.
18Barth's concept of eschatology was beginning to be refined: he did not, even
in 1919, move completely to a Christocentric emphasis in eschatology — that he
developed in the second edition of Romans and the Gottingen Dogmatics. Previous
to his adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula, Barth had
difficulties reconciling the role of God as being in history, yet outside of it. His
eschatology at this early stage reflects this struggle.
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question and answer or assertion and contradiction in dialogue."19 Therefore, the
dialectic works on the basis of a point-counterpoint: the question is the answer;
the answer is the question, but only in relation to one particular question: that of
humanity's existence.20
The dialectic of ethics and eschatology manifested itself clearly in the
Tambach Lecture of 1919, which we will discuss at a later stage. However, the
interplay between eschatology and ethics, rather than experience and ethics is
apparent in the Romans material.
C. The break with Religious Socialism and the Tambach Lecture
Not only did Barth begin to understand revelation in a new light because
of the Romans study, but he also re-examined his views on the kingdom of God.
Much of Barth's initial view on this particular subject had emanated from his
interaction with Hermann Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz,21 two members of the
19Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence (Edinburgh and
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 9.
20Barth would add to this statement the following: "As long as man questions,
the answer is not the question; the answer can be the question only if God has done
the asking; that is, what is in question is the real man in his specific situation, not
abstract man." From Gesammelte Vortrage. 161.
21Hermann Kutter (1863-1931) was a Swiss pastor, and founder of the
Religious Socialist movement in 1906. Major works include Sie Miissen (Zurich,
1904); "Wir Pfarrer" (Lepzig, 1907); Wo is Gott? (Basel, 1926).
Leonhard Ragaz (1868-1945) was also a Swiss pastor and the theological
chair at Zurich from 1908-1921. Along with Kutter, he was the chief influencer of
the Religious Socialist movement. Works include Per Kampf um das Reich Gottes
in Blumhardt. Vater und Sohn - und weiter! (Erlenbach - Zurich, Miinchen und
Leipzig, 1925). For a helpful study of Ragaz see Andreas Lindt, Leonhard Ragaz:
Eine Studie zur Geschichte und Theologie des religiosen Sozialismus (Zollikon:
EVZ, 1957); Markus Mattmiiller, Leonhard Ragaz und der religiose Sozialismus.
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religious socialist movement which equated the kingdom of God with social action.
As early as 1908, Barth had heard Ragaz lecture on the theme of God meeting the
needs of humanity through socialism. Ragaz belonged to a group of Swiss
theologians who gave a "particularly surprising twist to the 'struggle for the
kingdom of God' by endorsing and affirming the eschatology and the hope of the
Social Democrats workers' movement, pitting it against the church, theology, and
Christianity."22 From Kutter, Barth had heard the message of God's power and
God's willingness to work in the church through events of secular world history.23
While Ragaz placed emphasis on active movement,24 Kutter focused more on the
'prophetic knowledge' of God. Both men helped Barth address his theological
questions, but as he continued in his study of the Bible and further developed his
commentary on Romans, neither completely convinced Barth to endorse
wholeheartedly the religious socialist ideal. Part of his frustration and suspicion
lay in Ragaz' 'systematizing' of the religious socialist belief. Barth had learned,
since his disillusionment following the first world war and his subsequent study of
Romans, that 'systems' do not bring God to humanity: only God is able to draw
Bd. 2 (Zollikon: EVZ, 1968).
22Busch, 76.
23See Sie Miissen. whose thesis was that the message of Jesus had been
distorted by the church: as an institution, Kutter believed that church had lost the
vision for socio-economic change because of its emphasis on inwardness.
24Ragaz was frustrated with Kutter's lack of interest in politics. See Lindt,
238ff.
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humanity and change the shape of the 'kingdom on earth.'25 Consequently, the
kingdom of God was taking on a new shape for Barth which he would begin to
articulate clearly in his 1919 Tambach Lecture.26
In "The Christian's Place in Society," Barth did several important things.
First, he signalled his rejection of the religious socialist teachings. From the
outset, Barth articulated his point with candor: the only source ofjustice, the only
one who has the power to calm the unrest and dissatisfaction in society, the only
initiator of the kingdom, is Christ — not Christians in general and not religious
socialists in particular. No longer did Barth speak unequivocally about the hope
of humanity and its ability to manufacture the kingdom. Rather, he stressed the
antithesis: "reality is no longer, harmoniously and unproblematically, a cloak for
divine life and operation."27 The socialist task would not be commensurate with
inaugurating the kingdom of God. Rather, the "socialist task would receive its
"The anti-systemic approach Barth takes has strong ties to Kierkegaard. In
Philosophical Fragments (1846) Kierkegaard argues against reason as an alternative
in forming a concept of God: "...the Reason, in attempting to determine the
Unknown.. .at last goes astray... .if man is to receive any true knowledge about the
Unknown (God) he must be made to know that it is unlike him....This knowledge
the Reason cannot possibly obtain of itself; we have already see that this would be
a self-contradiction. It will therefore have to obtain this knowledge from God.
But even if it obtains such knowledge it cannot understand it, and thus is quite
unable to possess such knowledge." Sfren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936), 37. See also Kierkegaard's
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments (1846) and
Either-Or (1843).
26The Tambach lecture, entitled "The Christian's Place in Society," was




ground, limit and orientation in terms of God's revolution alone."28 This
movement away from the religious socialist influence regarding the kingdom of
God bears heavily on Barth's ethics: since the kingdom cannot be created by
human attempts, the initial activity must rest with God. While the ethical agent is
responsible to think and act in the earthly realm, God facilitates the reality of the
kingdom. Therefore, all ethical activity must be directed by God and God's
command. This relationship is crucial to our understanding of the early
groundwork of Barth's ethics: even as early as 1919 (and even before this date
when he initially was suspicious, in 1913, of religious socialism in its entirety),
Barth gave God primacy in the ethical realm.
Furthermore, the antithetical statement Barth made regarding humanity's
inability to create the kingdom of God reveals a second point of significance: in
Tambach we see the use of dialectical language. Whereas in Romans I, Barth
viewed the relationship between God and the world as predominantly harmonious,
in Tambach he placed stress on the disharmony. Barth expressed the force of this
new relationship in the form of dialectical tension, a style of point/counterpoint,
thesis/antithesis. While he was not suggesting that God is uninvolved or lacks
concern for the workings of the world, Barth was aware of a gulf between God and
the world. At this juncture we see some of the ethical tension which exists for
Barth: if a gulf exists between God and the world, how does one act ethically?
How is the ethical agent on earth able to know the mind of God in heaven? We
28Hunsinger, 211.
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believe Barth resolved this ethical dilemma in two ways. First, he placed the
synthesis in God, over and above the thesis and antithesis:
The original is the synthesis. It is out of this that both
thesis and antithesis arise...Naturally we shall be led first
not to a denial but to an affirmation of the world as it is...
Only out of such an affirmation can come that genuine, radical
denial which is manifestly the meaning of our movements of
protest. The genuine antithesis must follow the thesis: it is
through the thesis that it derives from the synthesis.29
How does the placement of synthesis resolve the ethical dilemma? By
placing God in the position of "origin," Barth laid the groundwork for God as both
immanent and transcendent; the God who is both interacts with humanity and also
remains holy and separate. Later, Barth would call this interaction as it takes place
in the ethical realm, the 'Command of God.'
Second, Barth employed analogy to discuss the relationship between God
and humanity. In Tambach, Barth introduced a form of analogy in which God
tears down in order to build. What is significant about this form of analogy, for
our purposes, is the aspect of God's tearing down human attempts at ethical
solutions in order to allow God to work. This form of analogy is most important
when coupled with the idea of synthesis as the first act of God, rather than the last,
as it allows the grace of God to overwhelm the judgement of God: the Gospel
encapsulates the Law. Thus, in the Tambach lecture we see, in its nascent stage,
Barth's ordering of Gospel and Law and its relationship to ethics. For if we
discern Barth's use of the dialectic as expressed in synthesis-thesis-antithesis and
29Karl Barth, "The Christian's Place in Society," in The Word of God and
Word of Man (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928), 299.
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his use of analogy, we are able to see how his ethics function, and why, within his
ethical system, they are able to function — perhaps even in a helpful way.
Undoubtedly, the Tambach Lecture catapulted Barth onto center stage
theologically. But what he said at Tambach was not by any means an articulation
of his mature thought. It would continue to expand as he found new windows of
opportunity to further his theological insights. One such window was the second
edition of Romans.
D. The changes of Romans II.
In order to understand fully the significant changes that took place with the
rewriting of the Romans material, we must first look briefly at the interim period
between the first and the second edition of Romans.
During this phase of his theological development, Barth explored others'
ideas which would influence his rewriting of the commentary. The first came to
Barth in January of 1920 in the form of Franz Overbeck's30 Christentum und
Kultur. In his book, Overbeck attacked the theology of his era, with particular
reference to Harnack's historical interpretation of Christianity. Barth discovered
in Overbeck the "profound impotence of 'modern theology,' hidden only too well
behind the fig leaf of culture-Protestantism."31 Presuppositions in theology, Barth
30Overbeck (1837-1905) was Professor of Critical Theology from 1872-1897
at the University of Basle. His most significant contributions to Barth's thought
came in the books Christentum und Kultur. ed. Carl Albrecht Bernoulli (Basle:
Benno Schwabe and Co., 1919) and Uber der Christlichkeit unseren heutigen
Theologie (1873).
31Eberhard Jiingel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy (Philidelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1986), 56.
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avowed, must be questioned, and the ultimate realities of God taken seriously if
theology were to move forward. Overbeck had seen the negative side of
Christianity which associated its bourgeois moral idea of the kingdom of God with
Jesus' teaching. Barth believed this 'negative' side of Christianity exposed by
Overbeck merited serious consideration. Yet, at the same time, Barth made room
for the positive hope he gleaned from Blumhardt.
Other important influences upon Barth during this period were those of
Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and Plato.32 Barth's friend Eduard Thurneysen stirred
an interest in Dostoevsky. In his reading of the Russian, Barth encountered the
often different world of saints and sinners. More important, he discovered
Dostoevsky's high esteem for forgiveness; even the vilest of sinners could
experience catharsis. In the midst of this forgiveness lay hope. The same thread
that wove its way throughout Dostoevsky's work now found a renewed place in the
theology of Barth: forgiveness for all possible. Also important was the influence
of Kierkegaard, from whom Barth gleaned the idea of 'krisis' as well as the
dialectic of time and eternity, which assured the essential separation between God
and humanity. Kierkegaard attacked the objectivism of the historical method and
called for a total assent to faith. It was the philosopher's relentless critique that
would intrigue and challenge Barth to give Kierkegaard serious attention:
He only entered my thinking seriously, and more extensively,
in 1919, at the critical turning-point between the first and
second editions of my Romans: after that he could be seen in
a more important role in my other literary works...what we found
32The Epistle to the Romans. 4.
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particularly attractive, delightful and instructive was his
inexorable criticism...We saw him using it to attack all
speculation which wiped out the infinite qualitative difference
between God and man.33
Lastly, through his brother Heinrich, Barth was influenced by Plato. In his role
as philosopher, Heinrich Barth encouraged Barth to listen afresh to the 'wisdom of
Plato' and to examine the thought of Immanuel Kant in light of Plato.34
Subsequently, Barth adopted the Platonic framework to support his view that the
temporal could not, by its own power or ability, conceive of the eternal. From
Plato, Barth began to put flesh on his impossible-possibility.
In the spring of 1921, the lecture "Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas"35
reflected some of Barth's newly incorporated ideas. Into the lecture, Barth
interrelated the ideas of Overbeck, as well as those acquired from Dostoevsky,
Kierkegaard and Plato.36 Barth transformed them into a message which
proclaimed loudly and clearly the need to approach theology with a critical eye —
in light of the inadequacies of the past, theology must undergo a critical
inquisition. Barth based his call for critical analysis on the belief of the YES of
God - the YES which allows us to be on the inside and allows us to search
relentlessly and critically. It was this YES which Barth would clothe in the NO.
33Busch, 116.
34While Plato may not have been the only 'interpreter' of Kant for Barth, his
brother Heinrich's influence on Barth did emphasize the Platonic.
35This lecture was delivered at the Aarau Student Conference.
36Karl Barth, "Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas," in The Word of God
and the Word of Man. 54-56, 67-69, 81-83, 92.
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It was also Barth's pressing inquiry that would characterize the second edition of
Romans.
Barth approached the second edition, knowing that he had to communicate
the thoughts of the first edition in a new way.37 He wanted to introduce a
theology critical of the liberal and positivist theology of the nineteenth century
while at the same time restoring to God, the God presented to humanity in the
Bible, the rightful position of complete sovereignty.
Throughout the revised commentary Barth took up a polemic against
'religion': whereas in the past 'religion' had failed to bring the kingdom to earth,
now only the action of God, to whom humanity stands in opposition, could bring
change to the world. Within the pages of this commentary Barth undertook a
frontal attack against the concept of religiosity and its tendency to make a religious
system based on the law. He knew that in Romans II he had to clarify the role of
grace: the grace that justifies us, the grace given in Jesus.
In the face of his polemic against religion and his rejection of his past
liberal theological leanings, Barth faced difficult questions. How can humanity
know God if humanity is completely separate from God?38 Even in the first
edition of Romans there was a larger glimmer of hope for the possibility of human
'contact' with God. But with Romans II, this glimmer seemed to have been
obliterated. Was it possible that the gap could be bridged, or had Barth created an




Confronted by this question Barth's further developed his doctrine of
revelation. In order to address this issue, Barth argued that humanity gained
knowledge of God through the event of the resurrection. In the resurrection
revelation meets humanity:
...the unintuitable historical event of the resurrection
becomes, by an act of God's grace, intuitable in the event
of the cross. We see the resurrection in the Crucified...
But however central the cross may be as a locus of revelation
within the intuitable world, its light too is borrowed. The
resurrection alone is revelation.39
Resurrection is revelation. Previously in Romans I, revelation was
eschatology; now it was resurrection. Barth had not abandoned completely the
thought of Romans I; rather, he had refined it through this new approach. Despite
the disparity created by the separateness between God and humanity, argued Barth,
resurrection bridges the gap. The significance of this thought for Barth's ethical
development lies in the emphasis he placed on the act of God as that which allowed
for contact: Barth's framework, both theologically and ethically, gave God
primacy in the initiation and in the acting out of relationship. Furthermore, as
Barth refined his idea of revelation from one based wholly on eschatology, he
opened the door for an ethic which was not only future oriented but also which
dealt with the present situation. In the resurrection we find revelation; in the
inbreaking of God to our situation, we, as ethical agents, see the possibility of
39Bruce L. McCormack, "A Scholastic of a Higher Order," Ph.D
Dissertation; Princeton Theological Seminary, 1990, 130.
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living as God's people in a God-forsaken world. Encouraged to live responsibly,
Barth believed that humanity is called to respond to God's grace in concrete ways,
not by living in accordance with abstract principles.
Barth further developed this possibility of interaction with God in his
dialectic of time and eternity. He used this dialectic to ensure the distance between
God and humanity, with the intent of debunking any myth about humanity's ability
to reach God through effort alone. The time and eternity dialectic also gave rise
to Barth's dialectic of the veiling and unveiling of God, which assured the
goodness of God and 'wholly otherness' of God while maintaining the 'impossible
possibility' of God's revelation to humanity.
By 1922, Barth had completely broken from the liberal tradition. With the
publication of the second edition of Romans Barth fully embraced the belief that
the only revolution was God's revolution, and the only initiator was God.
However, it would be incorrect to state that by 1922 Barth had completely
solidified his thought with regard to his theology and ethics. He had, nevertheless,
had made tremendous strides in the development of his thought, particularly with
regard to his understanding of revelation and the kingdom of God. It would not
be, however, until 1924 in his Gottingen Dogmatics, that Barth would establish, in
full, the base for all his theological and ethical thought.
E. Gottingen Dogmatics and the new Christology
In 1921, Barth accepted a position as Associate Professor of Reformed
Theology in Gottingen, a post for which he felt poorly prepared and inadequate.
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But the years in Gottingen would stretch and mature Barth as exemplified by his
work in historical theology and his dialogue with Roman Catholic theologians.
The most important work he produced during the Gottingen years was his
Dogmatics of 1924, in which he made a crucial shift in his Christology.
Previously, Barth approached revelation through the ahistorical event of the
resurrection. In the 1924 Dogmatics, Barth adopted the anhypostasis-enhypostasis
Christology,40 which permitted revelation to have a historical content. By
adopting the ancient Christological formula, Barth allowed for God to enter into
the historical without becoming identical with it, for the human nature of Christ
had its "personality, subsistence, reality only in its union with the Logos of
God."41 Hence, although God was in history vis-a-vis the Incarnation, God was
not equated with history. Therefore, he retained the divine incognito.
How does the adaptation of the Christology impact Barth's ethics? What
makes this shift so important for our discussion? First, the new Christology
marked the completion of the base of Barth's theological thought with reference to
revelation. From 1924 onwards, he centered all talk of revelation on the
Christology of 1924: any adaptations were merely fine tuning, not complete shifts.
Second, the establishment of the Christology and its impact on the doctrine of
40Barth was lecturing on Reformed dogmatics for the very first time in
Gottingen and was particularly daunted by the task. He sought refuge by
reacquainting himself with Protestant orthodoxy, and the early church Fathers,
where he located the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula. See Karl
Barth and Eduard Thurneysen, Revolutionary Theology in the Making, trans.
James D. Smart (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1964), 182-185.
41McCormack, 321.
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revelation marked a crucial point in Barth's ethics: we have suggested that it is in
Barth's doctrine of revelation and his theological placing of Gospel over Law that
we see the key to understanding his ethics. Furthermore, we have suggested that
the development of these two strands of thought parallel one another and the
development of his ethics. With this relationship in mind, we deem it important
to connect the development of the Christology with the development in ethics: by
1924 Barth's thought with regard to his 'theological enterprise' was set. Because
his ethics parallel his theology, the conclusion is clear: by 1924 the base of Barth's
ethical thought was also established. Any adaptations from this point would be
those which mark a honing, rather than a transformation of his ethics.
By 1924, several significant changes had occurred in Barth's theological
thought. The content of the Gottingen Dogmatics displayed Barth's new phase of
dogmatic thinking. Moreover, his theology had unfolded from the days of
Romans: although the dialectic was still present, Barth now maintained a newly
developed view of revelation, eschatology and Christology.
At this point in Barth's theological development we move in our discussion
to the development of Barth's ethics through the 1928-30 ethics lectures in Munster
and Bonn.
III. Developments in Barth's ethical thought.
In this section of our discussion, we will examine four themes that occur
in the development of Barth's thought which we believe touch on the significant
stages of his ethical development.
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A. The Primacy of God: the dialectic of ethics
As we examine Barth's ethical criteria, the concept of the full hegemony of
God becomes clear as a leading, if not the leading theme of his ethics. Inherent
in the theme of God's sovereignty is also the dialectic of ethics, a means by which
Barth continually emphasized the distance between God and humanity.
The nascent stage in Barth's emphasis on the dominion of God is seen as
early as 1916 in his lecture, "The Righteousness of God" delivered in the town
church of Aarau. The motivation for the lecture was Barth's ongoing concern
about ascribing to God the rightful place as the Sovereign of the universe. Because
of his newly found interest, Barth desired to "begin all over again with a new inner
orientation to the primitive basic truths of life; only this can deliver us from the
chaos arising from the failure of conservative or revolutionary proposals and
counter-proposals."42 This critique of both the religious socialists and the classic
liberals moved Barth toward placing God as the primary agent of all ethical action.
For Barth, humanity had no means to create a righteousness great enough to bring
its members to God, nor could a humanly conceived ethic establish the kingdom
of God on earth:
We should like to take the mighty thing into our own hands and
under our own management, as we have done with so many things...
the righteousness of God itself has slowly changed...and is now
at all events our very own affair...You may act as if you were
God, you may with ease take his righteousness under your own
42Karl Barth. Letter to W. Spoendlin, January 1916.
29
management. This is certainly pride.43
Barth challenged any presupposition that the ethical task emanate from
humanity. For Barth, the righteousness of God displayed the distance between
humanity and God and therefore the necessity of God's initiation in all areas of
ethics.
Barth continued to develop this theme in his lecture of February 1917, "The
Strange New World Within the Bible." In it he continued his assault on the
liberal and religious socialist ideology regarding the kingdom of God and
epistomolgy.44 It is the Bible, stated Barth, which informs humanity that God has
sought it.45 In this argument Barth furthered his insistence on the primacy of God
within ethics: because humanity cannot find God via reason, or even through
sincere searching, neither can humanity construct or live an ethic not rooted in the
priority, authority and sovereignty of God. As it submits to hearing the Word of
God in each situation, new and fresh, humanity discerns what is ethically correct.
Paralleling the theme of the dialectic in his theology, was the dialectic
within ethics. This feature was most noticeable in the second edition of Romans.
43Barth, "The Righteousness of God," in The Word of God and the Word of
Man. 15-16.
44Karl Barth, "The Strange NewWorldWithin the Bible," in The Word ofGod
and the Word of Man. 39-41.
45For Barth, "The Bible tells us not how we should talk with God but what He
says to us; not how we find the way to him but how He has sought and found the
way to us." Ibid., 43. See also page 45.
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For Barth, the dialectic of ethics is that which disturbs humanity.46 As it faces the
ethical question, "What should 1 do?," humanity confronts the truth of God, that
truth being that in light of who God is, humanity cannot speak of God.47 Our
encounter with this disturbance creates the dialectical tension: as thought about
God disturbs humanity, so does the problem of ethics disturb our conversation
about God — the relationship is reciprocal. Just as ethics cannot be separated into
its own discipline, just as ethics is dogmatics, so the dialectical tension we know,
as we confront the reality of our separateness from God, impinges upon the ethical
realm. God disturbs both the dogmatist and the moralist. The dialectical tension
forces humanity to recognize God as the creator and initiator of the ethical
moment:
There is no such thing as the 'building up' by men of an
adequate ethical life, not even if the quality of their
moral behaviour were so sublime that it might be claimed
that the will of God had been united with the human will,
or that the human will had been absorbed into the divine,
or that the divine will had been fulfilled in the human
will. All human doing or not-doing is simply an occasion
or opportunity of pointing to that which alone is worthy
of being called 'action', namely, the action of God. In
the sphere of ethics, this rule is adamant.48
"The Problem of Ethics Today" also reiterated the theme of the dialectic as
that which maintains the primacy of God within ethics. Delivered at a pastor's
conference in Wiesbaden and Liineburg in September 1922, this lecture synthesized
46The Epistle to the Romans. 424.
47Ibid., 427.
48The Epistle to the Romans. 431-432.
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what Barth had been saying since 1916. The problem of ethics, stated Barth, is
disturbing and disquieting. Rooted in crisis,49 it implicates humanity, a crisis
which leads to responsibility, a crisis of response to God. Within this lecture Barth
vehemently criticized liberalism as incapable of making prophetic, Christian
discernments50 — the starting point for all theology and ethics had been lost, and
what Barth was attempting to communicate was that the crisis of humanity's
inability to find God theologically and ethically was the starting place for all
theology and ethics: humanity must seek the base of all theology and ethics first
and foremost with God and God's action.51
B. Ethics as dogmatics: dogmatics as the locus of ethics
A second theme, evident throughout the development of Barth's ethics, is
his placement of ethics within the locus of dogmatics. As mentioned previously,
Barth believed ethics to be dogmatics, a thought given much attention in the
Church Dogmatics. But where are the threads of this theme prior to the Church
Dogmatics? We find the first strands of this idea in "The Righteousness of God"
in which Barth argued against attitudes and practices of the nineteenth century
which had separated theology and ethics into two different disciplines.52
Barth's critique of those who divided ethics and dogmatics expressed itself
49Karl Barth, "The Problem of Ethics Today," in The Word of God and the
Word of Man. 139.
50Ibid., 146-147, 149.
51Ibid., 169.
52"The Righteousness of God," 16-18, 21-22.
32
in the form of a rebuke against the efforts of 'religion' to create a different ethic
from that tied to dogmatics. Although Barth did not directly argue for the
unification of dogmatics and ethics in this lecture, it adumbrates thoughts later
developed in the second edition of Romans. Within Romans II Barth continued to
enunciate this theme. In his exegesis of chapter 12, verse 1, Barth articulated the
relationship between dogmatics and ethics in this way: "the problem of 'ethics'
is.. .identical with the problem of 'dogmatics': Soli Deo gloria! "53 Humanity faces
this problem when it attempts to speak of God: in its realization that it cannot
speak about God, that even its attempts fall short of reaching to the heavens, in the
face of the dialectic, humanity is claimed by the truth of God's action. So also in
the field of ethics is humanity claimed by this very same truth. Therefore, the
attempt to separate what is intimately related results in the very same despair that,
according to Barth, we find in the dogmatic dilemma. However, humanity is not
left in the chasm of theological or ethical doubt, for the same God who reaches out
to us and initiates relationship with us in the realm of dogmatics does so in the
ethical.54
"The Problem of Ethics Today" further elucidated this idea set forth in the
second edition of Romans. Barth became far more direct in his critique of
nineteenth century theology and its attempt to sever dogmatics from ethics. He
53The Epistle to the Romans. 431.
54There are not, for Barth, two realms of God's dealings with humanity — the
one true God deals with humankind in what Barth classifies as dogmatics and
ethics.
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stated that in the past theologians and philosophers treated the ethieal problem as
purely academic. Barth argued that the belief in the nineteenth century was so
naive that it simplified the question of the good.55 Rather than attempting to
discover 'what to do,' the nineteenth century theologies focussed energy on which
theologian or philosopher had the most compelling argument or formula for ethics
to perpetuate an 'infinitely imperfect but infinitely perfect culture.' Barth posited
that in the face of the crisis in which twentieth century humanity found itself; it
could not but look to the interrelationship between dogmatics and ethics for an
answer. Because, according to Barth, the ways of humanity had been proven
impossible in relation to the ethic of Christianity (and this is a direct reference back
to Barth's disillusionment with World War I), humanity faced a need for an ethic
that could arise only from a relationship with dogmatics, a relationship founded on
God and God alone.
By the time Barth delivered his ethics lectures in Miinster and Bonn in 1928-
30, he had clearly articulated his position on dogmatics as ethics. Within the
lectures, Barth decried the division of the two disciplines; to separate them was to
surrender Christian theology:
Justice will be done to the special problem of Christian ethics
...when we do not regard the Christian element as just the
predicate but as the subject...when we do not let human conduct
as such be the centre, beginning and the end of theological ethics,
but allot this position instead to man's claiming by the Word of
God, to his sanctification, to God's action in and on his own
55"The Problem of Ethics Today," 147-148.
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action.56
Important for our discussion at this point is to note the emphasis Barth
placed not only on the primacy of God but also on the unique relationship between
dogmatics and ethics. Early in his thought, Barth desired to create an ethic which
united theory and praxis, for "if the knowledge of God is not in itself the service
of God — if eternal truth does not include goals, if illumined consciousness is not
in itselfwill and faith act ~ then what are they?"57 This thought will be important
for our assessment of Barth later in this work, for many denounce his ethics as
incapable of uniting theory and praxis.58 If this be the case, was Barth
shortsighted in his concern, or is his ethic purely theoretical and not practical?
Does the union of dogmatics and ethics help Christians face and resolve ethical
dilemmas, or does the union hinder such efforts?
C. The Command of God and its koinonia function.
As the union of dogmatics and ethics is significant for Barth's ethic, so also
are two further relevant concepts: the command of God and the function of the
Church. By 1916, Barth had begun to formulate the idea of the command of God
as the basis for ethics. In "The Righteousness of God" Barth indirectly called for
an ethic rooted both in God and the command of God. Remembering that much
56Karl Barth, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 49.
57Ibid.; 9.
58Barth has been criticized for having an 'Olympian' ethic that does not apply
to everyday life. One critic who levelled this complaint was Reinhold Niebuhr,
whose polemic we will address later in this work.
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of this lecture was a battle cry against the prevalence of liberalism and its emphasis
on morality and religion, we must focus on how Barth develops the idea of the
command. First, we see this idea in his insistence on allowing 'God to be God.'59
Barth argued that all of humanity's knowledge about theology and ethics originates
from God as God chooses to initiate relationship with its members. Therefore, the
origin of ethics must stem from what Barth called the command. Religiosity,
morality, or philosophy cannot create a platform upon which to proclaim any ethic:
God is the one who calls us to ethical action: God's command tells us what is
'good' and 'right.'60
Second, in pointing out the inadequacy of human reason, intellect and will
to reach God, Barth called for something different — humanity must stop and listen
to God:
There is a fundamentally different way to come into relation
with the righteousness of God. This other way we enter not
by speech nor reflection nor reason, but by being still, by
listening to and not silencing the conscience when we have
hardly begun to hear its voice.61
In listening, humanity finds the righteousness of God. In listening, humanity finds
that God is right. In listening, humanity hears the command of God.
In the 1927 lecture, "Das Halten Der Gebote," Barth was much more
59"The Righteousness of God," 24.
^Ibid., 23.
61 "The Righteousness of God," 23.
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deliberate about the command of God. Some scholars, such as Robert Willis,62
have argued that this lecture provides the first instance of Barth's reference to the
command.63 Although we suggest that Barth began to formulate this idea well
before this lecture, the lecture itself is instructive for our interest in the command.
"Das Halten der Gebote" was Barth's attempt to approach, in a new way, the
question of the relationship between faith and works. He formulated the
relationship between ethics and the Word of God in the form of a question: what
shall we do? Barth stated the issue in this way:
...what are we then to do?...no answer can be given except this:
follow the command, understanding both ideas in their plainest
and deepest meaning as they are to be understood in the Bible.64
The concept of the command of God plays a major role in Barth's ethics.
But how does it best function? According to Barth, within the locus and authority
of the Church. In the lecture "The Desirability and Possibility of a Universal
Reformed Creed," Barth reflected upon the role of the church and its relationship
to ethics. If we recall that during this period (1923-1925) Barth had been
expanding his theological horizons with particular reference to studies in the Creeds
and Confessions of the Church and to interaction with Roman Catholic theologians,
the importance of this lecture becomes obvious. What Barth had learned in new
areas of theology he appropriated in the ethical realm. The Church must have
62Robert Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).
63Ibid., 41.
MKarl Barth, "Das Halten der Gebote," Zwischen den Zeiten V 119271: 206.
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something to say regarding the concrete life of men and women; in the ethical
stand of the church, those on the outside see the church as the arena for ethical
discussion.65 As such and as a locus of authority, we see the koinonia function
of Barth's ethics. They are not an individualistic ethic in which one hears an
etherial command and does as one pleases. Rather, the command of God is heard
by Christians concretely within the locus of the church amidst the history of the
Creeds and Confessions and amongst the community of faith.
D. Ethics and the freedom of God
Although Barth viewed the Church as a locus of authority, the Church does
not stand alone. As with all aspects of Barth's theology, it stands under the
authority of God. Barth expressed this idea of God's authority in terms of God's
freedom. In many ways, this is the most difficult of Barth's ideas to discuss,
primarily because it is a large theme within the work of Barth. For our purposes,
we will touch only on two points which we believe important in Barth's ethical
development.
The first relates to Barth's position on the primacy of God in ethics. As we
have stated, much of Barth's energy in the late 1910's and 1920's directed itself
toward combatting the theology and the ethics of the nineteenth century. Because
of the prevailing emphasis on the ability of humanity to reach God through reason,
experience and even good will, Barth knew he had to restore what was, in his
mind, the freedom of God: the freedom of God to act — to choose humanity in
65See Karl Barth, "Church and Culture" and "Church and Theology" in
Theology and Church.
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grace and love and thereby to initiate the moment of relationship. Barth believed
the theology of the nineteenth century had obliterated this concept of God's
freedom. Therefore, he focussed on establishing the primacy of God in theology
and ethics. God is free in God's command to humanity; God is free in the
concreteness and the uniqueness of the command for each situation. God is free
in the fresh hearing of the Word by humanity as it encounters ethical decisions
within the locus and authority of the church. Hence, we see that much of Barth's
concern about maintaining the freedom of God relates directly to his fight against
his predecessors and his desire to place God first in all things, to knock down the
towers of Babel built by human hands and establish the base of all theology and
ethics in the righteousness of God.66
Second, we find Barth's concern with the freedom of God related to his
fight against natural theology. We will discuss this concern in greater detail later
in this work, but at this stage we note Barth's aversion to any kind of natural
theology, any form of analogia entis, or any kind of eristics. Barth abhorred
natural theology because of its tendency to allow humanity to arrogate to itself the
credit for entering into a relationship with God. Perhaps Barth is overly defensive
in his polemic against natural theology with its limitation on God's freedom.67
But given his theological and ethical enterprise, it is no surprise that no room exists
in his thought for a natural theology — especially in the realm of dogmatics and
""The Righteousness of God," 14.
67Barth saw natural theology a threatening because he believed it 'humanized'




The purpose of this chapter has been to examine what we believe to be
crucial points of development in Karl Barth's theology and ethics during the time
period of the 1920's. We believe this process necessary in order to clarify the
thesis of this study, which argues that the ethical thought as exposited in the
Church Dogmatics is not new thought but an elaboration of thought adumbrated
and even clarified in earlier works. We have argued that Barth's ethical
development parallels his theological development: as changes occurred in his
eTs
theology, so also did changes occur within his ethics. As Barth rejected the tenants
of liberal theology, so too, did he reject an ethic originating in the actions of
humanity. As Barth developed his thinking regarding the complete sovereignty of
God, his ethics became an ethic of the command of God. In discussing the
dialectic which entered into his theological thinking — the dialectic which posits the
separation existing between God and humanity, we see the role of the dialectic
within ethics. Humanity cannot create or live an ethic construed by reason or good
will; humanity must submit itself to the sovereignty of God and to the command
of God as it is heard by Christians within the locus and authority of the Church.
Finally, with the adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology of the
Gottingen Dogmatics, in which revelation is given historical content, (the
imminence and transcendence of God is upheld),- God enters into history without
losing the divine incognito. Therefore, in the realm of ethics we have a God who,
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while remaining separate and holy, enters into the world and interacts with
creation.
By 1924, Barth's thought had matured in significant ways, so much so, that
he had set forth the entire base of his theology and ethics by the mid-1920's, with
periodic refinements. If, as we believe, by 1924 Barth's theology and ethics were
set, then the implications are important: no longer is the thought of the Church
Dogmatics completely new thought. It is, rather, that which mirrors the work of
the 1920's. Moreover, Barth's ethics during the church struggle of the 1930's did
not arise 'ad hoc' but were a result of the base he had set early in his work. We
believe that as his theological base was set, so too, was his ethical: both being
established by 1924. In discussing these ideas, we must understand the significant
points of entry for unlocking Barth's ethical system. The first emanates from the




From Experience to the Incarnation: The Development of Barth's
Doctrine of Revelation
In order to fully understand Barth's ethic, we must address his doctrine of
revelation; it is intimately tied to his entire theology, and therefore his ethics. In
tracing Barth's doctrine of revelation, we will show how it was established by 1924
with the adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula of the
Gottingen Dogmatics. In the doctrine of revelation, as presented in the Gottingen
Dogmatics, we find a refinement in Barth's thought regarding the question of the
A
role of history and faith: for the first time, Barth was able to recocile A god who
would fully enter into and participate in the affairs of humanity, yet remain holy
and distinct from humanity. In this doctrine of revelation, we find that God was
able to be a part of the human arena, including the realm of ethics, in such a way
as to completely understand and experience human life, but remain sovereign over
it. As Barth established his doctrine of revelation by the mid-Twenties, so too, we
will argue, was the basic structure of his ethical thought developed.
Our purpose in this chapter is to discover Karl Barth's interpretation of
revelation and analyze its development in the period of the Twenties with particular
reference to the impact on Barth's ethics. In order to analyze Barth's
understanding of revelation, we have separated his development into four phases:
(1) revelation as experience; (2) revelation as revolutionary eschatology; (3)
revelation as resurrection within the locus of the cross; and (4) revelation as
incarnational eschatology within the locus and authority of the Church. Our first
task is to examine Barth's initial phase: revelation as experience.
I. Revelation as experience: 1909-1915
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Barth's first approach to revelation stressed the role of experience as the
medium by which God could be known. In this regard he was most influenced by
nineteenth century theologians like Friedrich Schleiermacher.1 After Kant's
reshaping of Enlightenment thought,2 Schleiermacher heralded many new ideas as
he attempted to find a mid-point between protestant dogmatism and philosophic
rationalism. Drawing upon certain Kantian suggestions, Schleiermacher based his
view not on speculative reason but on the sentiments of the heart or intuition
(Gefuhl).3 His experiential approach declared that faith rested upon the basis of
a highest knowledge of human feeling or immediate self-awareness in correlation
to God:
...the feeling of absolute dependence becomes a clear self-
consciousness... in this sense it can indeed be said that God
is given to us in feeling in an original way; and if we speak
of an original revelation of God to man or in man, the
meaning will always be this, that, along with the absolute
dependence which characterizes not only man but all temporal
existence, there is given to man also the immediate self-
'FriedertSa Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a prominent theologian of the
nineteenth century was best known for his approach to revelation as a feeling of
absolute dependence. His most famous works include The Christian Faith (1821-
1822), eds. H.R. Mackintosh and James Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1928);
On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisersd 799T trans. John Omen (New
York: Harper and Row, 1958). For Barth's interpretation of Schleiermacher, see
The Theology of Schleiermacher (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 1982); Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (Valley Forge: Judson
Press, 1973). Of the influence of Schleiermacher, Barth wrote, "The first place in
a history of theology in the most recent times belongs and always will belong to
Schleiermacher, and he has no rival... .The nineteenth century brought with it many
deviations from Schleiermacher, and many protests against him, and he was often
overlooked and forgotten. But in the theological field it was nevertheless his
century." From Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. 425.
2See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. F. Max Miiller (New
York: Macmillan and Co., 1915.
3On Religion. 90.
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consciousness of it, which becomes a consciousness of God.4
For Schleiermacher, self-consciousness was a sense of dependence on God, and
humanity's feelings were the immediate product of the universe. This
consciousness of being wholly and utterly dependent was, therefore, tantamount to
being in relation to God.5
In addressing the question of revelation, Schleiermacher turned to his
philosophy of religion, centering on the feeling of absolute dependence. According
to Schleiermacher, revelation was any original or new communication of the
Universe to humanity.6 The content of revelation was, therefore, nothing but
immediate self-awareness in which each individual knew what was original and
new and what was repeated and learned elsewhere. Dogma and doctrine had no
prominent place in Schleiermacher's view, and revelation interested him only in
its function as a 'transformer' of humanity's religious consciousness. Therefore,
Schleiermacher approached revelation and all of theology from an anthropocentric
point of view, from religious consciousness, from humanity's action in regard to
God. Faith was not God's revelation but humanity's experience, the former being
a correlate to the latter.
We would misunderstand Schleiermacher if, at this stage, we simply stated
that theologically he approached revelation purely from the position of an analogia
entis. This is untrue. Throughout two of his major works, Dialectic and The
Christian Faith. God was presented to humanity, but humanity possessed no strictly
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and J.S.
Stewart, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1928), 17-18.
'Mackintosh, 42.
6Schleiermacher, On Religion, in Mackintosh, 44.
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objective cognition of God; God was never apprehended purely, but always with
the correlate of a finite human element, that being, the feeling of absolute
dependence. The feeling of the Universe (or the Divine) was the cause for the
change and piety of the human soul.
With this approach Schleiermacher combatted the school of rationalism
which equated human knowledge with knowledge of God. By presupposing that
feeling was "a mode of objective apprehension, a species of emotional perception
or awareness of spiritual things,"7 Schleiermacher postulated a God whose divine
presence could be known in human feeling. This notion about God was one of
the legacies inherited by Barth. The other was found in the thought of his greatest
teacher, Wilhelm Herrmann.8
Herrmann held that the truth of moral ideas was evident to humanity.9 He
believed that humanity's moral task was to gain an actual unitary will or disposition
— to achieve a personal life in which one realized the good will by living wholly
for others.10 But in seeking these moral ideas, humanity, Herrmann argued, finds
itself confronted with its weakness: unable to realize the good by living wholly for
others, it needs an encounter with Christ.11 Because a morality, which raises
'Mackintosh, 48.
8For an understanding of Herrmann's influence on Barth, see Revelation and
Theology: An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack Correspondance of 1923. ed. H.
Martin Rumscheidt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 4-5.
Hereafter cited as Revelation and Theology.
9Wilhelm Herrmann, Ethik. 5th ed. (Tubingen: JCB Mohr, repr. 1921), 90,
93, 95.
10Herrmann, Systematic Theology. 27.
"Herrmann, Per Verkehr des Christen mit Gott im Anschluss an Luther
dargestellt. 94. Hereafter cited as Per Verkehr.
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humanity above what it was, can originate only when humanity is filled with awe
and trust for others, a person is needed in whom humanity's trust will not be
disappointed. This one is the historical Jesus as presented in the Gospels.12
The Christian faith, presented to humanity through Jesus and his inner life,
was best exemplified by an inward subjection to God:13 in faith, argued
Herrmann, humanity gained the conviction that God's power (above and beyond
this world) led its life through this world to an incorruptible consummation. While
God was the fulfiller of human longing as expressed in conscience, so too, was
God opposed to humanity and idolatrous religion such as that found, according to
Herrmann, in eighteenth century European bourgeois values.
Like Schleiermacher, Herrmann sought to obliterate what Barth believed to
be culture religion of reason found in the eighteenth century and to create a
religion based solely on the self-revelation of God. Herrmann viewed this self-
revelation as "...any sort of communication... if we have found God in it. But we
find and have God only when he so incontestably touches and seizes us that we
wholly yield ourselves to him...God reveals himself in that he forces us to trust
him wholly."14 While God's self-revelation is a matter belonging to God, it does
have a subjective human element which correlates to the authenticity of the
believer. God's revelation is only for those who want to be authentic, and thus,
Herrmann wanted to underscore that "the moral self- determination to which the
superiority of a stronger personal life brings us is also the beginning of a faith of
12Herrmann, Systematic Theology. 47ff.
13Herrmann, Per Verkehr. 65.
14Wilhelm Herrmann, Per Begriff der Offenbarung. in H. R. Niebuhr's The
Meaning of Revelation (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), 152.
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a genuinely religious nature."15 Lest humanity believe itself able to rationalize its
way to God through superior reason (as in the Enlightenment), Herrmann
emphasized that only Jesus as the revelation of God made true religion possible.
This true religion was based on two aspects of the revelation of Christ.
First, revelation was grounded in the positive datum of Jesus of Nazareth16 — the
inner life of Jesus as portrayed in the gospel story which communicated God's
omnipotence and goodness. Second, revelation was based on the practical reason
by which humanity recognized this datum as the ultimate moral demand which
made God language appropriate. Herrmann did not place the greatest weight on
discussing revelation on the latter point, for by 1910, he would divorce revelation
and history.17 Severing the connection between faith (personal) and the results of
research into the question of historical trustworthiness, Herrmann relegated faith
to the position of being beyond (Jenseits) history. When humanity found faith as
expressed in the 'inner life' of Jesus, and found in itself the image of this "inner
life," there it found itself in communion with God.18
In his doctrine of revelation, Herrmann assaulted the Enlightenment. Like
Schleiermacher, Herrmann gave credence to the role of the inward state of
humanity, which seemed to result in a type of divine revelation in each individual's
15Wilhelm Herrmann, Per Verkehr. iv.
16Herrmann, Systematic Theology. 52.
"For Herrmann's view of history see Hans Frei, "The Doctrine of Revelation
in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909-1922: The Nature of Barth's Break with
Liberalism," Yale University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1956, 348.
18Herrmann criticized Schleiermacher because he believed Schleiermacher
"never investigated.. .whether the consciousness of absolute dependence in the inner
life of men did not arise from certain facts experienced by them." From
"Christlich-Pl&Jestantische Dogmatik," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart. 2nd ed.. ed.
Paul Hinneberg (Berlin and Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1910), 143-144.
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life. However, this revelation could be imparted only by the experience of a
liberating and guiding goodness found in the inner life of Jesus. Unfortunately,
Herrmann became confusing in this very principle of the "inner life." We never
really find out what he meant by the "secret inner life of Jesus" and how this secret
is imparted to humanity. However, most important for Barth would be not only
the emphasis on inwardness but the divorcing of revelation from the historical, as
well as a Christocentric perspective,19 themes derived directly from Herrmann.
These constituted major factors influencing the first phase in the development of
Barth's doctrine of revelation.
As we examine this first phase, four main points stand out as the foundation
of his position. First, Barth espoused a belief in a revelation based not on reason
but on experience. In the 1915 essay, "Der Glaube an den personlichen Gott,"
Barth witnessed to the necessity of grounding knowledge (or faith in God's
personality) through the medium of religious experience. According to Barth,
reason or dogmatics "should explicate religious experience.... Religious experience
is the last court of appeal."20
Second, Barth appealed to religious individualism (inwardness) and
historical relativism. As early as 1909, in his first sermon in Geneva, Barth
preached that he saw himself as a 'guide to the sphere of the inner life,' reminding
his congregation that he could do no more. In the same year Barth again posited
19Berkhof, 145.
20Peter H. Monsma, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation (Somerville, New Jersey:
Somerset Press, Inc., 1937), 44.
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that religion was experience "understood in rigorously individual terms. "21 We
can hear the words of Herrmann resonating through Barth in statements such as
"the ground of faith is the personal inner life of Jesus. By that I mean his human
character which is described to us as utter obedience towards God, as complete
love of his brethren, and therefore as complete self-denial, which does not halt
even in the face of death."22
Third, Barth embraced the view that faith not founded on history and
historical study. Thus he articulated an historical relativism, espousing that faith
and revelation could be possible only with the presupposition of an absolute
relation to an absolute history.23 For Barth, there was no inherent connection or
marriage of history and revelation.24 But history could, through what Barth
termed 'Das Leben aus Gott,' reflect a religious idea of God within humanity.
This 'Das Leben aus Gott' was, according to Barth, aroused through the gospel of
Jesus. Therefore, although God was not known by any argument from human
analogy or by a projection of human self-consciousness into another realm, God
was known on the basis of religious experience worked through the mediation of
history — this mediation being found in 'Das Leben aus Gott,' or the gospel of
Jesus. Even at this early stage in his formulation of ideas about revelation, Barth
21Karl Barth, "Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit," Zeitschrift fur
Theologie und Kirche 19 (1909): 320-321.
22Karl Barth, April 1911, in Busch, 56.
23Barth rejects the "opposition of faith and history in favor of their
coincidence." From Karl Barth, "Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte,"
Schweizerische theologische Zeitschrift 29 (1912): 4. Eberhard Jiingel points out
that for Barth, faith was Christian "insofar as the personality of Jesus has
historically mediated presence within human society." See Jiingel, 29.
24"Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte," 77ff.
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separated human means to God from God's means. In no way had he rejected the
liberal teaching vis-a-vis experience and inwardness, but a glimpse of a movement
directed towards a revelation based fully on the action and initiation of God had
appeared. This movement, however, would come later and would not be
completely developed until 1922 when Barth broke entirely from both liberalism
and socialism as far as the religious socialism of Ragaz and Kutter.
Lastly, in the initial stage of working out his doctrine of revelation, Barth
did place emphasis on Christology, albeit in nascent form. Preaching again in
Geneva in September 1909, Barth stated that the beginning as well as the goal of
humanity was Christ. From Herrmann, Barth had inherited a view of Christ as an
image of revelation and as the Redeemer of humanity. Although this Christological
emphasis was far different from that expressed in his later theology, clearly Barth
had begun to think in Christological terms and sought to reconcile these thoughts
with his views on revelation.
In developing his doctrinal position on revelation, Barth stood, for the most
part, in the Marburg tradition. During this first phase, Barth held firm to several
important points: the role of experience in revelation; the inwardness of faith;
revelation as separate from history yet faith as abstractly mediated by history
through the secret inner life of Jesus (not the historical Jesus); and the special place
of Christology inherited from Herrmann and Schleiermacher.
The impact of Schleiermacher and Herrmann, especially Herrmann, cannot
be underestimated. So significant was Herrmann for Barth that the latter once
stated,
...on the day I began my ministry, five minutes before I was
to go up into the pulpit, the post brought the new, fourth
edition of Herrmann's Ethik, which the author had sent me. I
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accepted this coincidence as a dedication of my whole future.25
While Herrmann's Ethik may have seemed portentous, the impact and influence of
Herrmann would wane, as would that ofmost of the theologians of the time, when,
with the outbreak of World War I, Herrmann and his colleagues affirmed the
actions of Kaiser Wilhelm II — an event which would catapult Barth into the
second phase in the development of his doctrine of revelation.
II. Revelation as eschatology: 1915-1922
With the outbreak of World War I and the disillusionment that came from
seeing his theological mentors support the actions of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Barth was
forced to rethink his theology. He was now acutely and painfully aware that the
theology, which he had once viewed as a displacement of Enlightenment error was
only an extension of it in terms of its support of a 'bourgeois culture religion' of
the state. With an 'enlightenment' of his own, Barth disavowed his teachers. In
a letter to Eduard Thurneysln Barth stated, "The spiritual situation of our German
friends is now more comprehensible to me even if it is not more congenial...It is
truly sad! Marburg and German civilization have lost something in my eyes by
this breakdown and indeed forever! "26
As Barth sought to find a new theological base, he was impressed by the
thought of Christoph Blumhardt.27 In this theologians writings Barth found a hope
25Busch, 52.
^Letter dated September 4, 1914, in Briefwechsel Karl Barth-Eduard
Thurnevsen: 2 vols. (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1973-74), 1:9-10.
27Of his relationship with the Blumhardt's Barth said, "in the midst of this
hopeless confusion, it was the message of the two Blumhardt's with its orientation
on Christian hope which above all else began to make sense to me. I owe my
acquaintence with it to my friend Eduard Thurneysen." From "Fakultatsalbum der
Evangelisch-theologischen Fakultat Munster, 1927," in Karl Barth-Rudolph
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centered in eschatological thinking. It presented a new way for Barth to approach
the Kingdom of God. Blumhardt's theology, as Barth analyzed it, could relate to
and be involved in the world yet still be faithful to God (unlike the thought of the
Enlightenment which reduced God to a predicate of human reason) because
Blumhardt's starting point was God.28
The eschatology of Blumhardt affirmed Christ's victory on the cross — the
Easter miracle gave humanity reconciliation with God and a hope for the initiation
of the kingdom. Armed with the idea of 'revolutionary expectancy' gleaned from
his socialist leanings, Barth seized upon Blumhardt's idea of the victorious God as
the means by which humanity might see the potential of a coming kingdom.29
Indeed, what characterizes Barth's thought during this second phase is precisely
this idea of revolutionary eschatology, whereby God breaks into the world and
encounters it in a new way.30 God's Kingdom becomes a possibility realized in
the present, although it will only find its fulfillment in the eschaton.
Whereas in Phase I Barth viewed revelation as experience, in Phase II,
revelation was rooted in an eschatology of 'revolutionary' proportions. We must
Bultmann Letters. 1922-1966. ed. Bernd Jaspert (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982),
154. Hereafter cited as "Fakultatsalbum."
28Revelation and Theology. 12.
29Ibid., 13.
30Thomas F. Torrance underlines the significance of Blumhardt on Barth's
eschatology that Torrance characterizes as "...a fresh understanding of the
Kingdom of God as the breaking into the world of God's unutterable compassion
in a victorious grace which was both the judgement of the world and the great
supernatural saving event of the Gospel. God has poured himself out in love upon
the world in Jesus Christ in order to take all its agony and hurt upon himself, and
his purpose of love will conquer, come what may." Thomas F. Torrance, Karl
Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology. 1910-1931 (London: SCM Press,
1962), 36.
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not assume, however, that this formulation was simply a modification of
Blumhardt's ideas. Barth still infused his theology with a large dose of socialist
ideology. Certainly he did question what he viewed as the religious socialist's
attempt to create a system which seemed to confine God. Nevertheless, Barth still
had room for socialism, particularly as a human reflection of the Kingdom of God.
Furthermore, Barth's insistence on a revolutionary eschatology reflected the strong
polemic against 'religion' he had formulated during this period. In the lecture,
"Religion and Socialism," Barth decried the idea that God's kingdom could be
equated with religion. Rather, that kingdom was interpreted as "the living majesty
of God. "31 Although Barth still held on to vestiges of socialism32 (especially in
terms of a God manifested in a new and radical way which transformed the world),
Barth was beginning to make clear that his true concern was to regain and retain
the sovereignty of God, which he expressed in his doctrine of revelation as
revolutionary eschatology.
For Barth, revelation took on an eschatological emphasis, not in the sense
of end times, but in the relationship of time to eternity — the distance between
humanity and God. Phase II adumbrates thoughts on this relationship, which Barth
3IJungel, 31.
32Within Barth studies, debate has arisen over the relationship between Barth's
theology and socialism. Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, in Theologie und
Sozialismus: Das Beispail Karl Barths (Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1985),
argues that Barth's theory was a by-product of his political activity while a pastor
in Safenwil. This position has elicited much response: see Markus Barth,
"Current Discussion on the Political Character of Karl Barth's Theology," in
Footnotes to a Theology: The Karl Barth Colloquium of 1972. ed. H. Martin
Rumscheidt (Sciences and Religious Supplements, 1974); George Hunsiger, ed.
Karl Barth and Radical Politics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976);
Eberhard Jungel, Barth-Studien (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn,
1982); Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology.
1910-1931 (London: SCM Press, 1962).
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developed more fully and explicitly in Phase III in his second edition of the
commentary on Romans. However nascent or inchoate, the relationship between
God and humanity as expressed in revolutionary eschatology33 was present in this
phase of Barth's development and therefore warrants our attention.
In adopting a position regarding revelation, Barth made an important move
from the position he had held as a student and young pastor: whereas he had once
viewed revelation as experience, (inward experience), he began to view revelation
as a 'God-event,' certainly not an anthropological exercise. The first commentary
on Romans banished the notion of revelation as experience and inwardness. For
Barth the reality of revelation was one in which "God expropriates our unholy
individuality."34 At this juncture, two points stand out for our discussion: first,
Barth moved away from an optimistic view of humanity. While he did not fully
express his anthropocentric reservation until Romans II, there was still a hint of his
33When speaking of revelutionary eschatology, we are referring to Barth's
positon regarding God's relationship with humanity: in a fresh and exciting way,
God enters the world, "showing that the 'return of all things to their source' (Der
Romerbrief, first edition, 332) is the wneld of the dissolver of all bonds who
intrudes into the dying world. (See Jiingel, 33)
The idea of revolution means a fundamental transformation, difference from
what has come before. This transformation, "is so radical that it cannot be forged
by the old powers; only new powers can produce it." Helmut Gollwitzer,
"Kingdom of God and Socialism in the Theology of Karl Barth," in Karl Barth and
Radical Politics. 92. For a provocative discussion on revolution see Paul
Lehmann, "Karl Barth, Theologian of Permanent Revolution," Union Seminary
Quarterly Review 28 (Fall, 1972); The Transfiguration of Politics (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975).
The definition of revolution underlines why the term revolutionary
eschatology is so important for understanding Barth's doctrine of revelation: for
Barth, as he began to reshape his theology, there had to be something radically
new: this something was God and God's relationship with humanity.
34Karl Barth, Der Romerbrief (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1963 reprint of
the first edition), 423.
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distrust of theology grounded in human goodness and effort.35 Second, Barth
moved away from the idea of inwardness. If we recall that in Phase I Barth
equated revelation as inwardness and individuality, two ideas gleaned from
Herrmann, we see the importance of a statement as that cited earlier, in which
Barth negated individualism as a theological/revelational starting point.
Barth was distancing himself, even in this transitional time, from his liberal roots
and from a view of God based on human experience and intuition. The
significance of this development is clear, for with it, Barth began to restructure not
only his view of humanity but his entire theological enterprise.
As Barth began to express his newly found insights on God and the
Scripture (arising out of his relationship with Eduard Thurneyson and his
interaction with the Blumhardts)36 he formulated his vision of the dialectical
tension existing between the world and God. No longer are God and humanity in
pure harmony; no longer is humanity able to reach God by its high powers of
reason. Rather, God is the one who permeates our world, despite the separateness
which exists between the world and God. Revolutionary eschatology bridges the
gap between a world distant from God, not quietly or subtly, but in the form of
a revolution. A new world enters into our world — the world of God: "Do we
desire the presence of God? Do we dare go whither evidently we are being led?
That were faith! A new world projects itself into our old ordinary world. "37
Revelation is revolution for Barth, but in Phase II, the revolution is God's,
"Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 56.
"Revelation and Theology. 12-13.
37Karl Barth, "The Strange New World Within the Bible," in The Word of
God and the Word of Man. 37.
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not humanity's. Expressed as a metaphor, God's revolution is a "cosmic intrusion
into the cosmic order,"38 a revolution that entails everything — "trust in God, |the|
solving of the riddle of life,...the certainty of salvation."39 While Barth believed
the revolution belonged to God, strains of previous thought remained. For
example, socialism, as a human reflection of the kingdom of God, was still in the
forefront of Barth's thought,40 and he believed that some kind of human element
was involved in creating the kingdom on earth. He seemed to be linking a vision
of the possibility of an eschatological kingdom with a present reality. This effort
would be dropped completely in 1919 in the Tambach lecture and even more so in
Romans II. The difference is that here in Phase II, Barth took the positive hope
discovered in Blumhardt and concentrated on the 'already' in the 'not yet.' In later
stages, particularly in Romans II (phase III), Barth appeared "to bring the 'already'
to silence in his concentration on the 'not yet.'"41 Hence, we find that in Phase
II, Barth moved completely away from the focus of his first phase of revolution as
experience but still maintained vestiges of his socialist thought regarding the
kingdom of God.42
Most significant for our purposes was Barth's new launching point for
theology: God was now seen as the initiator, bursting into the world, breaking the
eschatological barrier. Yet while God entered into the world in a revolutionary
38Barth, Per Romerbrief. 135.
39Ibid., 241, 246, 250.
40Jiingel, 31.
41Michael Beintker Die Dialektik in der dialektischen Theologie Karl Barths
(Miinchen: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1987), 39-40.
42See Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus and "Sozialismus bei Karl Barth,"
Junge Kirche 33 (1972): 2-15.
56
way (and here one could say we see this inbreaking through the human vehicle of
socialism), God did not enter fully into history. In other words, God did not
become equated with the world into which he entered. Therefore, at this point in
time, Barth had a doctrine of revelation which allowed for a God who radically
encountered the world yet remained distinct from it. This 'imminent and
transcendent' God was, for Barth, the God of unhistorical revelation.
According to Barth, the revelation of God is not an historical event.
Although at this point in his development humanity seems to have a more
prominent role to play in the revelation of God (ie. via socialism), revelation is
still not to be confused with history. Yes, God entered into history, but God is not
to be equated with this history:43 "When God enters, history for awhile ceases to
be, and there is nothing more to ask; for something wholly different and new
begins - a history with its own distinct grounds, possibilities and hypotheses."44
Again, in "The Christian's Place in Society," Barth underlined this distinction:
I mean a movement from above, a movement from a third dimension,
so to speak, which transcends and yet penetrates all these
movements and gives them their inner meaning and motive; a
movement which has neither its origin nor its aim in space, time,
or in the contingency of things, and yet is not a movement apart
from others: I mean the movement of God in history.45
At this point in time (1919), Barth had moved away from the socialist thought more
prevalent in the earlier stages of this phase. Now Barth separated the possibility
of a humanly fabricated kingdom from the kingdom of God and made clear the
43For a discussion of Barth's view of history, see Charles West, Communism
and the Theologians (London: SCM Press, 1958).
"""The Strange New World Within the Bible," 37.
45Karl Barth, "The Christian's Place in Society," 283.
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distinction between a God who enters into history and a God who becomes equated
with history.46 Simply stated, Barth could not accept a God equated with history.
To accept such a position would be to reaffirm the rationalism of the
Enlightenment and the optimism of the liberals. At this point in time, Barth's
thought adumbrated the thought of the second edition of Romans, a development
emanating from his encounter with Franz Overbeck.47
The period in which Barth met with Overbeck and began rethinking his
commentary on Romans could, in some ways, constitute a separate phase in itself.
However, we have chosen to include this period in the second phase of Barth's
development of his doctrine of revelation because we view it as a transitional
phase. Barth's thought was, in many ways, still entrenched in the God of
revolutionary eschatology and hope. Now, however, because of the encounter with
Overbeck, Barth's thought on revelation (with reference to the historical) would
take on a new shape. How did Overbeck influence Barth? What was so important
about Overbeck's thought that it stirred Barth to reassess his thought?: The answer
is this: Overbeck's view of history.
Overbeck approached Christianity with a suspicion which was, for him,
validated by Christianity's decline into historicism. According to Overbeck,
history was "an abyss into which Christianity has been thrown wholly against its
will."48 He therefore created a new category by which to join Christianity and
history : Urgeschichte, or primal history. For Overbeck, Urgeschichte was that
^Ibid., 298, 320, 323.
47"Fakultatsalbum," 155.
48Franz Overbeck, Christentum und Kultur. ed. Carl Albrecht Bernoulli,
(Basel: Benno Schwabe and Co., 1919), 7.
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which lay beyond normal human history, that which transcended the events and
happenings in the world and pointed to the "supratemporal, unknowable,
inconceivable.1,49 Enamored by this idea, Barth adopted and refined it within his
own thought.
What appealed to Barth was the concept of God being in history without
being equated with history. The seeds of this notion planted by Overbeck began
to grow and marked a move from Phase I of Barth's thinking about revelation. In
Phase I Barth, following his teachers, had mistrusted history as a means of
revelation50 (although Herrmann had confused the issue by holding to what he had
termed the historical reality of the secret inner life of Jesus); however, within this
second phase of development, Barth refined this mistrust even further by separating
the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith and by adopting Overbeck's concept
of Urgeschichte. By 1920, the power and impact of Overbeck's influence was
obvious in Barth's lecture, "Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vista." Here Barth
described his interpretation of Biblical history:
Biblical religious history has the distinction of being in
its essence, in its utmost character, neither religious nor
historical...not religion, but reality, not history, but truth,
one might say...Biblical history in the Old and New Testaments
is not really history at all, but seen from above is a series
of free divine acts and seen from below a series of fruitless
attempts to undertake something in itself impossible.51
At this point two points need to be underscored: first, by 1920, Barth left behind
49Karl Barth, "Unsettled Questions for Theology Today," in Theology and
Church. 58.
50As early as 1912 Barth had stated, "God is not found in history." From:
"Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte," Schweizerische theologische
Zeitschrift 29 (1912): 3.
51"Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas," 66, 72.
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any vestiges of reference to religious socialism as a human reflection of the
kingdom of God. Now the kingdom of God was radically distinct both from any
human enterprise and from human history, although a part of it. Second, Barth
began to insist on the freedom of God. Recalling that as early as 1916 Barth had
coined the phrase "let God be God,"52 we see in this lecture a leaning towards a
God-centered theological approach. Barth had been wanting to clarify this idea
ever since 1915 when he broke with liberalism. In Romans II he would continue
this clarification process. However, within this second phase, Barth also wanted
to communicate that when speaking of revelation (and its relationship to history)
God's freedom was at stake: the freedom to be God and God alone, the freedom
to be involved with humanity yet distinct from humanity, the freedom to be in
history but not equated with history. Barth's adaptation of Overbeck's
Urgeschichte was crucial in terms of the former's complete insistence on the
sovereignty and freedom of God within revelation. For Barth, when speaking of
the relationship between history and revelation,53 Urgeschichte was the only
possibility.
With the adoption of Urgeschichte, Barth gravitated from emphasizing the
"now" of the Kingdom to focusing on the "not yet" of the Kingdom. The hope he
52"The Righteousness ofGod," 24. Barth also said this in a sermon on Genesis
5.16, in 1916. See "Das Eine Notwendige," Die XX Christliche Studenten-
Konferenz (Aarau, March 13-15, 1916), lOff.
53Barth clarifies that for him, only primal history is the answer when talking
of history in its relation to God: "The only possible abode of Christianity lies, so
far as the past is concerned, not in history, but in the history before history, the
Urgeschichte. And only non-historical concepts, standards and possibilities of
observation could put us in the position to understand, to talk about — in fact, to
represent in any way — this Christianity which is not Christianity in the historical
sense." From: "Unsettled Questions for Theology Today," 62.
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had found in the Blumhardts he did not in any way abandon. Indeed, Barth would
always place the 'Yes' of God first — the grace and hope of God, in a position of
primacy over the 'No' and judgment of God. Yet disillusioned by his theological
teachers and socialism, recommitted to the Scriptures in a new and exciting way,
intrigued and influenced by Overbeck, Barth now shifted his gaze from the 'now'
to the 'not yet' as a means to combat any form of rationalism or religion, as
human attempts to reach God. He would now, during this transition period of
Phase II, concentrate on the gap apparent between God and humanity, a rift which
could not be bridged by any human historical act.
Barth's thought regarding history and revelation in this phase of his
development is significant for two main reasons. First, his break with the
theological tradition of Marburg, and especially Wilhelm Herrmann, would be
complete. Both were now "very far away....Without explicitly referring to it
|Marburg] he is constantly combatting it. Over against its bloodless idealism Barth
posited his realism; over against its individualism, he offered his organic way of
thinking...he had now decisively turned his back on Herrmann."54 Second, the
adoption of Urgeschichte and his new way of approaching theology had forced
Barth to rethink the first commentary on Romans. In a letter to Eduard
Thurneyson dated October 27, 1920, Barth wrote: "...suddenly the letter to the
Romans began to shed its skin; that is, I received the enlightenment that, as it now
stands, it is simply impossible that it should be reprinted; rather it must be
reformed root to branch."55
54Berkhof, 188.
55Barth, Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 53.
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As a result of this new view of history, and his break with the socialist
tradition, Barth had to find a new way of viewing the kingdom of God, namely
from the perspective of the 'not yet,' a shift in emphasis which would mark the
beginning of a new phase for Barth in his doctrine of revelation.
III. Revelation as Resurrection within the locus of the Cross: 1922-1924.
With the realization that the first edition of Romans needed to be reformed
and rewritten, Barth began a task which would further clarify and define his
doctrine of revelation as centered in the Resurrection within the locus of the Cross.
Crediting Franz Overbeck as one of the chief influences in his reworking of the
commentary, Barth stated in a letter to Eduard Thurneyson: "For the rest we shall
be happy that we have already come so far -chiefly through Overbeck whom we
cannot thank enough."56 In Overbeck, Barth had found a means to communicate
the dominant thought in his newly found theology: as human history obscured true
religion,57 via Christianity's fall into culture protestantism, the only kind of
history which could validate and positively represent Christianity, revelation, and
its relationship to God was Urgeschichte; a history that while present in the world
was above and outside the world, placing God in a position of sovereignty and
maintaining God's holiness and transcendence.58
As Barth reapproached the Romans commentary, he did not obliterate what
he had stated in the first edition. Rather, he sought to modify and refine:
Whatever its merits and failings, the first edition can now
56Karl Barth to Eduard Thurneyson, December 6, 1920, in Revolutionary
Theology in the Making. 55.
57The Epistle to the Romans. 100.
58Ibid., 118, 268.
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disappear from the scene. The work has been continued...New
advance positions have been occupied, and, as a result, the
original position has been completely reformed and consolidated.
Consequently the position as a whole has an entirely different
aspect. And yet identity of historical subject matter as well
as of the theme of which both editions treat, guarantees a
definite continuity between the old and new.59
This continuity is important to note. We cannot dismiss Barth's past
thought as merely adiaphorous. It must be likened to a continuous line moving in
one direction. However, we must also recognize the importance of the
metamorphosis taking place. With the rewriting of the commentary and its new
emphases and aspects, Barth completely broke all ties with the liberal and socialist
traditions. He was now stepping out on a branch alone (although really not alone,
as he would find in his later study of the Creeds and Confessions of the Church).
In 1922, he was sending out a battle cry against all 'religion,' against all attempts
to 'humanize' God, against any theology that did not have God as its beginning,
middle and end.
During this third phase in the development of his doctrine of revelation,
Barth focussed more intently on what he termed the 'no' of God, than on the 'yes'
upon which he had focussed in his second phase of development. One of the ways
in which Barth made this shift apparent was in his speech regarding humanity's
relationship to God. The positive image of hope so clearly rooted in his early
encounters with the Blumhardt's was now overshadowed. Instead, Barth
emphasized the reality of the world's humanity, its inability to escape its finitude,
its limitation, its separation from God:
'God stands in contrast to humanity as the IMPOSSIBLE in contrast
to the possible, as DEATH in contrast to life, as ETERNITY in
59"The Preface to the Second Edition," 2. [Underline mine.]
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contrast to time. There is no way which leads to this event; there
is NO faculty in humanity for apprehending it; for the way and the
faculty are themselves new, being the revelation and faith, the
knowing and being known enjoyed by the new humanity.'60
While Barth emphasized the negative, or the impossibility, he did not negate the
possibility of a revelation of God to humanity. But this revelation is not created
or discovered by human reason or will. This revelation is God's revelation, the
revelation of faith, apprehended by humanity in the event of the Resurrection with
reference to the cross of Jesus Christ.61 Even before Romans II we see the new
emphasis of Barth: the inability of humanity to come to God on its own terms, the
impossibility of revelation made possible by an act of God, and the unique
relationship between time and eternity so helpfully supported by Barth's adoption
of Urgeschichte as a historical category.
While we may, at first encounter, think that Barth now abandoned the hope
found in phase II and completely changed his thought to focus primarily and
exclusively on the negative, we must not jump to such a conclusion as have many
other critics of Barth. Barth did not — and this is key — ever forget the positive
as expressed in the grace of God. (We will perceive this point more clearly in our
next chapter as we examine his theological ordering of Gospel over Law). For
Barth, even in the darkness there is always light — even in the negative, the
positive shines forth, for without God's first initiating revelation, an act which we
believe to be rooted and sustained in the positive, there can be no negative
understanding of why humanity is unable to reach God by its own machinations.
'"Karl Barth, "The Task of the Ministry," in The Word of God and the Word
of Man. 189-90, 197. [Caps mine],
61The Epistle to the Romans. 206-207.
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True, there was a huge, seemingly unbreechable chasm created by Barth in this
phase. Perhaps even Barth felt it to be so. However, this chasm, would force
Barth to seek to find a bridge for the gap — a bridge he believed could be found
within the doctrine of revelation as approached and understood in the ahistorical
event of the Resurrection.62
Whereas in Phase II revelation was seen as revolutionary eschatology with
the emphasis resting upon the possibility of the hope of the 'now' of God's
kingdom, in Phase III Barth established revelation as Resurrection. What did this
new 'category' mean for Barth? It certainly did not mean a rejection of revelation
as eschatology. It meant a refining of the idea. The emphasis, as stated earlier in
our discussion, moved from the 'now' to the 'not yet' ~ revelation can be known
only through the event of the Resurrection.63 The distant God, inaccessible to
human knowledge, was made known in the Resurrection, for in the Resurrection,
humanity caught a glimpse of the 'not yet' in the 'now':
'The Resurrection from the dead is...the transformation: the
establishing or declaration of that point from above, and the
corresponding discerning it from below. The Resurrection is
the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the
appearing of God and the apprehending of God in Jesus. The
Resurrection is the emergence of the necessity of giving
glory to God; the reckoning with what is known and unobservable
in Jesus, the recognition of Him as Paradox, Victor and Primal
History. In the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit
touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent
touches a circle, that is, without touching it. And precisely
because it does not touch it, it touches it as its frontier —
as the new world.'64
62Ibid., 195.
63Ibid., 206.
"The Epistle to the Romans. 30.
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Barth's entire doctrine of revelation in Phase III is outlined in this
statement. Not only is the Resurrection the revelation but also the recognition of
the 'not yet' in the 'now' vis-a-vis the victorious Christ. And yet this revelation is
a paradox of sorts, for it touches our world only as a tangent touches a circle —
without really touching it. God enters into human history via Urgeschichte and
therefore is not equated with human history which would, for Barth, destroy God's
mystery and sovereignty. In the event of the Resurrection, humanity sees the
"impossible-possibility."65 Not because Jesus is the revelation. In no way was
Barth at this point in his development equating Jesus with revelation. From his
perspective, Jesus was a medium of revelation who, in his victory on the cross, in
his exalted state, revealed God to humanity.66 But not in any other state —
definitely not in his historical presence as a human on the earth. In no way did
Barth wish to reduce God to a revelation which humanity could take into its hands,
manipulate and call its own. For this reason Barth refused to equate Jesus with the
revelation, or revelation with the historical. For Barth, revelation could be
accomplished only by God being made known without the loss of the divine.67
Therefore, revelation could not be a figure in history. Revelation had to be beyond
history.68 Following this logic Barth placed a high priority on communicating the
ahistorical nature of revelation.
"Ibid., 195.
"Ibid., 203.
67See McCormack, p. 135, for a most helpful discussion on this topic.
McCormack's study of the genesis of Barth's theology provides a very useful
reference point not only for this discussion, but for any discussion regarding
Barth's theology.
"The Epistle to the Romans. 205.
66
For Barth, Jesus was a medium of revelation within the framework of the
Cross and Resurrection. In the event of the Resurrection, the impossible became
and remained possible. Recalling that in Phase I and Phase II, we saw Barth give
weightier attention to the historical figure of Jesus, we must not infer that in these
early phases Barth equated the historical Jesus with revelation. However, the
legacy of Herrmann's "secret inner life of Jesus" seemed viable for the early Barth
in that God "as the individual inner certainty and authority which became divine
revelation for him in Christ as he moves through the history of peoples. "69 But
by 1922, Barth had broken away from this viewpoint to espouse the belief that
Jesus was purely a medium. Within history Jesus could only be a paradox.70 But
in the event of the Resurrection, in the eschatology of the Resurrection, that is,
God breaking into time from eternity, Jesus was Victor, but the event not Jesus,
is the revelation. We must have Jesus, but we must also have Resurrection.71
In the event of the Resurrection and through the medium of Christ, Barth
believed that God was able to remain God (holy, other and sovereign), and
humanity is
made aware of the impossible eschatological
possibility - the possibility that he who receives
the revelation, and as such must yield and decrease
to pass to corruption, is he who has been saved and
justified and raised from the dead: saved as one has
been lost, justified as beyond justification - this is
the resurrection of the dead, which in Christ enters within
69Monsma, 34.
70The Epistle to the Romans. 29.
71Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead (London: Hodder and Stoughton
Ltd., 1933), 152.
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the possibility. Thus God manifests himself.72
While in Phase 11 Barth did not in any way label Jesus directly as the revelation,
little was mentioned about the role of Jesus. In Phase III, however, Barth
seemingly took a hard line approach to the issue: Jesus himself was not the
revelation but the medium of the event of Resurrection and revelation.73 About
this point Barth seems overly emphatic. Why was it so significant for Barth to
spell out clearly the role of Jesus as only a medium of revelation? Because of
Barth's view of history, Jesus as a historical figure could not be revelation. Jesus
as God within history could not reveal God because then the divine incognito
would be lost and be subject to the manipulations of humanity.74 For this reason,
Barth vehemently insisted revelation be ahistorical.
According to Barth, the historical is "subject to time. And whatever is
subject to time is limited, is relative, is made manifest as world by the last
things."75 History for Barth, can be defined only in its relation to the ahistorical.
History has validity only when it bears witness to the historical;76 the non-
historical forms the veritable substance of quality of all history.77 The
unhistorical, with its ability to touch history without becoming equated with
history, was the crux of the historical debate for Barth and was crucial for his
72The Epistle to the Romans. 415-416.
73The Epistle to the Romans. 203.
74Ibid.
"Barth, "Unsettled Questions for Theology Today," 59.
76The Epistle to the Romans. 146.
77Ibid.; 147.
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theology of revelation. Barth maintained that revelation had to be unhistorical
because it could not be a predicate to human experience:
If we thrust the Resurrection into history, if we set the
presupposition which is in Jesus within the sequence of events,
if we weave the paradox of faith into human spiritual experience,
we introduce, as it were, a specter which devours every living
thing...Resurrection ceases to be resurrection is it be some
abnormal event side by side with other events...If the revelation
of Jesus be no more than a particular historical happening, an
event among other events, a religion among other religions, its
relative and particular character ought to become apparent when
contrasted with an occurrence so remote as is the story of the
religion of Abraham.78
Here Barth underscored that in his way of thinking, revelation has to be
unhistorical; otherwise it will be subject to human interference. Revelation could
now only be an event, forever initiated by God, not created by human experience,
never actually participating in world history. Revelation intersects history, and in
so doing, neutralizes any attempt by humanity to claim any form of ownership:
revelation is in this world, but not of this world. It is not similar to any human
experience that might be likened to the divine, it is the divine, initiated by the
Divine and carried out in such a way that humanity is able to participate only by
responding in faith to the resurrected, victorious, yet paradoxical Christ.
We must not, at this juncture, confuse Barth's insistence on the unhistoricity
of revelation as an effort to minimize historical fact. For Barth, the Resurrection
was a specific event in time, in history, in a particular place. In this sense,
revelation/Resurrection was historical. But the historical process did not, in itself,
produce the event of the Resurrection. This was accomplished only by God and
therefore revelation also (being equated with Resurrection at this stage by Barth)
78Ibid.; 115-117.
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could only be enacted by God from above to humanity below.
For Barth, the truth of God was not dependent upon the historical process.
How clearly we see Barth combatting the same nineteenth century liberalism which
he had once embraced! His new view of history, along with his strong emphasis
on the 'not yet,' was undoubtedly an effort to renounce, once and for all, any
possibility of humanity's ability to reach God, find God, and control God. With
Phase III, highlighted most effectively in Romans II, Barth finally and completely
broke away from anything liberal. In this sense, one phase of his development was
complete. He would never look back on the break, nor would he ever mitigate his
strong attack against 'religion.' With his modified view of revelation in this phase,
we see, more than ever, the vast separation between God and humanity. But we
must emphasize that this phase is not a complete shift from earlier stages. It is a
modification of thought germinated in 1915 in Barth's initial disillusionment with
liberalism and socialism. Barth did not, in any way, abandon the eschatology
established in Phase II (with particular reference to Romans I). Rather, Barth
refined and refocused it. Eschatology — meaning the relationship between time and
eternity79 — was as ever, at the forefront of his thought, for according to Barth,
"if Christianity be not altogether thoroughgoing eschatology there remains in it no
relationship whatsoever with Christ."80
79Dr. Bruce McCormack makes a helpful distinction regarding Barth's
eschatology during the period ofRomans II. He states that Barth' eschatology "has
to do with the relation of eternity to time, a relation which is always and
everywhere the same." (McCormack, p. 145). Also helpful is a citation from
Barth's 1923 lectures later published as The Resurrection of the Dead, in which he
spells out clearly the distinction between eschatology as last things and eschatology
as that which reflects the relation between eternity and time. See The Resurrection
of the Dead (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1933), 110-112.
80The Epistle to the Romans. 314.
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The connection between eschatology, Resurrection and revelation is
apparent: eschatology for Barth defines the relation between time and eternity.81
Resurrection as revelation intersects the line between time and eternity but does not
equate time with eternity, humanity with God, the historical with the ahistorical.
The eschatology of Phase III can be regarded as a different side of the same coin
of Phase II in which eschatology was more a present reality (although still
ahistorical) vis-a-vis the socialist ideology of the Kingdom ofGod. With Phase 111,
eschatology is more untouchable yet still a realistic possibility.
While it may seem that the eschatological relationship in Phase III is wholly
negative (i.e. in Barth's insistence upon the chasm of separation between God and
humanity, the Kiekegaardian sickness unto death, and the 'NO' of God to
humanity), a positive relationship can be seen in history: God, through the
medium of Christ, through the event of the Resurrection, enters into history but
does not become bound by or equated with it, thereby retaining the divine
sovereignty and divine incognito.82 The unknowable God becomes knowable; the
transcendent God, immanent. The Resurrection brings revelation and knowledge
by faith, of the "disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the appearing of God and the
apprehending of God in Jesus...the action, the supreme miracle, by which God the
unknown...dwelling in light inapproachable...makes himself known."83
Barth would soon restructure this event of knowing (the Resurrection). In
81Karl Barth, "The Freedom of the Word of God," in Come. Holy Spirit
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1934), 22If.
82Barth said that, "what touches us - and yet does not touch us — in Jesus the
Christ is the Kingdom of God who is both Creator and Redeemer." From The
Epistle to the Romans. 30.
83Ibid.; 30, 35.
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his lectures on the Incarnation in the Summer of 1924, Barth began to examine
more closely the relationship between the Incarnation and Revelation, an
examination which would cause Barth to modify for the last time, his doctrine of
revelation.
IV. Revelation as incarnational eschatology: 1924
Barth's transition from the phase of Romans II was marked by several
of. iw r<kf*
different influences, eaclfwhich moved Barth towards a new emanation «t the role
of the Incarnation within revelation. Barth had a deep desire to expand his
Christology through a Trinitarian looking glass. He had been accused by Hermann
Kutter of living in a Christological vacuum, leaning towards docetism.84 This
charge Barth wanted to refute. Therefore, he began to reframe the question of
revelation from a Trinitarian viewpoint, a new perspective at this stage in his
thought. In late May of 1924, he wrote to Eduard Thurneystfn: "I understand the
Trinity as the problem of the inalienable subjectivity of God in his revelation... "85
With the concern about the Kutter attack, earlier work on the history of doctrine,
as well as the preparation of his lectures on dogmatics and the Incarnation, Barth
found himself engaging in a new ways not only with the doctrines of the Ancient
Church and Reformers but also with the dogmatic thought of Heinrich Heppe.86
Perhaps Heppe was most helpful for Barth as the latter sought to find a way
84See Kutter's letter to Eduard Thurneysen in Revolutionary Theology in the
Making. 210-211.
85Barth, Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 185.
86Barth was most helped by Heppe's Reformed Dogmatics, revised and ed. by
Ernst Bizer (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), v-viii. For an understanding of
Barth's appreciation of Heppe, see Karl Barth, "Zum Geleit," in Heinrich Heppe's
Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche. ed. Ernst Bizer (Neukirchen:
Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins Neukirchen, Kreis Moers, 1935), iii-iv.
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to approach the teaching of Reformed Dogmatics, for in Heppe, Barth found much
of the material, with respect to Reformed Doctrine, which he lacked from his
liberal training. Furthermore, Barth's dialogues with Roman Catholic theologians
forced him to take more seriously the historical impact of the Ancient Church.
Consequently, early in 1924, Barth began to shift his focus for the very last time
as he wrestled with the foundations of his theology.
During the period of Phase IV, Barth's major and most significant work in
the area of revelation came with his lectures in dogmatics given to students in
Gottingen. In these Barth's doctrine of revelation, as well as the base for his
theological and ethical thought, would reach maturation.
The doctrine of revelation found within the Gottingen Dogmatics is best
defined as incarnational eschatology. In Phase III, and particularly in Romans II,
Barth approached revelation through the event of the Resurrection. Christ's life
was significant only in its relation to the Resurrection in which Jesus assumed an
exalted, victorious state. But in the Gottingen lectures, Barth developed his
revelational theology further to include the Incarnation: not only did revelation
now meet humanity in the Incarnation, but it also entered into history, taking on
historical content.
This new position found its roots in Barth's adoption of the ancient
anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology. Revelation was still considered an event
in which God is veiled and yet revealed in a creaturely reality; the modification of
Barth's doctrine of revelation was its basis in the Incarnation. Eschatology now
found its fulfillment in the Incarnation and within history! The adoption of the
ancient Christological formula allowed Barth to have a God who, while entering
into history fully, could still maintain the divine incognito. Suddenly, the God so
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far away and removed from the events of humanity and its history, entered into
these events and this history to be revealed to the creation.
This new adaptation to Barth's thought was, in many ways, revolutionary.
With it, Barth still maintained that a chasm separated God and humanity; that
humanity could not, through its own machinations, bridge the gap; and that God,
in an infinite act of grace, entered into the world fully, thus breaking through the
eschatological barrier between God and humanity. This modification in Barth's
thought merits more attention, as we discuss revelation within the Gottingen
Dogmatics and the impact of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology on Barth's
doctrine of revelation as well as his ethics.
When we examine the Gottingen Dogmatics, we immediately notice
similarities to his doctrine of revelation in Phase III. First, God is still subject.
In no way has Barth abandoned his firm belief that the theological enterprise begins
with God. For Barth, "revelation means the knowledge of God through God and
from God."87 Barth argues that modern theology's tendency to locate revelation
in feeling or experience (here combatting Schleiermacher primarily) relegates God
to the level of an object for human use and consumption, rather than ascribes to
God the role of subject who chooses, in the event of revelation, to become object.
Second, God is, even in the event of revelation, still wholly God. The content of
revelation is not a part of God, or an aspect of God's character, but God alone,
wholly God. Third, God is the one who reveals the revelation:
The revelation of this God...cannot be confused or
admixed with humanity's question, because no matter
in which person he reveals himself, in virtue of the
87Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics, v.I. trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Press, 1991), 61.
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unity of his three persons he escapes every attempt
of humanity to identify him with itself, and as a final
Word that both attracts and repels he constantly tells
humanity that he himself is God.88
Lastly, God is still the hidden God. While God now fully enters into history and
is revealed, God is still veiled. Revelation is thus not a direct openness on God's
behalf but a becoming open. The husk is torn away, the incomprehensibility is
removed, but God's infinite sovereignty is retained. God does not, in any way,
lose the divine incognito. God does in these 1924 dogmatics, however, seem to be
more approachable, more reachable, than in Phase III. But in sovereignty and
holiness God is still hidden.
While Barth retained much of his view of revelation from Phase III and
carried it over into Phase IV, the main difference is evident in his eschatology, for
with Phase IV, Barth's eschatology would move from being rooted primarily in the
Resurrection with reference to the locus of the cross, to the event of the
Incarnation, with reference to the locus and authority of the Church. We have
stated earlier that with the modification in his eschatology, Barth allowed for the
possibility of the historicity of revelation. What prompted Barth to make this
move? What factors were involved as he struggled to make sense of a doctrine of
revelation that might possibly have historical content and yet not obliterate the
'wholly otherness' ofGod? These were questions Barth asked himself as he wrote
his lectures on dogmatics.
In the margin of his notes, Barth wrote to himself, "If God is so immutably
God (transcendence, immanence, turning to us), does he reveal himself? Is he not
88Ibid.; 96.
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hidden precisely in his revelation?"89 The question confronting Barth was, 'Could
the hidden God be also the revealed God?' For Barth, the hidden God could also
become the revealed God only by concealing God's deity in another; God's being
subject by a being as an object. For Karl Barth, everything is dependent upon God
concealing His 'inacc^sible' divhe I-ness with a human I-ness, as with a veil, so
that humanity can grasp God as a person: God could not merely be an object, but
a recognizable I, a human being.90 The hidden God could become the revealed
God in an I-Thou relationship with humanity. But what might the conditions of
this revelation be? How might the hidden God be revealed? Could there possibly
be revelation with historical content? According to Barth, yes, as long as certain
conditions were met:
1. God must be wholly God. It must really be God who encounters
humanity if revelation is to be possible.91
2. God must meet humanity, and therefore God must be truly human and
nothing else.92
3. The real deity and humanity of God must be so united that neither can
be changed into the other or mixed with it. The union must be strictly
dialectical.93
4. This union of deity and humanity cannot be general or multiple — it can






only occur once for all.94
By what means might these conditions be met? According to Barth, the
Incarnation is the objective possibility of revelation. In the Incarnation, Barth
found the answer to his question. But his argument did not stop with the
realization of the Incarnation. He had to find a way to express the reality of God's
becoming human in such a way that the I-Thou relationship would be maintained.
Barth does so by adopting the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology of the Ancient
Church.95
During his studies on the Creeds and Confessions and in his preparations
for teaching on the Incarnation and Reformed Dogmatics, Barth reacquainted
himself with the ancient Alexandrian Christology. It would become the lynch pin
of his doctrine of revelation. In the Spring of 1924, Barth mentioned this important
reacquainting process to Thurneyspn: "Take a look in an old book on dogmatics
and see what they understood by 'An-Hypostasia' in regard to the nature of Christ.
That was forceful teaching — which should now be put back on the lampstand."96
As Barth understood it, the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology affirmed the full
94Ibid.; 139.
95George Hunsinger points out that the terms anhypostasia and enhypostasia
were first used as a pair by Leontius of Byzantium. Hunsiger argues that "the
contribution of Leontius was to accept the Chalcedonian formula, 'in two natures'
but to interpret it along lines that preserved.. .emphasis on the priority of the Word
and the unity of the Word made flesh. Leontius achieved this conceptual
reconcilation in terms of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis of the human nature of
Christ." George Hunsinger, editorial note #4 in Herrmann Diem, "Karl Barth as
Socialist," in Karl Barth and Radical Politics. 135. For further discussion on the
anhypostasis-enhypostasis see D.M. BaillJ^ God Was In Christ (London: Faber
and Faber, 1948); J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine. 5th ed. (London: A&C
Black, 1977); John Mclntyre, The Shape of Christology (London: SCM Press,
1966, especially 98ff).
96Barth, Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 185.
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divinity and full humanity of Christ. The term anhypostasia asserted that the
human nature assumed by Christ had no existence in itself: there was no distinct
human personality, but divine Personality assuming human nature.97 Christ's
humanity could have no other mode of existence apart from the union with his
divinity. However, in the enhypostasia, this nature (the human) had existence
through its relation to the second person of the Trinity (and note here how Barth's
movement from a potentially 'docetic' Christological position was thwarted in his
adoption of the Trinitarian emphasis), the eternal Logos. For Barth, the adoption
of the ancient formula verified that "the human nature of Christ has no personhood
of its own. It is anhypostatos-the formula which the description culminates. Or,
more positively, it is enhypostatos. It has personhood, subsistence, reality only in
its union with the Logos of God."98 Barth was attempting to communicate that
in his humanness alone, the nature of Christ had no independence: Christ's real
humanity always exists in His divinity and has no othermode of existence.
It could not, for if this nature were independent from the eternal Logos, it
would nullify the holiness and the veiledness of God. Only in its intimate
connection with the second person of the Trinity did the nature assumed by Christ
have meaning and substance. It had to be connected to the divine in order to have
meaning. Alone, it could not stand - not as revelation. What was significant in
Barth's adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology was that with it,
97D.M. Bailie, God Was In Christ (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), 85.
98Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics. 157. In the Church Dogmatics. Barth said,
"Jesus Christ exists as a man because as this One exists, because and as He makes
human essence His own, adopting and exalting it into unity with Himself. As a
man, therefore, He exists directly in and with the one God in the mode of
existence of His eternal Son and Logos -- not otherwise apart from this mode."
CD IV/2, 49.
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Barth could allow for revelation to take on historical content without God losing
the divine incognito. The vast chasm, so painfully obvious in Phase III, was thus
bridged by Barth via the Incarnation, in which the Logos is both ensarkos and
asarkos.
Barth's adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology had major
implications for his doctrine of revelation. First, as we have discussed, revelation
now had historical content: "the Logos had truly assumed human flesh and in so
doing, has entered fully into human history, taking up a kind of residence
there."99 In Phase III, and particularly in Romans II, revelation had been
unhistorical: through the event of the Resurrection and medium of Christ, God
was revealed and yet remained veiled, outside of history. Only in his exalted state
was Christ a medium of revelation, thus preserving the distance between time and
eternity. With Phase IV, as expounded in the Gottingen Dogmatics, revelation
now had historical content and was understood through the window of the
Incarnation: in the medium of the human yet divine Christ, history and revelation
are united.
The barrier so apparent and emphasized in earlier phases had been broken
through without the loss of God as subject. And God was still able to 'be God'
in the divine incognito. The anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christology indicated that
"although Jesus Christ is the creaturely medium of revelation, he is first and
foremost the Eternal Logos who is eternally God himself. When he condescends
to the creaturely realm and assumes a human nature and human body, he becomes
clearly visible and knowable as other creatures are knowable...However, his
"McCormack, 333.
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complete identity with God is not abrogated by his appearance in time."100
Furthermore, Barth's Trinitarian emphasis, so lucidly developed in this phase,
became the base of his doctrine of revelation and would also provide the foundation
for his ethics.
These implications for Barth's doctrine of revelation remind us that by 1924,
Barth's doctrine of revelation was complete. Any changes he made thereafter
would be modifications, but not complete shifts. The essence of this doctrine
found in the Incarnation of Jesus, revealed to humanity the veiled God, the God
once so seemingly distant and removed from the world. Jesus, for Barth, is the
revelation and in being the revelation, Christ becomes the reconciliation. In the
revelation, in the act and through the initiation of God, humanity is able to know
the unknowable and be reconciled; the same word of grace, spoken as the primary
word to humanity, provides the framework by which a world once separated from
God is called to live.
In this chapter, we have traced the development of Karl Barth's doctrine of
revelation during the late Teens and early Twenties. We believe that in this time
period the major development occurred in Barth's doctrine of revelation,
culminating in what we have termed the incarnational eschatology of the Gottingen
Dogmatics — God, through the Incarnation, in the second person of the Trinity,
Jesus, enters into history without becoming identical with it. Whereas in earlier
thought, revelation was viewed from the realm of human experience, the divine
revolution of God vis-a-vis eschatology, to the Resurrection, in the final analysis,
revelation is found in the Incarnation. The Resurrection is in no way discarded but
100Charles T. Waldrop, "Barth and Bultmann: Representatives of Two Ancient
Theological Traditions," Perspectives in Religion 11 (1984): 11-12.
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is seen under the locus of the Incarnation. In this respect, Barth's doctrine of
revelation grabbed a hold of an historical anchor, yet God is not equated with
human history alone. By 1924, Barth's theology and ethics were grounded in this^
reality: the revelation of God has historical content as seen in the Incarnation, in
which the eternal Logos assumes a human nature. Hence, Barth's eschatological
chasm found a bridge in the Incarnation, thereby making his theology one which
has an interactive emphasis.
In approaching the Barthian ethic, the importance of the doctrine of
revelation is clear: maintaining a view of revelation in which God retains the
divine incognito and yet is completely involved in history means that Barth will
have an ethic (and we believe this occurs in the Twenties) that will uphold divine
sovereignty, finding its base in the Word of God as issued in the form of a
command. In so doing, God for Barth, remains in a position of control, yet in the
Incarnation, becomes genuinely a part of the world.
Barth will argue that the transcendent and immanent God speaks to
humanity and the ethical issues it faces through the 'voice' of the Creeds and
Confessions of the Church and within the locus and authority of the church, God's
living symbol of Christ on earth.
The word that God speaks, argues Barth, is a loving one. Therefore, the
ethic to which Barth adheres has as its center, a 'gracious command,' instilling
within humanity a committment to respond to God and the world in such a way as
to reflect Divine grace. Barth defines this word of grace for ethics through his
theological ordering of gospel and law, the next window into which we look.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Barthian Version of the Inversion: Gospel and Law
Karl Barth's doctrine of revelation had far reaching consequences for his
entire theology and ethics. Established by 1924,1 with the adoption of the
anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula, Barth's theology placed God in
a position of divine sovereignty, yet allowed for God's full entry into human
history through the incarnation.
Not only did Barth's doctrine of revelation significantly shape his theology;
it also shaped his ethics, as exemplified in his theological ordering of gospel before
law. In this chapter, we intend to examine Karl Barth's theological ordering of
gospel and law and to show how its development parallels the development of
Barth's doctrine of revelation.2 We believe Barth's gospel-law inversion is not
only apparent in his thought before the Church Dogmatics and his 1935 essay
Gospel and Law3, but is also intricately tied to his epistemology. Therefore, we
will first discuss Barth's ordering of gospel and law and then will draw parallels
with the development of his doctrine of revelation.
'We are not suggesting that Barth's development in his thought was a
completely smooth, linear process. Indeed, his journey theologically was, at times,
a rough one — from his early years as a student through 1924 (and his entire life),
Barth always wrestled with his theology in an attempt to be true to what he
perceived to be the task of dogmatics. Therefore, while each stage we discuss
represents a point of modification in his thought, we are suggesting that by 1924
Barth established the base for his theology and ethics once and for all.
2While the phases of Barth's development discussed in this chapter and the
previous chapter are not to be considered definitive, they are helpful as signposts
for the development of his thought.
3The essay, Gospel and Law was originally to be read as a paper in Barmen.
However, because of an injunction to silence, Barth was unable to do so.
However, the paper was published in 1935 in #32 of the first series of Theologische
Existenz heute.
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I. The Question of Gospel and Law
A. The Question of the relation of God to humankind
When Barth speaks of gospel and law,4 he is describing the relation of God
to humankind. For Barth, gospel and law are predicates of God. Whereas Martin
Luther attempted to make law-gospel categories which described human existence
before God,5 Barth could not, with regard to his starting point for theology, speak
of humanity in the presence of God before he spoke of God in the presence of
humanity.
For Barth, the relation of God to humankind is an expression of the divine
disposition: God for us.6 By choosing to be in a covenant relationship, God also
chooses to be in the presence of humanity which brings humanity before God and
establishes its 'primal history.' This existence in God's presence is best described
4We believe that for Barth, gospel and grace are interchangeable terms.
5For a deeper understanding of Martin Luther's (1483-1506) position on law
and gospel, see the following: Paul Althaus, Paulus und Luther iiber den Menschen
1938; The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. R.C. Schultz (Philidelphia, 1966); H.
Bornkamm, Luther's World of Thought, trans. M.H. Bertram (St. Louis, 1958);
G. Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought (London: Collins Publishing
Company, 19703: Martin Luthe^feie'fekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherisch
Kirche (Gottingen, 1952); Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galations
(London: James Clarke and Co., 1953); On the Bondage of the Will, trans. Packer
and Johnston (London, 1957); Reformation Writings v.I&II. trans. B.L. Woolf
(London, 1952); Thirty-four Sermons (on the law-gospel theme), trans. W. Gace
(London: T. Paine, 1649), available in the British Museum Library, 695 a.II.;
Vorlesung iiber den Romerhrief (Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1928); Luther's
Works (American edition) ed. Jarislov Pelikan 7 Helmut T. Lehmann (St.
Louis/Philidelphia: Concordia, 1955-) German edition: Kritische Gesamtausgabe
der Werke D. Martin Luthers (Weimar Edition: Hermann Foltaus Nachfolger,
1883-); T.M. McDonough, The Law and Gospel in Luther (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1963); A. Schlatter, Luther's Deutung Pes Romerbriefs (B.f.
Chr. Th., 1917).
6For an excellent and in depth treatment of gospel and law and its relation to
the divine disposition, see Jiingel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy. 126.
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within the doctrine of election.
Because humanity's primal existence is in the presence of God — the God
who chose humanity — election is what determines humanity and defines its
existence as a covenant partner with God. Election is, for Barth, the inclusive
concept7 and thus, the sum of the gospel, and the essence of humanity is therefore
determined in the gospel. Because Barth takes a supralapsarian view on
predestination,8 the decision of God from the beginning to the end of time places
humanity in the position of recipient of the mercy and righteousness of the divine
will. From eternity God lays claim to the human race. Hence, the fundamental
relationship of God to humanity is based on one and the same disposition: the
7In placing gospel before law, Barth makes election an act which is prior to
justification and regeneration. And sanctification is found within the doctrine of
election: "We would not stand in sanctification did we not also stand in
justification and therefore in election." Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics v.I.
473.
8Ibid., 468. As we discuss Barth's supralapsarian position with regard to
predestination, brief background of the 17th century Infralapsarian-Supralapsarian
controversy may prove helpful. The issue at stake in this controversy was the
relation of predestination to the creation of the world, humanity and its fall. The
question surrounding the controversy was 'What do we mean when we say that
from eternity humanity is elected by God, or, rejected by God? Is it that in eternal
election God thought of humanity generally, i.e., humanity as not yet created, but
to be created; not yet fallen, but to fall because of divine permission and human
action? Or, is it that in eternal election, God thought of humanity as already
created, fallen because of the divine permission and human action? Infralapsarians
argue that God's eternal purpose is to reveal and glorify Himself. The fall is an
event decreed by God. However, the Infralapsarian does not believe that the
reasons for this decree are knowable. The Infralapsarian would not say, for
example, that the creation and fall were decreed in order to reveal God's mercy
and justice. The Supralapsarian view differs. The Supralapsarian would espouse
that God had and has a basic purpose quite apart from all His other purposes,
particularly creation and the fall. The original purpose of God is this: that God's
mercy and righteousness should be revealed to humanity. Barth himself held to the
Supralapsarian view. For him, predestination is the secret of creation, and
redemption and consummation — from all eternity, humanity is the object of the
mercy and righteousness of the divine wil.
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grace of God which, from eternity, is revealed in Christ, the pre-existent Logos.
Since God has decided in Christ, from eternity, to be for humanity, humanity is
determined as people, that is where the law makes its entrance.
According to Barth, God's decision for humanity in Christ and the
execution of judgment upon Christ from eternity establishes a divine justice, the
justice of the gracious God. In this sense, law is a form of the gospel. Barth
clarifies this relationship in his definition of law as "the form of the Gospel, i.e.,
as the sanctification which comes to man through the electing God."9
For Barth, gospel and law are a single word in God's activity.10 Because
God loves from all eternity and is the one who chooses humanity, the law is simply
first and foremost the form taken by God's commitment to the good of the human
race. This loving attitude claims humanity and demands a corresponding attitude
towards God. Therefore, in determining humanity to be in covenant relationship,
in the divine disposition, God becomes simultaneously a judge of humanity and
thus the law of its existence.11
As objects of the divine disposition and action, humanity confronts several
questions: 'How will it respond to its covenant partner?' 'How will it exist under
this determination?' Here humanity finds that it has responsibility within the
covenant. The gospel does not simply bring humanity into God's presence, but
law, as a form of the gospel, calls humanity to action. Where humanity is
9Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, trans. G.W. Bromiley, J.C. Campbell,
Iain Wilson, J. Strathearn McNab, Harold Knight, R.A. Stewart, eds. Geoffrey
Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 509. (hereafter




understood as that which is constituted by self action and determination (in so far
as it is connected to the divine action), gospel acts as law. This self-action and
determination, therefore, comes to humanity as a result of the divine action of
eternal election in Christ and is enacted within humanity by the Holy Spirit, which
transforms humanity into a rational, self-determining, acting creature.12
Therefore, as divinely determined people, humanity is faced with a
decision: whether to live as God has commanded and thus affirm God's eternal
decision of election. In so doing, humanity acknowledges its eternal determination
and God as the law of its existence which to Barth, is the gospel, for the gospel
creates:
a new being for a person only by permitting him to act, so
that he may come to a 'human decision which corresponds to
the divine decision.' Barth's version of the relation
between gospel and law is, in the final analysis, concerned
with this correspondence, this analogy between God and
humanity, an already ontological correspondence between the
the existence of God as pure act and the existence of the
human person as self-defined in action.13
Thus, in discussing gospel and law, the relation of God to humanity is defined.
By calling humanity into a covenantal relationship from eternity, God's grace
becomes the first and final word from the Creator to the creature. This eternal
relationship of grace is closely connected to Barth's doctrine of revelation: in the
God event of revelation, God speaks a word of grace to humanity by revealing
Himself in the veil of the incarnate Christ. The relationship between Barth's
doctrine of revelation and the theological ordering of gospel and law is not mere




finds the true relationship between the gospel and the law.
II. The Relation of God to Humankind as expressed in Gospel and Law: the
parallels in Barth's doctrine of revelation and theological ordering of gospel
before law.
Phase I: Gospel and Law as viewed through the lens of socialism (1909-19151
During the years prior to 1915, Barth had little specifically to say about the
relationship between gospel and law. However, indirectly, Barth dealt with this
relationship in two major ways: through his liberal adherence to inwardness and
his commitment to socialism.14
During this phase of development, Barth viewed, as mentioned previously,
revelation as experience. This posture had a major bearing on how he approached
gospel and law. As early as 1909, Barth stated, "...for us religion is experience
understood in rigorously individual terms...."15 What this means for Barth's
treatment of gospel and law is this: during his first years as a student16 and as
a pastor in Safenwil,17 Barth clearly adhered to a tradition of liberal theology in
which religion/revelation were equated with inwardness and experience. This left
little room for any revelatory function of the law or the gospel. For if revelation
were understood purely from the perspective of how humanity experiences God,
14An interesting dichotomy is found in the influence of Herrmann and the
inwardness he espoused and the outwardness of socialism embraced by Barth.
15Karl Barth, "Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit," Zeitschrift fur
Theologie und Kirche 19 (1909), 320-321.
16Barth's advanced studies occurred in Bern, Berlin, Tubingen and Marburg;
thereafter, he went to Geneva as a ministerial probationer and finally to Safenwil
as a pastor.
17Safenwil was an industrial and agricultural community located in Canton
Aargau, Switzerland.
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then gospel and law become predicates of human experience and do little to aid in
revealing God. At most, they might function to clarify who God is, but in this
phase of development, Barth's concern was not with how gospel and law
functioned epistemologically.
However, it would be unfair to state that even in the beginnings of Phase
I, Barth had no interest in or concern for the role of the gospel and law. During
his early years as pastor in Safenwil (1911-1914), Barth addressed the concepts of
gospel and law through the lens of socialism.18 In coming to Safenwil, he
confronted the hardships of industrial workers and therefore began to take a keen
interest in societal issues: "...when I moved into the industrial village.. .my interest
in theology as such had to step back noticeably into second place...I became
passionately involved with socialism and especially with the trade union
movement."19 The pastorate in Safenwil catapulted Barth into the world of class
warfare and into studies directed toward factory legislation, insurance and trade
union affairs.20 This engagement with socialism and social issues forced Barth to
incorporate new ideas into his theology.21
18During his tenure in Safenwil, Barth's commitment to socialism was based
on the socialist emphasis on confronting injustice and the hope that lay therein.
The influence of religious socialism on Barth came also during this period (see
Fakultatsalbum, 155), but was most significant after the outbreak of World War
I (see Busch, 76-78).
''"Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher," 263.
20See Fakultatsalbum . 292.
21FriedrichWilhelm Marquardt argues that it was Barth's socialist praxis which
informed his theology. Marquardt argues that it was Barth's engagement in political
issues during his pastorate in Safenwil that shaped his theology. In an oral
interview at the Frei Universitat in Berlin, December 1990, I asked Professor
Marquardt to clarify his position. In the interview he reaffirmed what he had
already stated in his book, Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972) that is, that one must first and always look
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He began to examine what he believed to be the "divine power of the
gospel reflected in the organizational concepts of socialism: 'I see it in other
places as well, but here more clearly and purely, and I see it here in the way that
it must work in our time.'"22 One of the ways Barth saw the relationship between
socialism and the gospel was in the person of Jesus.23
In the lecture, "Jesus and the Social Movement," given to the Workers
Association in Safenwil on December 17, 1911, Barth stated, "Jesus is the social
movement and the social movement is Jesus in the present....The real significance
of the person of Jesus can be summed up in two words — social movement — .. .the
spirit which counts before God is the Social spirit."24 For Barth, Jesus and
socialism both sought independence for the dependent,25 and both arose as
movements that identified with the poor and lowly.26 For Barth, Jesus' movement
to Barth's socialism and political praxis as the basis for his theology. We disagree
with Marquardt. While Barth's socialism certainly played a crucial role in all of
his theology, we cannot agree that Barth's theology was a product of his
engagement with socialism. Barth is, first and foremost, a theologian, not a
socialist. Although his interest in socialism would always exist, it did not as a
political influence, create the foundation of his theology.
22Barth made this comment on December 17, 1911. (Jiingel, 87).
23In discussing Jesus, we believe Barth is adhering to the view of Christ as an
image of revelation and Redeemer of humanity. Moreover, in discussing Jesus as
the social movement, we believe Barth is drawing heavily from what he had
learned earlier from Herrmann, that is, the 'secret inner life of Jesus'— that which
was portrayed in the gospel story, communicating God's omnipotence and
goodness. In this inner life is the faith that humanity must grasp in order to find
communion with God.
24Karl Barth, "Jesus and the Social Movement," in Karl Barth and Radical
Politics. 19. The original lecture was printed in Per Freie Aargauer 6 (Dec. 23,




was a "volcanic eruption from below."27
Moreover, Barth argued that in socialism, the kingdom of God was realized
— at least on a human level. Unlike the Church, which Barth believed viewed the
kingdom as only other- worldly, Barth espoused a view in which the kingdom
"comes to us in matter and on the earth"28 and is best reflected in socialism. For
Barth, the kingdom was not of the world, but was in the world.29 From a human
standpoint, the gospel was for Barth a movement from below to above. But from
the divine side, it came from above: "it is not that we go to heaven but that
heaven comes to us...not in a spiritual sense purely, but materially in social help,
in the social spirit. "30 At this point we must clarify that even in phase I of his
development, Barth did not equate socialism with what the socialists were doing
but with what Jesus had done.31 Flowever, socialism was the place where, on a
human level, the kingdom of God was best expressed.





31 Interestingly, despite Barth's conviction that the socialists were not fulfilling
what Jesus had done, Barth joined the Social Democratic Party on January 26,1915
in a venture to display solidarity with those in Safenwil and even more so, in an
attempt to help direct the future of socialism, which he believed had been severely
compromised. In a letter to Eduard Thurneysen, dated February 5,1915, he stated:
"I have now become a member of the SDP. Just because I set such emphasis
Sunday by Sunday upon the last things, it was no longer possible for me personally
to remain suspended in the clouds above the present evil world. Rather, it had to
be demonstrated here and now that the faith of the Greatest does not exclude, but
includes work and suffering in the realm of the imperfect...the Socialists in my
congregation will now, I hope, have a right understanding of my criticisms of the
party. And I myself hope now to avoid becoming unfaithful to our 'essential'
orientation..." From Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 28.
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socialism this way: in 1911, gospel was, for Barth, ultimately connected to Jesus
(as revealed in the way of life given to us through Jesus' secret inner life), who
was connected to the social movement. At this point in Barth's ministry, while
gospel was associated with the salvation of the individual before God, clearly, the
gospel also had a quality of unrest-of revolution: God's plan was for a different
kind of world, not one in which workers or others experience oppression:
...the new kingdom of God, a new world, a new society: that is
what was at stake in the entire contents of the gospel. This new
reality could also be called "socialism" -not as an ideology but
as a condition to be realized. "Jesus is the movement for social
justice." "Socialist" is thus, it must be said, a predicate of
the gospel. God wants socialism. The true socialism is the
kingdom of God-both as the goal of God's history with man, and
as the present movement on earth here and now. Where the kingdom
of God is at stake, there socialism is always at stake as well.
Where socialism is at stake, moreover, there God's kingdom is
always already at stake.32
Barth continued articulating the connection of gospel to the social movement
in a sermon on I Corinthians 11.23-26, given in Safenwil on March 16, 1913. In
this message, Barth made three major points that illumine the relationship between
the gospel and socialism. First, the gospel functions to convict us of our sin and
accuse us33 as it "makes us pensive, disquieted, yearnful; it arouses in us the
32Gollwitzer, 77-78.
33In the sense that the gospel has an accusatory tone, Barth seems to be
following the traditional orthodox view of the theological use of the law. This may
be due to his reading of John Calvin (1509-1564) while Barth was a probationer
in Geneva. To this effect Barth has said that while in Geneva, although "living
completely and utterly in the religious atmosphere that I had brought with me from
Marburg.. .Nevertheless it may have been the spirit of the place.. .which caused me
to deepen the experience I had gained...by making considerable inroads into
Calvin's Institutes." From "Concluding Unscientific Postscript on
Schleiermacher," in The Theology of Schleiermacher. 262. For further study on
Calvin's approach to the law and gospel see Andrew J. Bandstra, "Law and Gospel
in Calvin and Paul," in Exploring the Heritage of John Calvin, ed. D.E. Holwerda
(Michigan: Baker Book House, 1976); Josef Bohatec, Calvin und das Recht
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longing for a freedom and strength; it allows us to wait for a new heaven and a
new earth in which righteousness lives."34 But the gospel does more. It also
offers the power of thatAis found in Jesus and is given to humanity through his
body and blood that "allows, according to Barth, for Christ to rule in the lives of
humanity. In the giving of bread and wine, Jesus offers humanity Himself and,
therefore, the power of faith, for "as bread and wine nourishes and strengthens
your body, so shall my life (Jesus) become a power for you."35 Lastly, the gospel
offers humanity "not only...a knowledge of sin and power of faith, but also the
Law and Spirit of New Life,"36 found in the words of Jesus, "for you." But this
is a corporate "you": within the "Gemeinschaft," or community, is the place that
ultimately expresses Christ's love, found in bread and wine:
...the love we experience in Jesus can not remain dead in us,
but it must flow through us to others...for you! We must also say
for you...the Law and Spirit of New life in the community with
Christ means: unconditional brotherhood and solidarity, unlimited
(Graz: Hermann Bohlaus, 1934. Esp. pp.22-24ff); John Calvin, Commentaries of
John Calvin 46 vol. , various trans. (Edinburgh: The Calvin Translation Society,
1843-1855J: Instruction in Faith (1537) trans. P.T. Fuhrmann (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1949); Institutes of the Christian Religion. Book I&II. trans.
Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill (Philidelphia: The Westminster Press,
1960. Especially Ch.7-8); Theological Treatises trans. Rev. J.K.S. Reid (London:
SCM Press, 1954); Edward A. Dowey, The Knowledge of God in Calvin's
Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Especially Ch. 5); R.A.
Gessert, "The Integrity of Faith: An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Law in the
Thought of John Calvin, " Scottish Journal of Theology 13 (1960), 25Iff.; John
Hesselink, Calvin's Concept and Use of the Law (unpublished dissertation, Basel,
1961. A copy is available in the Calvin Collection of the Calvin Theological
Library, in Grand Rapids, Michigan.); Reformatio Perennis: Essays on Calvin and
the Reformation in honour of Ford Lewis Battles, ed. Brian A. Gerrish
(Pittsburgh: The Pickwick Press, 1981. Especially pages 11-26).
34Karl Barth, "I Korinther 11, 23-26," in Gesamtausgabe 1. Predigten 1913




justice and eagerness to be face to face with our fellow humanity.37
At this point we may note that the inwardness so characteristic of this phase
seems to have given way to a communal orientation so important within socialism.
True, there is a communal flavor in this later part of phase I (i.e. 1911-1915), but
this does not mean that Barth in any way changed his views towards revelation:
revelation was still very much experience in Barth's mind. In the context of even
the later part of phase I, gospel is reduced to an experiential concept vis-a-vis its
relation to socialism. Barth stated in 1911, that the gospel "is a matter of the
Kingdom of God in the hearts, of Christian character, the moral consciousness
oreiented to the norms of Jesus."38 Surely at this point in time, gospel as Barth
defined it in 1924 was not the same gospel of 1911 or 1913. However, with the
impact of the First World War and the developments in his doctrine of revelation,
the place of the gospel-law debate would begin to move from a shadowy presence
to a place of substance. This metamorphosis would begin in phase II of his
development, from 1915 through to the second edition of the commentary on
Romans (1922) in which gospel and law would find their roots in a radical
eschatology.
Phase 11: Gospel and Law within revolutionary eschatologv: the beginning of the
YES. (1915-19221
As we discussed earlier in this work, the move from the liberalism of Phase
I to the revolutionary eschatology of Phase II did not occur in one sudden bolt.
Rather, the development of Barth's doctrine of revelation up through the second
37Ibid., 112.
38Karl Barth, "Wir wollen nicht, dass dieser tiber uns herrsche!," Kirchenblatt
fur die reformierte Schweiz 21 (1911).
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edition of Romans was a continuum of gradual shifts away from liberalism and
religious socialism. This period, marked by constant flux and new ideas, impacted
Barth's theological ordering of gospel and law. Most significant in providing
understanding of Barth's ordering of gospel and law within Phase II is the
Tambach lecture, "The Christian's Place in Society," delivered in 1919. In it, Barth
utilizes the dialectical language of the thesis-antithesis and synthesis and places the
YES of God (gospel) in a position of primacy over the NO (law) of God.
However, Tambach was not the first indication of Barth's positioning of gospel
before law: several earlier works adumbrate that which provided the basis for
Barth's argument given at Tambach.
Barth's break from the liberal theology of his student and early years in
Safenwil reflected not only a crisis within theology and socialism but also a crisis
of grounding: Barth's entire foundation for his thought had been severely
disappointed.39 In the wake of his frustration, Barth sought a new base for his
theology40 and began to reflect upon God's revelation as that which could be best
described through the medium of revolutionary eschatology: the radical inbreaking
of the kingdom of God into the kingdom of the world in such a way as to point to
39Barth himself stated: "...the outbreak of the World War...meant for me
concretely a double fall into a sickness of spirit: first, in the teaching of all my
theological teachers in Germany who seemed compromised beyond redemption by
what I perceived as their failure vis-a-vis the ideology of war; and then, in
socialism, of which I had expected, credulously enough-more so than I had of the
Christian church-that it would shun the ideology, and which I now saw to my
horror doing just the opposite in every country." From: Karl Barth-Rudolph
Bultmann Letters 1922-1966. trans. Geoffrey Bromiley and eds. Geoffrey
Bromiley and Bernd Jaspert (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Press, 1981), 154.
40With reference to his pursuit of a new base for thought, we have previously
addressed the importance of his study of the Bible with Eduard Thurneysen and his
interaction with the Blumhardt's as two of the key events that shaped the thought
of Barth in this second phase of development.
94
the sovereignty of God. Barth's reflection of revelation also impacted his ordering
of gospel and law in such a way that in a nascent form, he began to place the
gospel, God's YES, before the law, God's NO.
Barth expressed this placing of gospel before law in two major strains of
thought during phase II. First, he insisted that all theology be God-based, as
against experiential. In so doing, humanity experiences unrest which in turn moves
it towards God. Undoubtedly, this rings of orthodox Lutheranism.41 However,
we must understand that this seemingly loud NO of God to humanity is really the
beginning of Barth's no to religious socialism. Barth wanted to make it very clear
that the unrest humanity faces is the unrest of realizing that by its own merits or
programs, it cannot appropriate access to God. The unrighteousness that humanity
experiences is not the judgment of God, but is, in a sense, a judgment of itself.
The problem Barth underlines is that when humanity feels this unrest, rather than
ascribing to God the rightful place of sovereignty, rather than acknowledging that
the righteousness it seeks can be found only in God and given by God, humanity
attempts to 'build Towers of Babel' and reach God itself. In a letter to Eduard
41For Martin Luther, humanity under the law perceives life and death-life
through the commandment of the law, which simultaneously becomes death in that
humanity cannot fulfill the commandment. The law pursues humanity, demands
of humanity, points to the failure of humanity, and thus leads to despair and a
preparation to hear the gospel. Ronald F. Thiemann clarifies the Lutheran
position: "According to the standard of the law God pronounces a verdict of
condemnation over sinful human existence, a verdict which stands in stark
opposition to the gracious declaration of forgiveness in the gospel of Christ. In the
context of atonement the concepts law, wrath, sin, and condemnation are sharply
distinguished from and opposed to the concepts gospel, grace, faith and forgiveness
in order that the unique saving work of Christ might be highlighted." "Toward of
Theology of Creation: A Response to Gustaf Wingren," in Creation and Method,
ed. H. VanderGoot (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1981),
121.
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Thurneyson, Barth stated his objections this way:
The conference in Patteln was very fine. I was greatly delighted with
Bader's lecture...he described the development of the distinction between
Ragaz and Kutter...Conclusion: the religious-socialist "concern" is
finished, the taking of God in earnest at its beginning.42
By 1916, in his lecture, "The Righteousness of God," Barth began to equate the
unrest and Towers of Babel with religious socialism:
We are inwardly resentful that the righteousness we pant
after is God's and can only come to us from God. We should
like to take the mighty thing into our own hands and under
our own management, as we have done with so many other things
...We arrogate to ourselves, unquestioningly, the right to
take up the tumultuous question, What shall we do? as if that
were in any case the first and most pressing problem. Only
let us be quick to put our hand to reform, sanitation, methods,
cultural and religious endeavors of all sorts! Only to do
'real work!' And before we know it the trumpet blast of conscience
has lost its disturbing tone...The longing for a new world has lost
all its bitterness, sharpness, restlessness, has become the joy of
development, and now blossoms sweetly and surely in orations, donor's
tablets, committee meetings, reviews, annual reports...and countless
mutual blows. The righteousness of God itself has slowly changed
from being the surest of facts into being the highest among various high
ideals, and is now at all events our very own affair.43
The language of reform, methods, religious endeavors and the like clearly points
to Barth's growing frustration with the religious socialists. In that discontent, we
hear a loud and resolute NO from Barth, and from Barth's perspective, also from
God. But this is not a no to humanity in general. This distinction is extremely
important. In emphasizing theology as God-centered and focused, Barth was
making sure that no one or nothing got in the way. He had already rid himself,
for the most part, of the liberal legacy. He was beginning, now, to do the same
^Revolutionary Theology in the Making. 31. Note: Hans Bader was, at the
time of this letter to Thurneyson (September 8, 1915), a pastor in Zurich and one
of the founders of the religious-socialist movement in Switzerland.
43"The Righteousness of God," 15-16.
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with religious socialism.
Moreover, Barth argued that God's righteousness, which we seek, is an
eternal righteousness and therefore, is prior to the unrighteousness of humanity.
In this sense, humanity is able to expect, as Barth says, more from God.44 God's
sovereignty is greater than humanity's unrighteousness. Therefore, as humanity
expects more from God, humanity will recognize the touch of God that reaches
out, empowering people to seek after this righteousness that, on the one hand, so
readily awaits them, but on the other hand seems elusive. Humanity's attempt to
sanctify itself through its own efforts only obstructs the coming of God's
kingdom. When humanity seeks to find this kingdom, this righteousness, on its
own, it deafens itself to the call of God.45 However, nothing can stop the
inbreaking of God into the world: the righteousness of God permeates even the
unrighteous world, regardless of human machination. This inbreaking of God into
the world is the second strain of thought prevalent during Barth's second phase of
development.
For him, God initiates a revolution when confronting humanity, a
revolution of eschatological proportions. This revolution of God offers the
"Ibid., 25.
45Barth believes that although humanity may, by its own machinations, fail to
hear the word of grace God offers, this choice does not prohibit the freedom of
God to continue to speak and, during this phase of Barth's development, radically
break into the world. Barth reminds us that to hear the word of grace is a difficult
task amidst the unrighteousness of the world: "His righteousness is an eternal
righteousness! This is difficult for us to hear. We must take the trouble to go far
enough off to hear it again. We make a veritable uproar with our morality and
culture and religion. But we may presently be brought to silence, and with that
will begin our true redemption." From "The Righteousness of God," 23-24. This
silence that comes upon humanity is the silence the Barth of this phase would
describe in the revolutionary eschatology of Tambach and Romans I.
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"magnificent, productive, hopeful life of a grain of seed, a new beginning, out of
which all things shall be made new"46 and the Word of God to humanity
"authoritatively announces that God must be all in all...Oh that we dared in faith
to take what grace can offer us!"47 This revolutionary eschatology, this radical
inbreaking of the righteous God into the unrighteous world, is, for Barth, the word
of grace that places the gospel before the law. God's YES comes to humanity in
the kingdom of God-the eternal YES reaches to humanity and offers it a word of
grace. This is the radical eschatology of Phase II and for this reason Barth begins
to place gospel before law.
Even in 1916, with his doubts clearly expressed regarding the efforts of the
religious socialists to fabricate the kingdom of God on earth, Barth still believed
that socialism, in the sense of Jesus 'as the social movement,' and 'the social
movement as Jesus' was a human reflection of the kingdom of God. There was
still very much a linking of God's kingdom with humanity's present reality.
However, with the Tambach lecture, much of this thought was dismissed, and the
YES of God found itself once again in the center of Barth's dialogue with
theology.
In that lecture, Barth did away with any notion of religious socialism as the
kingdom of God.48 In its call for a radical renewal, Barth would affirm socialism
as a parable of the kingdom of God. However, there was much, particularly
46Barth, "The Strange New World Within the Bible," 49.
47Ibid., 49-50.
48Eberhard Busch argues that the Tambach lecture was "to speak a farewell to
al theology which Barth himself had followed for some time, and especially to
religious socialism." From: Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth. 111.
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within religious socialism, which in Barth's mind needed an overhaul.49 In the
Tambach lecture, Barth described this needed change by discussing the dialectical
tension between Christ/kingdom of God and human actions, whether conservative
or revolutionary.
In setting up a contrast between God and the world, Barth immediately
established a thesis — the presence of God in the world — yet quickly countered
this thesis with an antithesis — the tension which exists between Christ and the
world.50 The tension so apparent between the thesis and antithesis is, however,
overcome by the synthesis: the revolution of God that is from eternity, preceding
our human revolution:
The original is the synthesis. It is out of this that both thesis
and antithesis arise. Insight into the true transcendence of the
divine origin of all things permits, or rather commands us, to
understand...Naturally we shall be led first not to a denial but to
an affirmation of the world as it is...only out of such an
affirmation can come that genuine, radical denial which is manifestly
the movements of our protest, the genuine antithesis must follow
the thesis: it is through the thesis which derives from the
synthesis...it is the original and spontaneously productive energy
of the synthesis from which the energy of the thesis and the energy
of the antithesis both derive.51
49A helpful example of how Barth viewed the socialist call for radical reform
as a parable of the kingdom is found in the Tambach lecture in which Barth states
that in its protest against existing things, spiritual Israel represented the parabolic
characteristic of the present world and the penetration of it by God. See "The
Christian's Place in Society," bottom 307. Helmut Gollwitzer in the article "The
Kingdom of God and Socialism" gives a helpful clarification: "Positively, the
concept of 'parable' means this: What ought here to take place in social affairs is
capable of 'reflecting' the kingdom of God 'indirectly as a mirror-image.'" In
Hunsigner, Karl Barth and Radical Politics. 98.
50Barth sets up this dialectical relationship by stating: "The Christian... in
society! How these two magnitudes fall apart! How abstract they are to us!"
From "The Christian's Place in Society," 275.
51"The Christian's Place in Society," 299, 321.
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Barth's concern in establishing this dialectic is two-fold: first, he wants yet again
to make clear that any revolution — any origin-any initiation of the kingdom — is
purely and solely God's work. The tension established in the antithesis underscores
this point. Humanly speaking, society's renewal is impossible.52 Second, Barth's
concern to establish the synthesis as the origin of the thesis and antithesis relates
closely to questions of gospel and law. It would be inaccurate to state that Barth's
main concern in the Tambach lecture was to differentiate between the role and
order of gospel and law. Yet, indirectly — and we believe underlying his entire
purpose of the lecture — was his intense concern for a place of primacy for gospel.
True, Barth is cognizant of and acknowledges the function of the NO - the role
of the law that reveals to humanity its need for God. But even more important,
he stresses that the NO finds its full meaning only when enclosed within the YES:
To go back to origins is not to go back to annihilation, if we
go back to the origin of origins, to God. On the contrary, it
is only in God that we can come to a positive position. The
negation which issues from God and means God, is positive and
all positives not built upon God are negative.53
There is then no denial of the negative, but there is a clarification as to its place
and function: the NO follows the YES.54
52At this point Barth breaks decisively from religious socialism. He states that
the "relation between Christ in us and the world is not really a matter of opening
the sluices and allowing the ready water to stream over the thirsty land...The
Divine is something whole, complete in itself...it does not permit being applied,
stuck on, fitted in. It does not permit of being divided and distributed, for the
very reason that its more than religion. It does not passively permit itself to be
used: it overthrows and builds up as it wills. It is complete or it is nothing."
Ibid., 276-277.
53Ibid., 294. (underline mine).
54Again Barth clarifies: "...we may deny ourselves the No even less than the
Yes, for it follows after it." Ibid., 316-317.
100
Recalling that during this period (1915-1919) Barth was most concerned with
ascribing to God a place of authority, sovereignty and primacy, especially in
matters of epistemology, the connection that arises with gospel and law is no
surprise. Considering Barth's position on revelation (revelation as God's
revolution - from above), the place of the gospel as that which precedes law must
stand. Religious socialism was dead; the revolution of God's kingdom was based
on God's initiative and humanity was able live accordingly, in expectation of the
coming kingdom, for "in light of the resurrection, we no longer live under the
illusion that we can overcome the world but we also know that God can and
will."55
For Barth, Tambach marked an important part of the development of Phase
II: religious socialism was swept out of Barth's approach to the kingdom, and the
revolutionary eschatology of the first edition of Romans had become more defined
with God as the initiator and sole legislator of the kingdom. Moreover, Barth
began to view God's kingdom at being 'wholly other,' a term gleaned from his
brother Heinrich.56 Because God now stood at the forefront of his theology,57
so gospel would take a position before law.
With the close of 1919, Barth moved into a transitional period marked by his
55McCormack, 69.
56McCormack notes that Barth had heard this term used in a lecture given by
his brother at the Aarau Student Conference. Furthermore, following this lecture,
Barth noted this term in a letter to Thurneysen, dated April 13, 1919 (in Barth-
Thurnevsen Briefwechsel I. 325.)
57Barth again underlines this importance in the Tambach lecture: "The
synthesis we seek is in God alone and in God alone can we find it...For creation
and redemption are possible only because God is God, because his imminence
means at the same time his transcendence." (322).
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interaction with Franz Overbeck and Overbeck's concept of Urgeschichte. This
period of time (after Tambach and before Romans II (1919-1922) would be
characterized by a continued refining of Barth's doctrine of revelation, and thus his
ordering of gospel and law.
As examined earlier, Barth's interaction with Overbeck and his adoption of
0•»
Urgeschichte significantly impacted his doctrine of revelation. The concept of
Urgeschichte placed the relationship between revelation and human history at an
impasse: while present in human history, God was not equated with it.58 This
strong insistence on maintaining the freedom of God is key to Barth's clarification
of the positioning of gospel before law. One way that Barth stressed this freedom
of God was through clarifying the role of the YES (gospel, grace) and the NO
(law, judgment).
In the 1920 lecture, "Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas," Barth clarified
the role of the gospel and law in two ways. First, he stressed the role of the YES
as that which comes before the NO. For Barth, God's first word to humanity is
a word of grace: because we are known by God before we ever know God, we
encounter an act of grace on God's part from eternity.59 God's grace is eternal,
and the only "eternal election is God's: the disposition of history and of the
individual mind are secondary and temporal."60 Here again, we see Barth
attacking any form of human reason and any act of history (WWtiW here
Overbeck's influence is clear) as falling short of God's eternal act of electing
58For the more detailed discussion of this concept, see Chapter Two.
59"Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas," 95-96.
"Ibid., 59.
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humanity to participate in covenant relationship. Furthermore, this God of grace,
who is involved in yet separate from, human history, has from eternity predisposed
humanity as the recipients of His deep love, for according to Barth,
...we belong to the Yes and not to the No...we are caught and taken
captive by a presupposed and original Yes which we would not attempt
to deny if it did not cause us such unrest. We cannot quite forget
the souls provenance: we cannot quite forget its unity with God
in the beginning.61
Second, Barth expressed the role of gospel and law in terms of a crisis
facing humanity. This theme, which adumbrates what would become the primary
theme of Phase III, warrants our attention. The crisis of humanity is, according
to Barth, not in the NO. It comes to humanity in the YES! Humanity's
knowledge of God's grace, of God's eternal election, is what causes humanity
unrest because people must admit that even in the YES, they often take part in
refusing the very grace offered.62
Within this lecture, (Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas), we begin to
see how Barth holds gospel and law in tension, how they are unified and yet
distinct. Barth does not, and will not, deny the possibility that even within the
YES, there is NO63 or that humanity is forced to live on the narrow ridge of rock
upon which it must balance between the YES and the NO.64 But clearly the
eternal word of God is gospel: clearly, the eternal election is God's. The question






where humanity finds its origin and yet from which is finds itself separated.65
Most assuredly, the NO Barth is combatting is religiosity: the bourgeois
nineteenth century culture-religion and the socialism that had failed to meet the
crisis of the war and had lulled Christianity into a faith of anthropomorphism. And
because religiosity was a product of the law,66 the law could never be a means by
which humanity gained knowledge of God —certainly not in the revelatory sense
of the word. The NO of God is the NO humanity confronts after God's revelation
has met it: the NO finds its complete meaning in the YES.67
During this point of transition, Barth's treatment of gospel and law was still
very much a focal point. Since he viewed revelation as ahistorical, he was even
more determined to lift up the sovereignty of God and, at the same time, underline
the gap existing between God and humanity. This he would do in the second
edition of Romans by developing the other side of the hope found in Phase II: the
hope located in the revolutionary eschatology would not be abandoned but refined.
In fact, this hope would exist in an even more significant sense since Barth had
rejected religious socialism that was, ultimately, a false hope. Therefore, while
Barth never abandoned the hope he expressed in the revolutionary eschatology and
the YES of God in Phase II, he would emphasize this hope in a different way in
Phase III. This would be in the crisis of the NO.
65Ibid., 59.
•"Ibid., 81.
67Even in 1920, Barth viewed the relationship between gospel and law as one
in which gospel came before law and yet was uniquely related to the law.
Although he does not, in Phase II, use the terminology he would later apply to the
relationship between the gospel and the law (i.e. law as a form of the gospel and
gospel as the content of the law), certainly the skeleton of this language is
apparent.
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Phase III: The Crisis Of the Yes: Gospel as made manifest in crisis (1922-24).
Barth entered into Phase III of his theological development with a need to
further define his own theology. Having encountered Overbeck's concept of
Urgeschichte, having broken with the religious socialists, he knew that the radical
eschatology of Phase II needed to be redefined, a task that could best be
accomplished in a revision of the commentary on Romans. Within this third phase,
there was undoubtedly an emphasis on the negative of the dialectic that might lead
us to believe that the hope of the revolutionary eschatology of Phase II had been
abandoned by Barth. It had not. Rather, it took on a different character. Since
his adoption of the concept of Urgeschichte, Barth was extremely concerned to
once again make clear that revelation was not in any way, shape or form related
to a human-centered event; in other words, revelation had to come from God to
humanity and not from humanity to God. It would seem that this idea is
redundant. However, if we examine the various factors in Barth's development,
we can understand how with each new piece of information, with each new
influence on his thought,68 Barth became more and more certain that if he were
to stress anything in theology, it had to be the sovereignty and freedom of God:
God had to be in a position of primacy. In Phase 111, Barth further refined his
doctrine of revelation to revelation as resurrection: in the event of the resurrection
- in his exalted state as the Redeemer of humanity, as the eternal Logos at the
right hand of God — Jesus in his resurrection is revelation to humanity. Revelation
68For Barth there were some very significant people who impacted his thought
during the interim period between 1920-22. In the preface of the second edition
of Romans, he mentions several such as Overbeck, Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard,
Dostoevsky, and of course, Eduard Thurneysen. See "The Preface to the Second
Edition," in The Epistle to the Romans. 3-4.
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was, therefore, more than ever, God's event-outside of, yet within and impacting^
history. There is no denying that the tone of Romans II and the entire phase
carries a more harsh tone. However, in lieu of his revisions and his concern for
the place of God, that which seems negative, is, for Barth, positive and, more
important, rooted in the positive, in the YES of God. This relationship between
the positive and negative would have implications for the further development of
his ordering of gospel before law.
By 1920, Barth had begun to develop the theme of the YES of God as a
crisis. By the second edition of Romans, this crisis was fully manifest, impacting
Barth's ordering of gospel before law. In the article, "Krisis und Gnade,"69
Michael Beintker provides excellent insight into the function of the crisis motif and
its relationship to the gospel-law ordering in Romans II. Beintker states that (in
reference to the 1935 essay "Gospel and Law") "Barth had really said nothing
decisively new in 1935...so it may not be surprising when this same crisis motif of
Romans II is taken into consideration as an important building block for Barth's
ordering of gospel before law. "70 Beintker argues, and we concur, that the crisis
motif — the loud NO — in Romans II is a crisis arising from the YES, from grace.
Faced with God, who chooses humanity from eternity, humanity confronts a crisis:
in encountering the freedom of God, the freedom to choose and initiate
relationship, humanity faces the electing God and the reality of the chasm that
exists between people and God:
In grace, not sin, God enters in on their behalf...Grace is the truth




of God about the individual and about the broad cause of his whole
life; and because grace is this, it brings him radically under crisis...
We know that grace is the grace of the hidden God by which the vitality
of the known man in this world is fundamentally disturbed. We know also
that in grace the supposed unity of mankind meets and is disturbed by
a wholly other majestic and unobservable unity, which is true oneness.71
The crisis humanity faces is an unavoidable, rooted in the eternal grace of God:72
...God does not leave us and we cannot leave God. It is
because God himself and God alone lends our life its
possibility that it becomes so impossible for us to live.
It is because God says YES to us that NO of existence here
is so fundamental and unescapable. It is because the
answer to all our questions is God and God's conduct towards
us, that the only answers that we fan find in terms of our
own conduct either change immediately into questions or are
otherwise too vast for us.73
This predicament is, in fact, one of time and eternity. In facing God and
God's love, humanity finds itself cognizant of the vast difference that exists
between itself and God.74 This dialectic of time and eternity sets off within
humanity a series of shock waves: the wholly other God speaks a word of entrance
into the world and, in so doing, emphasizes the vast difference between time and
eternity that only God can bridge through, in this phase, the resurrection of Christ.
Undoubtedly this difference, can be construed as the NO of God — indeed, a loud
NO. However, this judgment, this crisis, arises first out of God's grace, out of
the YES. The YES brings a disturbance to human lives75 in a way that law
71The Epistle to the Romans. 221, 452.
72Karl Barth, "The Small Moment," in Come. Holy Spirit. 53.
73"The Problem of Ethics Today," 169.
74Barth states, "Under grace men know that they are servants of sin." The
Epistle to the Romans. 226.
75Barth comments, "It is grace alone that is competent to provide men with a
truly ethical disturbance; and if grace is to perform this function, it must be treated
as covering the whole field of human life and must be permitted to make that
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cannot do, since humanity can corrupt and misuse the law, eliciting a contrived
righteousness separate from God's righteousness.76
According to Barth, the law cannot truly be understood without placing it
in the light of the gospel. The crisis of the NO is crisis only as it is related to the
YES of God, for "the crisis motif establishes God's NO already stated before in
the divine YES: because God has said YES before and will hereafter say YES, his
NO to humanity is especially sharp and deep...Already in Romans II is found the
surprising statement that the NO of God on the whole, will be clear only as it is
overcome in the YES."77 Thus, the NO of God is founded first and foremost in
the YES: judgment is possible only because of grace, and only in grace does God
judge.78 There is, according to Barth, "nothing but YES and NO in God, only
because of the YES;"79 the NO cannot exist without the YES, for
this NO, posited with finality by revelation, is not without
the 'deep secret YES under and above the NO' which we should
'grasp and hold to with a firm faith in God's Word' and 'confess
that God is right in his judgement against us, for then we have
won.' This is how it is with that NO: 'nothing but YES in it,
but always deep and secretly and always seeming to be nothing
but NO.'80
absolute assault upon men without which ethics are completely meaningless." Ibid.,
430.
76In this sense, Barth is referring to the law as "religiosity" or "religion" rather
than as a form of the gospel. Barth believed that if law were the guiding principle
behind God's relationship with humanity, humanity would create yet another Tower
of Babel. Ibid., 241.
77Beintker, "Krisis und Gnade," 447.
78The Epistle to the Romans. 93.
79Karl Barth, "The Great 'But,'" in Come Holy Spirit. 23.
80Karl Barth, "An Answer to Professor Adolf Von Harnack's Open Letter," in
Revelation and Theology. 50.
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Therefore, the NO cannot exist without the YES; because the NO is, in reality, the
YES of God.81 We have previously stated that the NO of God is intricately tied
to the YES, so much so that the relationship has been described as ontological.82
Therefore, the law stands in a unique position: only as a form of the gospel does
it function properly. Apart from the gospel, the law may, according to Barth,
form
an actual obstacle to the inheritance of the Kingdom of God...
Hence, when the law claims to possess in itself ultimate reality
and to be like God, it becomes ungodliness and unrighteousness
and attracts to itself the wrath of God...In this context the
word 'law' embraces all who set out to experience the infinite,
all who venture upon its contemplation or description or
representation. This is always transgression...The law is not
itself revelation, but a worldly, limited, negative impress of
revelation...The law of righteousness...'is the law of faith.'83
As the gospel moves humanity into crisis, and as the law becomes, then,
a form of the gospel, so too does God's word, as found in the gospel, place a
demand of grace upon humanity which calls for an acquiescence of the human will
to the divine. Humanity is wooed to give up its pursuit of God on its own terms
and accept the terms of God's revelation:
Grace means: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.
Consequently, grace, as the existential relation between God
and man, is bound to move from the indicative of the divine
truth concerning men to the imperative by which the divine
reality makes its demand upon them. They must will what God
wills as hitherto they have not!...There is demanded of them-
of each single person-a different being and having and doing.84
81Barth says, .the negation in which we stand can be understood only in light
of the divine affirmation from which it proceeds." The Epistle to the Romans. 94-
95.
82Beintker, "Krisis und Gnade," 449.
83The Epistle to the Romans. 135-136, 366.
84Ibid., 222.
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of each single person-a different being and having and doing.84
Significantly, this move from the indicative of the divine truth concerning humanity
to the imperative by which the divine reality makes its demand is the base for a
divine ethical command, which we will discuss in the next chapter. Equally
important is Earth's insistence upon the demand of grace, but the balance God's
grace plays in the working out of this demand. While Earth is more than aware
that humanity in its own power cannot fulfill the demand, the demand of grace
does, at one ievei, make humanity aware of the "possibility of impossibility."85
Not only does the gospel place a claim upon humanity, it also calls
humanity to a response — repentance:
The dialectic of the miracle of God is expressed in the words:
the goodness of God leadetn Thee to repentance. What is demanded
of men by God can be demanded only by God, can be only a new call
to God, a new call to conversion, awe, humility, a new requirement
to abandon every security and to resign every honor, to give glory
to God, to the unknown God, as always something new, as something
that has never been done before.86
Clearly the crux of the gospel-law ordering is found here! The love and grace of
God, the gospel, brings humanity to repentance. Certainly the law does not do so,
especially not by its own merit. The law as a form of the gospel has a direct
correlation to the crisis of the YES, which reveals to humanity the NO of God.
Earth's approach to revelation in Phase III impacts gospel and law in this
way: revelation in Phase III is an anistorical event with which there can be no





event permeates the world and displays grace. But this is not a temporal event, nor
is the grace displayed temporal. Recalling that Earth's eschatology is expressed
in the dialectic of time and eternity,87 the event of revelation finds its ultimate
parameters in the time-eternity dialectic as do gospel and law. The impossible-
possibility, as defined by the "coincidence of time and eternity, occurs as God's
deed in which the opposition between each of the poles mentioned is not abrogated
so that a continuity between them results."88 Eternity — the eternal grace of God
in the pre-existent Christ — touches the world, an event never to be confused with
any human event. For this reason, therefore, God's grace, even in the strident
tone of Phase III, must be the first word of God to humanity. And Barth confirms
this point in his ordering of gospel before law.
Phase IV: The Gospel as Incarnational Eschatologv: God's Eternal Election
of Humanity as Reflected in the Person of Christ 119241.
By the end of Phase III (1922-1924), Barth had clearly placed gospel in a
position before law. In Phase IV, especially within the Gottingen Dogmatics and
the Ethics lectures of 1928-1930, the gospel's content is more fully discussed. This
content is Jesus Christ.
87The dialectic of time and eternity serves as an expression of Barth's
eschatology in the following manner: it assures the inbreaking of eternity into time
without equating eternity with time. McCormack cites a helpful book by Michael
Beintker, Die Diaiektik in der dialektischen Theologie Karl Barths In it Beintker
examines this relationship between eternity and time. He states, "Eternity cannot
become time. But eternity can encounter time. Barth calls that moment the
'Moment,' when he has in view the relation of eternity to the existence of the
believer. And he characterizes it as 'primal history' when he is establishing the
relation of eternity to the even of revelation in the Christ event...Every temporal
moment can become a parable of the eternal moment.. .Thus Barth developed in the
second edition of Romans distinct features of an 'eschatology of the hie et nunc,'in
which all moments of our time and history can be thought of as being in the same
nearness to the eschaton.'" Michael Beintker as cited in McCormack, 147.
88Reveiation and Theology. 148.
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For Barth, Christ as the content of the gospel is correlated to his adoption
of the ancient anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula: God is fully
human yet fully divine. Entering into history as a man, God still maintains the
divine incognito. This Christology, along with its partner, God's eternal election
of humanity in Christ, served to reinforce Barth's ordering of gospel before law.
In Phase IV, Barth continued to reaffirm that the crisis humanity faces
originates in the grace of God: God's word to humanity is YES: "...the divine
Word does not say NO. It says YES, for the YES breaks forth out of the
NO.. .For when God is known, even though it be in judgment, then He is known
totally, and therefore, so also is His grace. When the divine NO to us is truly
heard, then it is broken through by the divine YES, whose shell it is. "89
While it may seem that here in the Gottingen Dogmatics Barth is arguing for the
primacy of the law, this is not the case. The YES which breaks forth from the NO
is the original YES of the crisis-the YES, which in fact, gives the NO its meaning.
God's gospel encloses the law like a shell.90
Significantly, Barth does see an interconnectedness between the gospel and
89The Gottingen Dogmatics. 461, 464. [underline mine]
'"Barth reiterates this idea of the gospel enclosing the law clear in the 1928-1930
Ethics. He argues: "...it may be easily overlooked that the origin of the
establishment and revelation of the law is undoubtedly God himself and the love
of God...while one may emphasize the distance and even the antithesis between
God and man which the revelation of the command and occurrence of the crisis
manifest, one must still remember above all that this event does at least mean
encounter with God.. .it must be perceived above all that the fact of this encounter
is itself proof of the love of God, a love which is perhaps displayed as wrathful
love, yet still is God's love." And again: "Love is before judgement and above
it. Law is simply the concrete form and voice of the gospel." From: Ethics. 90-
91.
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the law.91 However, Barth's emphasis is on God's word of grace as the first word
spoken to humanity. Even in the act of creation, God expresses grace to humanity:
"God's Word is his, the truth of the unknown, inscrutable, holy God, graciously
revealed to us so far as God speaks to us and by his speaking grants us hearing,
so creating communion between himself and us, between us and himself."92
Ultimately, for Barth, the gospel, reflected in revelation, is the gracious word of
God to humanity.93 And this revelation, which in Phase IV is constituted in the
Incarnation, reflects further the reason Barth places gospel before law.
With the adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis Christological formula,
Barth gave revelation historical content but allowed for the divine incognito to
remain intact. Recalling that in Phase III revelation did not have historical content
but did enter into history through the ahistorical event of the resurrection, Barth's
theological development in the area of Christology and therefore his doctrine of
revelation has significant consequences. With the revised Christology, God, who
91In the Ethics lectures, Barth describes the unique relationship that exists
between the gospel and the law: "As the concept of law cannot be interpreted
apart from the atonement that has taken place in Christ, so the concept of
atonement cannot be interpreted without thinking of the law. The command of the
Creator is formally and materially the command of life-formally because it is given
to us in and with the life that God has created, materially because we are ordered
to live this life that God has created-so the command of God the Reconciler is the
command of law-formally because it is given to us as we are directed by grace and
put under law, materially because we are ordered to acknowledge God's
contradiction of us by the law, and in this submission to give God the glory. To
live by faith is to love God and fear him, to fear God and love him." Ethics. 293.
Important to note here is Barth's insistence on the way the gospel brings us to the
law and how in the law we respond in obedience to God and therefore show God
we love him. But even in their interconnectedness, gospel is still very much God's
first and last word to the world.
92"Church and Culture,"(given June 1 1926), in Theology and Church. 335.
93"Church and Theology," in Theology and Church. 289.
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in Barth's theology had seemed so distant, enters into the world fully without
losing any divine sovereignty. The implications are two-fold: first, God's grace
as reflected in the gospel is emphasized in a new way — now the God whose first
word to humanity is a word of grace enters into history, demonstrating the
impossible-possibility of covenant relationship; second, the content of this gospel
rests in the Incarnate Christ.94
According to Barth, God speaks to humanity in Christ95 and "in himself
and primarily Christ is the Savior and Head of Elect humanity and only implicitly
and secondarily is he also the judge of rejected humanity."96 This concept of
Christ as the head of the elect is crucial to our understanding of Barth's ordering
of gospel before law: the gospel, whose content is Christ, is anchored in God's
eternal election of humanity.
Barth emphasizes that from eternity, humanity has been elected as God's
covenant partner:
'God lives for us in Jesus Christ...The meaning is: we are-I am,
you are-objects of God's regard from all eternity...I am regarded
and acknowledged by God, yes infinitely far from him as I am.
Not as a second God but as a man who has sinned, is sinning, and
will sin, and who can recognize himself as nothing else than lost,
I am acknowledged by God in Jesus Christ his beloved Son, acknowledged,
chosen, and, when the fullness of time was come, reconciled to Him.'97
The presupposition of humanity's election is therefore the great act of the mercy
94Karl Barth, "Gospel and Law " Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional
Papers 8 (1959): 5-6.
95"Church and Theology," 302.
96The Gottingen Dogmatics. 461.
97Karl Barth, The Christian Life, trans. J. Strathearn McNab (London: SCM
Press, 1926), 12-13.
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of God: God lives for us and in us in Christ and through the Holy Spirit.98
The sheer act of creation is one of grace in which humanity gains insight
into its own existence.99 Indeed, this act is an eternal manifestation of grace, of
election, of the eternal gospel. And this gospel, whose content is the eternal
Christ, is the eternal election of God. As God eternally elects humanity and as
humanity experiences the crisis that comes from this election, humanity is
simultaneously judged. Here, importantly, is where the gospel and law work so
closely: as the gospel brings humanity God's first word of grace, and subsequently
crisis, so the law of God calls humanity to obedience as God's covenant partners.
From eternity, the manifestation of God's mercy and righteousness is
established,100 and, for Barth,
the decision before and under which we are set by God's word
in Christ is so decisive that we are not permitted to go
back to an indecision, indefiniteness, or neutrality prior
to this decision. The decision is always first and supreme.
From and to all eternity we are simply the objects of the mercy
and righteousness of the divine will.101
The Christological formula of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis, specifically
introduced and discussed in the Gottingen Dogmatics confirms the ordering of
gospel before law as the reflection of God's gracious election of humanity in Christ
from eternity. The YES of God that informs the NO is the Word of God: the
Word of revelation, the Word of grace. We have, in the first three chapters of
this work, traced the development of Karl Barth's ethics from the late Teens to the
98Ibid., 41.
"Karl Barth, The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, trans. R. Birch Hoyle
(London: Frederick Muller, Inc., 1938), 20.
100The Gottingen Dogmatics. 468.
101Ibid., 468.
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early Twenties through an analysis of his doctrine of revelation and theological
ordering of gospel before law. This examination establishes the basis for
understanding the way that Barth approached the question of ethics. Our next task
is to examine the way that Barth's doctrine of revelation and theological ordering
of gospel before law influenced his approach to ethics. To this aspect of Barth's
work, we now direct our attention.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Ethical Aspects of Karl Barth's doctrine of revelation and gospel and law
I. The Relocation of the Ethical Question
In addressing questions of the relationship between Barth's theology (as
completed by 1924) and his ethics, we must begin by understanding where Barth
places the ethical question, which for Barth, finds its home and validation within
the confines of dogmatics and therefore within God's gracious election of
humanity. The question of ethics is, for Barth, not a question of good and evil or
the choice between good and evil, for this is a category redolent of human
inauthenticity.1 The question of ethics is,
a search for the heteronomous and intrinsic law with which
we must come into harmony if we are to live authentically
and creatively. Choosing between good and evil implies that
people are already in touch with reality and their only task
is its administration. Barth's relocation of the ethical
question acknowledges the fact that men and women are not
already in touch with reality, but that search is the human
task and it is possible only on the basis of grace. The
choice between good and evil calls elements within our
environment into question. The real ethical question calls
MS into question.2
The heteronomous intrinsic law of which Bettis speaks is, for Barth, the ethical
imperative (rooted and grounded in God's divine election) which carries its own
intrinsic validation and calls humanity into radical obedience to God:3 the ethical
imperative exists for Barth in God's authority alone.4
'CD IV/1, 449.
"Joseph Bettis, "Political Theology and Social Ethics: The Socialist Humanism




Because Barth places the ethical question within the locus of God's
prerogative and election, several implications follow, namely, Barth's rejection of
certain approaches to theology and ethics (natural theology, the point of contact,
eristic theology) and his basis for all ethical activity as found in the command of
God.
II. The Implications of Barth's doctrine of revelation and theological ordering of
gospel before law.
A. The rejection of Natural Theology.5
Barth's rejection of natural theology6 arose out of his doctrine of revelation,
one in which all knowledge of God was presented and understood in the event of
the revelation of Christ. This left no room for any form of natural theology,
which emphasized the role of humanity in comprehending the divine. This ability
was based on the power of reason, whereby humanity would reflect on its nature
5In "Natur und Gnade," Emil Brunner stated: "This much is clear: the
theologians attitude to theologia naturalis decides the character of his ethics."
From "Nature and Grace," Natural Theology (London: Geoffrey Bles: The
Centenary Press, 1946), 51. This statement is certainly true to the case of Karl
Barth, for his rejection of natural theology would clearly inform his ethics.
6We will not be examining theories of natural law in detail in this work. For
further information on natural law theories see the following: Thomas Aquinas,
Nature and Grace: Selections from Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas
(London: SCM Press, 1954); Summa Theologica. trans. Thomas Gilby (London:
Blackfriars, 1965); J. Dalby, The Catholic Conception of the Law of Nature
(London: SPCK, 1943); Alexander Passerin d'Entreves, Natural Law: An
Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1951 and 1971); Jacques
Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law, trans. Marguerite Wieser (London:
SCM Press, 1960); J. Finnis, The Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1983), Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1980); Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society v. I&II (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1934); C.G. Haines, The Revival of Natural Law
Concepts. (Harvard: Harvard University Press); N. Micklem, The Theology of the
Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943); E. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching
of the Christian Churches. 2 vols.. (Allen and Unwin, 1931).
118
and, in so doing, discover God's general end for humankind, 'blessed
immortality.' Apprehending this goal would thus empower humanity to determine
the means by which to achieve its end. Thus, at one level, natural theology
espoused a belief in the "participation of eternal law in rational creatures"7 and
believed natural law to be the imprint of God's providential plan on humanity's
natural reason. Natural law was ingrained in humanity as "that which God had
implanted in the mind of Adam and therefore man as man."8 With the help of
reason, humanity could seek for concrete norms that would serve its effort at self-
realization and reject those that radically contradicted this pursuit.
Proponent of natural law doctrine would concur that it functions under a
three-fold proposition: that "man is intelligent, that reality is intelligible and that
reality, grasped by intelligence imposes on the will an obligation that it be obeyed
in its demand for action or abstention."9 In this three-fold presupposition, natural
law demands a morality that stems from within human nature. Moreover, natural
law provides a structure of human order - this structure is the being of humanity's
nature, a rule or measure of righteousness that God demands from His creatures.
Born out of the Biblical legal codes, moral judgments and human conscience,
natural law provides not only a judgment of right and wrong originating in divine
reason,10 but also a valid norm of conduct that has as its first precept to do good
7St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. trans. Thomas Gilby (London:
Blackfriars, 1965), la2ae, 91.2.
8Natural Law: A Christian Reconsideration, ed. A.R. Vidler and W.A.
Whitehouse (London: SCM Press, 1946), 14.
9James Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in Religion, ed. Paul Ramsey (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965): 321.
'"Natural Law: A Christian Reconsideration. 21.
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and avoid evil.11
In functioning as a law of reason, natural law corresponds to the nature of
voluntary agents. True human action depends on reason (conformed to natural
law), controlling the activity of the will. Therefore, the full expression of natural
law depends on humanity's voluntary affirmation of it in right conduct: obedience
to natural law is not achieved automatically, for humanity is responsible for
cooperating or not cooperating with God in its use of reason.
Significantly, natural law can be known by humanity in spite of its sin.
The Encyclical Humani Generis states that in spite of the wounds of original sin,
humanity can know the basic principles of natural law.12 However, sin does
obstruct humanity's ability to accurately scrutinize that which may appear as
natural law: humanity cannot, therefore, fully and completely interact with the
Divine outside of faith. Thus, humanity's participation in eternal law is defective:
"Human reason cannot have full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason,
but according to its own mode, and imperfectly."13 While the natural law is
independent of divine revelation, it finds its fulfillment in divine revelation: there,
the Christian will be most able to discern the authority of natural law.
In Karl Barth's thinking, natural law and natural theology were anathema:14
the knowledge of God could "not be sought or found in human empirical or
existential reality. One cannot reflect upon the human situation and obtain
"Summa Theologica. 93.3 ad 1.
12Encvclical Humani Generis. D.2305f; 2320ff.
13Summa Theologica. 93.3 ad 1.
14Barth's major reaction was to natural theology. However, because natural
theology includes some concepts of the natural law, we include both terms. Our
discussion, however, will focus on natural theology and Barth's polemic against it.
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knowledge of God with any certainty at all. Such knowledge is not present before
us in everyday experience.'"5 Barth defined natural theology as "every (positive
and negative) formulation of a system which claims to be theological, i.e. to
interpret divine revelation, whose subject, however, differs fundamentally from the
revelation in Jesus Christ and whose method therefore differs equally from the
exposition of Holy Scriptures."16 According to Barth, whose most famous
argument against natural theology was in his response to Emil Brunner's "Natur
und Gnade,'"7 natural theology was not a subject that Barth would consider as
a separate entity within theology. Because, Barth argued, natural theology relied
upon other means (history, reason, nature) rather than God's sole revelation in
Christ, natural theology could only be compared to
an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does
not want to fall. All one can do is to turn ones back
upon it as upon the great temptation and source of error,
by having nothing to do with it and by making clear to
oneself and to others from time to time why one acts that
way....Really to reject natural theology means to refuse to
admit it as a separate problem. Hence the rejection of
natural theology can only be a side issue, arising when
serious questions of real theology are being discussed.18
Because Barth adhered (and indeed spent a great deal of time and energy
formulating his position) to a doctrine of revelation that was based on God's
15Paul Matheney. Dogmatics as Ethics (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang
GmbH, 1990), 16.
16Karl Barth, "No!," in Natural Theology (London: Geoffrey Bles: The
Centenary Press, 1946), 74-75.
17The famous Barth-Brunner debate of 1934 revolved around this issue of
natural theology. Barth also addressed the issue of natural theology in the 1938
Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University. See The Knowledge of God and the
Service of God, trans. J.L.M. Haine and Ian Henderson (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1938.) See especially Lecture 1.
18"No!," 75-76.
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gracious election of humanity, all natural theology could be nothing but a
nuisance.19 For him, there was no way that individuals could possess any kind
of moral criteria independent of their relation to God and God's revelation.
Hence, Barth's greatest complaint against natural theology: it reduces the God
event of revelation; it exercises divine sovereignty without being divine and it
relegates God to a position secondary to human reason and effort. Although
natural theologians like Thomas Aquinas have admitted to the natural law as being
intrinsically tied to revelation and faith, Barth argues that humanity, outside of
Christ, has completely lost the image of God: it has been annihilated. Therefore,
under no circumstances is access to God possible at any level through an intrinsic
law of nature in humanity. So emphatic was Barth on this point that he wrote in
a letter to Rudolph Bultmann:
Where people play around with a natural theology and are
so eager to pursue theology within a framework of a pre
understanding that has not been attained theologically, the
inevitable result is that they end up in rigidities and reactionary
corners which are no better than the liberalisms of others; on the
contrary, where this happens, I would rather be in hell with the
Religious Socialists than land up in the heaven in which it will be
ones lot to be condemned to a 'state of life' for all eternity, to
have to gaze at the 'Thou' that is foreordained by creation and have
to maintain this condition for redemption. "20
19In his response to Brunner, Barth states: "For of what use would the purest
theology based on grace and revelation be^fme if I dealt with the subjects of grace
and revelation in the way in which natural theology usually deals with its soi-
distant data derived from reason, nature, history, as if one had them pocketed, as
if one had the knowledge of them below one instead of always behind and in
front?" From "No!," 77.
2°Considering Barth's position regarding the religious Socialist's, this is a very
telling statement! From Karl Barth-Rudolph Bultmann Letters 1922-1966. 50. See
also The Gottingen Dogmatics. 92-93 for further elucidation by Barth on his view
of natural theology.
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In addressing natural theology, Barth's concern can be seen in his
confrontation with three major areas: the place of the analogia entis, the point of
contact, and the role of eristic theology.
1. The Analogia Entis
One primary area that Barth attacked in his fight against natural theology
was the concept of the analogia entis, the analogy of being. It suggests that there
is something in the being of humanity that has its analogue in the being of God.
Naturally, with the theology that affirmed the relationship between God and
humanity as purely God-created and initiated, an analogia entis would have no
place in Barth's theology or ethics.21 The issue Barth raises regarding the analogia
entis is one of openness: the receptiveness or non-receptiveness of humanity to
God's revelation. In approaching this concern, Barth's polemic against the
analogia entis "intends to maintain the same sovereignty of grace...Barth means
that in describing the relationship between man and God we may never speak of
an objective state of affairs, but we must speak of a relationship which is founded
in god and remains founded in Him."22 Clearly, then, Barth's concern revolves
around the relationship between the analogia entis and humanity's knowledge of
God: under no circumstances does Barth want the analogia entis to find a place
of parity with God's grace — indeed, he wants the analogia entis to find no place
21G.C. Berkower in his helpful book The Triumph of Grace in the Theology
of Karl Barth describes Barth's aversion to the analogia entis in this way: "On the
basis of the analogia entis, natural theology posits an essential readiness, an
openness for the knowledge of God as that knowledge which is already present in
natural man prior to and apart from the encounter with the gracious God. This
man of the natural theology is the man who knows God without the miracle of




at all except subsumed under the category and reality of faith. There is no
analogy, on the basis of which beginning with itself, humanity can come to a
knowledge of God's being.23
It would be incorrect to state that in refuting the analogia entis Barth rules
out any concept of analogy. On the contrary, Barth desires to speak of an analogy
of faith, the " jid\ TrtdTT^S V , the likeness of the known in
the knowing, of the object of thought...it is the divine act of knowledge which
takes place en man rather than through man that distinguishes those whose
knowledge is grounded in the love of God and therefore in true fellowship with
Him, in the presence of God."24 Dr. Bruce McCormack notes that Barth's
analogy of faith refers fundamentally "to a correspondence for which there are no
preconditions on the human side and no on going effects."25 According to
McCormack, this means four things:
1. The analogy is not posited with creation.
2. There is nothing in the being or knowing of the human subject that helps
initiate the event.
3. The analogy is actualized by God alone and therefore, does not pass onto
human control.
23CD II/1, 82. Earlier in II/1 Barth stated that humanity cannot speak of
knowing God as Creator "wholly or partially because we have a prior knowledge
of something which resembles creation. It is only because it has been given to us
by God's revelation to know Him....the factor that makes humanity analogous to
God does not lie in him or in his nature, also not in the sense that God could
recognize and accept as an analogy something lying in the creature as such." II/1,
77, 239.
'CD 1/1, 243-244, underline mine.
25McCormack, 160.
124
4. The possibility of human language is not grounded in the suitability of human
language for revelation. The possibility of language that becomes suitable for
revelation is grounded in revelation.26
The analogy of faith underlines Barth's entire theological enterprise: all
knowledge of God, all interaction with Him, depends on the meeting that takes
place in the event of revelation. The relation of the analogy of which Barth speaks
is one that is "founded in God's revelation and which therefore can be and is the
basis of true knowledge of God."27 Therefore, humanity does maintain an
analogy to God but only in so far as it is based in God's revelation, grounded in
faith. Humanity only knows God through grace, not through natural self-evidence
from which conclusions are drawn. For Barth, there is only the grace of God's
revelation.28
2. The Point of Contact
Closely related to the concept of the analogia entis is the point of contact,
this being the place where humanity is able to meet God because of God's image
being implanted within humanity, an idea closely linked to the theology of Emil
Brunner. Therefore, in order to understand Barth's aversion to the notion of the
point of contact, we must first examine Brunner's position.
26Ibid. McCormack cites Eberhard Jttngel who says that "...the language in
which the revelation shall be able to come to speech must, as it were, be
commandeered by revelation. Where such 'commandeering' of the language by
revelation for revelation becomes event, then there is a gain to knowledge. It
exists in the fact that God as God comes to speech." From The Doctrine of the





According to Brunner, there exists between God and humanity an
"ankniipfungspunkt," or point of contact, whereby humanity may perceive certain
knowledge of God, of the Divine Law, outside of the Bible. For Brunner, the
point of contact is the 'lex naturae' written on the hearts of human beings, which
when encountered by the law, says, "'Yes it is so; I cannot deny it.' We could not
persuade him so quickly were it not that the law is written in his heart. Because
it already in his heart, although in a dim and obscure manner, it is awakened again
by the Word."29 With this knowledge, humanity is open to being apprehended by
God — even in its rebellion, humanity has reason and is therefore receptive to
God's Word.30 Intregal to Brunner's concept of the point of contact is the place
of human reason, for without reason there is no revelation: by means of its
reason, humanity is able to perceive God in His works.31 This reason is a part
of what Brunner defines as the formal Imago Dei.
Brunner separates the Imago Dei into two realms: the material imago and
the formal imago. Brunner argues that materially
the imago is completely lost, man is a sinner through and
through and there is nothing in him which is not defiled by
sin. To formulate it differently: as before, man is a
person....Yet he is not a personal person but an anti-personal
person; for the truly personal is existence in love, the
submission of the self to the will of God and therefore an
entering into communion with ones fellow-creature because one
enjoys communion with God. This quid of personality is
29Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt (London: SCM Press, 1939), 537.
30Ibid., 103. Brunner argues that when humanity is apprehended by God, this
apprehension takes place in the following order: humanity's outward presence and
the external act of hearing; the act of understanding, in the logical and grammatical
sense; then humanity's rational and personal being, above all its center, the
knowledge of responsibility. See Man in Revolt. 536-537.
31Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (London: SCM Press, 1947), 68.
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negatived in and through sin, whereas the quod of personality
constitutes the humanum of every man and also that of the
sinner.32
While the material image has been destroyed, the formal has not. The
formal sense of the imago is the concept of the human — that which distinguishes
humanity from anything else that is in creation, in spite of its sinlessness or
sinfulness.33 The formal image impresses the superiority of the human over the
rest of creation. Based in humanity's special relation to God, humanity is to bear
God's image, one that has been perverted but not lost.34 Therefore, the formal
imago still acts as a means by which God is revealed: "...the dialectic of faith in
particular is based on the fact that man bears within himself traces of the divine
image, though they are disfigured, it is true; these traces witness to the fact that
originally the creation was good, and thus reveals God."35 Brunner is clear to
emphasize that what is not lost in sin is humanity's distinct role of being
'human36' in that its members have the capacity to reason and therefore
32"Nature and Grace," 24.
33Ibid., 23.
34Brunner asserts that "...sin does not mean the annihilation of the original
element in man, but its perversion." Revelation and Reason. 74. See also Man
in Revolt. 137.
35Emil Brunner, The Mediator (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1934), 31.
36For Brunner, "To arrive at an explanation of what happens between the
impressing of the divine image and its being lost, we must make use of a process
of 'extrapolation' (so to say). To say that man has lost the image of God indicates
that one no longer understands what the Old Testament meant by the expression:
being person in the sense that every man, sinner or not, whether believer or not,
is a person as differentiated from the subhuman creature; for this essence of being
is certainly not lost." Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter (London:
SCM Press, 1944), 94.
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comprehend the speech of God to them.37 However, Brunner is quick to point out
that he is not affirming natural theology in the sense of the Roman Catholic view:
humanity is always with revelation
...the natural man is never understood save as one who comes from
an original revelation, which was instituted by the Creator, but
has been perverted into a self imposed world view or mythology.
The status corruptus is only to be understood as the human perversion
of an original status integritas, and in the Bible it is never
otherwise understood....Thus even as a sinner, as the 'natural man,'
man is never without revelation; rather he always comes from and
can only be understood in light of, this revelation which precedes
the fact of his being a sinner.38
Therefore, because in the formal sense the Imago Dei is preserved even in its
perversion, it acts, for Brunner, as the point of contact.
Because the formal imago is not lost but perverted, humanity has a point
of contact with God. That humanity is unique in this sense is a result of two
factors: humanity has the capacity for words, and humanity is therefore,
responsible. Because humanity is receptive to language, humanity is receptive to
the Word of God.39 However, this is only on a material level. Nevertheless,
humanity is endowed with the possibility of being addressed, which for Brunner
implies a presupposition of human responsibility40 and a knowledge of sin and
grace: "Only a being that can be addressed is responsible, for it also can make
decisions. Only a being that can be addressed is capable of sin. But in sinning,
while being responsible, it somehow or other knows of its sin. This knowledge of
sin is a necessary presupposition of the understanding of the divine message of
37"Nature and Grace," 23.
38Revelation and Reason. 53.
39"Nature and Grace," 31.
40Ibid.
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grace."41 Therefore, although materially the imago has been lost, formally, the
imago is intact. This is Brunner's understanding of the point of contact.
Despite Brunner's argument, Barth finds fault with the concept of the
ankniipfungspunkt. What is at stake in their debate is the very issue of the starting
point of theology: Brunner, with creation and Barth, with Incarnation. Barth, in
his rejection of any form of revelation, which stresses even a modicum of human
receptivity before God's grace, renders a natural theology as simply
unacceptable:42 in Barth's view, nothing comes before the grace of God. Barth
cannot, on any level, accept the point of contact ground in the imago, which for
Barth has been totally obliterated in the fall:
The fact that God 'reaches' man with his Word may well be
due to something other than, the formal possibility of his
being addressed and his humanitas...evidently the 'formal
imago Dei' meant that man can 'somehow' and 'to some extent'
know and do the will of God without revelation....Has not
Brunner added to man's 'capacity for revelation,' to what
we have been assured is purely 'formal' something material:
man's practically proved ability to know God, imperfect it
may be, but nevertheless really and therefore surely not
without relevance to salvation?43
Barth argues that in the fall the image of God was completely lost, only to
be restored by the incarnate Christ. Therefore, the point of contact is not, for
Barth, real outside of faith.44
41Ibid.
42CD II/1, 137, 139.
43"No!," 89-90, 82.
44,1No matter how it may be with his humanity and personality, man has
completely lost the capacity for God....The image of God in man of which we
must speak here and which forms the real point of contact for God's Word is the
rectitudo which through Christ is raised up from real death and thus restored or
created anew, and which is real as man's possibility for the Word ofGod... .Hence
this point of contact is...real only in faith." £D 1/1, 238-239.
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Barth's rejection of Brunner's point of contact is based on Barth's rejection
of a presupposition of a suitability within humanity for the reception of God's
revelation. For Barth, God is the one who, in the event of revelation, creates a
point of contact - the point of contact, and there is "in no way prior habitus in
man for such reception. "45
3. Eristic Theology
The third position that Barth refutes, as a result of his doctrine of revelation
and his theological ordering of gospel before law, is that of eristic theology, which
Brunner used to describe a combination of apologetics and polemics.46 Barth
describes eristics as a theology wherein humanity's "aptitude for the revelation of
God consists only in the fact that in the rational existence of man there is a
diacritical point where this existence can become discontinuous, where it can issue
in a 'negative point' where its most essential truth, its 'fundamental condition,'
i.e. despair, can come to light... .All that man 'can do' with reference to revelation
is despair. "47 Naturally, Barth would reject such a theology whose root is despair,
since for Barth, theology finds its base in the eternal grace of God. Yes, this grace
does bring humanity into crisis and judgment. Yes, this grace does tell people that
they are in need of Christ in order to know God. But grace is the preemptive word
for Barth. In no way would he ever embrace an approach to God based on any
kind of human reason, even a reason that might lead to despair and, thus, to
conversion. True conversion happens for Barth when a person encounters the love
45Berkower, 192.
46See The Divine Imperative, especially Chapter VII.
47"No!," 115.
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and grace of God witnessed in Christ and, in embracing its election, sees the hand
of God reaching out as a covenant partner. For Barth, no one seeks after God
without God first revealing Himself through Christ. No one finds God until God
finds him or her. Therefore, the question of existence, so prevalent in Brunner's
eristics, can find its origin only in faith: because humanity's existence is so
perverse, it cannot begin to ask questions (even if these lead to despair) that are
capable of bringing about God's revelation.48
Since Barth does not accept any form of natural theology or a human point
of contact, how does this impact his ethics? In this next section, we will discuss
how Barth's doctrine of revelation and theological ordering of gospel before law
form the foundation for his ethic of command.
III. The Ethic of Command
For Barth, the criteria for all ethics is found in the command of God.
Because Barth believes in a personal living God, he based this command in the
groundwork of his theology — in God. According to Barth, the starting point for
all ethics is "the Word of God which is addressed to people and requires an active
answer."49 Thus, theological ethics revolves around humanity's response to the
Word of God and humanity's obedience to this Word in Jesus Christ.50 In placing
48For further discussion on this matter see Karl Barth, "Theology and the
Modern Man," Zwischen den Zeiten 8 (19301: 374 396.
49Heinz Eduard Todt, "Karl Barth, der Liberalismus und der
Nationalsozialismus," Evangelischer Theologie 46 (1986): 544. Barth states that
"the Word ofGod is the basis for all ethics" (Gottingen Dogmatics. 272), and calls
the task of ethics as that which presents and claims humanity by the Word of God.
(Ethics. 45).
50Matheney, 30. See also Karl Barth, "Politische Entscheidung in der Einheit
des Glaubens," Theologische Existenz heute n.f. 34 (1952): 8.
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the ethical question in the realm of human existence before God, Barth stands apart
from traditional moral philosophers51 and redefines the ethical question: the
divine-human relationship begins with the acknowledgement that "God is
God....Ethical propositions are therefore ethical only as expositions of this
presupposition which may never be regarded as a thing already known, or treated
as a basis of further routine questions, or a something from which it is possible to
hurry on to a new position."52 Consistently, Barth emphasizes that the foundation
of ethics is first and foremost rooted in God. Therefore, ethics is, for Barth,
dogmatics53 and must be treated within the doctrine of God.
In viewing ethics in this manner, Barth is again 'protecting' what is, for
him, the sovereignty of God: "the attempts methodically to separate dogmatics and
ethics are dubious even from the point of ethics itself because in the process there
regularly occurs a change of focus, a fatal interchange of the subjects of God and
man."54 Clearly we see yet again the connection between Barth's theological
position and his ethical: the polemic that Barth so vehemently supported in the
reshaping of his theology — namely the refutation of any kind of theology that
begins with humanity — Barth continues in his ethics. No ethic can be a true ethic
for Barth if its foundation is not in God. Ethics cannot, therefore, be separated
from dogmatics: since ethics addresses the question of human existence before
God, it can find its meaning in no other place than dogmatics, for the whole of
Barth's work seeks to answer the very question of existence, whose answer rests
51Matheney, 20.
52The Epistle to the Romans. 439.
53Ethics. 18, 49. See also CD II/2, 515; The Epistle to the Romans. 430.
54Barth, CD 1/2, 790.
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in none other than God's sovereignty and eternal message of grace to humanity.
There can be no other place where deliberation regarding the nature of God and
humanity's relationship takes place — the task of ethics must be elucidated in
relationship to dogmatics.55
Significantly, Barth does not discount the input of other ethical approaches,
such as philosophy. For Barth, "...general ethical questions and answers can
witness to Christian ethical knowledge if they are understood in light of God's
command... .Reason, experience, human freedom and other philosophical categories
can be subsumed theologically although they cannot have independent truth, value,
and authority in themselves."56 Barth is painstaking in his efforts to assure the
place of other ethical systems in answering the question of existence, but makes an
even greater effort to ensure that their place can be only within the hemisphere of
Christian ethics and the sovereignty of God. Only when enlightened by the truth
of the Word of God can any ethic find validity for Barth.
His approach has one major emphasis: the Word of God — eternal and
sovereign to humanity. Because for Barth, the gospel and life are intertwined and
interconnected, so too are dogmatics and ethics. Truth within ethics, as in
dogmatics, is known and comprehended within the arena of the hearing of the
Word of God.
We are not surprised to find that Barth unites dogmatics and ethics. In fact,
55For Barth, "Ethics, or rather the multifarious ethical systems,...result from
man's desire to give the answer himself and of himself and so be like God,
knowing good and evil....Such ethics is not genuine but illegitimate." From Ian
C.M. FairAweather and James I.H. McDonald, The Quest for Christian Ethics
(Edinburgh: The Handsel Press Ltd., 1984), 127.
56Matheny, 38. See also Barth, CD II/2, 524; Ethics. 36.
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had he not done so, there would be the surprise, for in a theology that from 1915
began to 'restore' God to a place of primacy in theology, there could be no room
for an ethic independent of this enterprise. To establish a standard of morality
detached from theology would, in fact, detract from Barth's goal, reinforcing the
analogia entis against which he fought so adamantly. Ethics had to be dogmatics.
Barth had to unite the two if his theology were to remain consistent. And in do
doing, Barth's ethics had to be one that applied the language of command. If, as
Barth strove to achieve, the sovereignty of God were to be upheld above all else,
then the form of an ethic had to be one that came from above, thus, the divine
command. But what is this command that Barth so ardently articulated? What is
the nature of the command for the Christian as he or she seeks to make ethical
choices in keeping with faith and relationship with the covenant partner?
For Barth, the most important aspect of the nature of the mandate is that
it belongs to God and God alone.57 The command originates in God and is given
by God - no other holds credence. In recognizing this starting point, humanity's
response is to be one that regards God as the unconditional Lord58 and in so
doing, hears that "God is our God and that we are His Israel, His Church."59
57Ethics. 94. Within Barth's command ethic, there is a hint of a Kantian
influence, particularly in the concept of an imperative given to humanity. Barth
himself stated, "Pure ethics require — and here we are in complete agreement with
Kant -- that there should be no mixing of heaven and earth in the sphere of morals.
Pure ethical behavior depends upon its primal origin, an origin which needs to be
protected by a determinism on our part to call God and man, however much we
may be tempted to stray into romanticism." (The Epistle to the Romans. 432).
Moreover, Kant's idea of conformity to the noumenal self will impact
Barth's approach to questions of freedom and obedience. For further discussion,




This is an extremely important concept for Barth. As humanity recognizes that the
directive emanates from God, and in response, elevates God to God's rightful
position of Lordship and sovereignty, then humanity is able to embrace its role as
God's partner and Church. This idea, inherent in God's command, is intricately
connected to Barth's doctrine of revelation and his ordering of gospel before law.
Recalling that for Barth, revelation is an event, positioned within history yet
remaining distinct from history in its eternal origin — (remembering that in
addressing the place of gospel and law, Barth argues that God's gospel, God's
word of grace, Jesus Christ, is the first and overwhelming word to humanity) —
the connection between the command and humanity's response is significant. Barth
cannot envision any ethic of command apart from humanity, in that, as God speaks
the irresistible word of grace, humanity responds (in whatever way each person
chooses) and thus hears and acts on the command. This is not to say that God's
pre-eminent declaration needs humanity. However, humanity does need the
command in order to embrace its election and live as the people God created
humanity to be. In this sense, command language is irreplaceable in understanding
Barth's theology and its relationship to ethics and the actions of humanity.
Therefore, the command as God's dictate means that in establishing the
starting-point for all ethics, and simultaneously lifting up God's sovereignty, there
must exist an absolute personal, living will distinct from humanity,60 that is, God.
Clearly, for Barth, the imperative concept governing his ethic is that of God's
directive and its primacy above all else. Furthermore, this mandate will not only
find its origin in God, but will also reflect God's gracious election of humanity —
^Ethics. 85.
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the content of the command.
When Barth speaks of the command and its content, he is referring to the
way that God's action is to be reflected in the actions of humanity.61 But this kind
of statement seems nebulous. What does Barth mean when he says that the content
of God's command is found in God's action? We believe Barth is referring to the
eternal action of God in His grace in electing humanity.
God's command, together with its content, is rooted in election.62 God
does not give humanity His command without first promising to be humanity's
eternal covenant partner, to whom He is fully committed.63 In this way, the
divine command, along with its content, is but a form of God's grace and is,
therefore, the starting point of every ethical question and answer for Barth.64
Barth is quick to point out that if God's grace has not been revealed, then the
content of the command is not of or from God: "We must seek the command of
God only where it has itself torn off the veil of all human opinions and theories
about the will of God and manifested itself unequivocally. We must seek it only
where He has revealed Himself as grace, and therefore, in His truth."65 Here we
see where Barth is congruent with his theology: ethics cannot have as its content
anything but God's grace, and this reality is equally true theologically for Barth.
61According to Barth, the content of the command is "simply that the person
should reflect God's action in his or her own action, accepting God's action as
right." From William P. Werpehowski, "Command and History in the Ethics of






Thus, the command that arises from Barth's theology, and therefore his ethics, is
rooted in God and God's eternal commitment to humanity by His grace, that is
Jesus Christ, the eternal Logos.
The scope of this command is all encompassing. Because God's eternal
election is for all humanity, because from eternity God extends His hand of
relationship to all his creatures, all people are under the command, whereby "The
truth from which - whether he knows and wants to know it or not - man derives
and which he will not evade."66 Starting with the knowledge of God's divine
election, there is, therefore, no human action that does not stand under God's
command;67 no human existence can avoid responding one way or another to the
command,68 and no human can be exempted from decision in relation to God's
command or neutral toward it.69
While humanity has a choice in its response to the command, its intention
is humanization.70 What God desires is not the creation of a race of automatons
but individuals who can embrace fully their humanity as they are created in the
image and likeness of the Creator. Barth is not arguing for a command that binds.
Rather, the command gives permission and freedom to be the people God has





70Matheney, 200. See also Eberhard Jiingel, "Keine Menschlogsikeit Gottes.
Zur Theologie Barths zwischen Theismus und Atheismus," Evangelische Theologie
31 (1971): 344ff.
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command and stand under its authority, but are free in how we respond to it.71
Because humanity is under the command of God and claimed by God,
humanity is also under an obligation72 that calls humanity to conform its actions
to those of God. Furthermore, humanity is able to discern what actions it might
take because the command of God is always concrete.73
Since Barth rejects any kind of universal norm or categorical imperative,
the command must be definite and specific: Barth's "divine imperative is valid
fully and only in the concrete context of specific human existence. The living
reality of God in time elicits free response to His directive within a particular
concrete event."74 Because humanity encounters the problem of ethics as the
fundamental question of its existence, Barth argues that humanity, too, must
recognize that in light of a definite time — humanity's time — answers to the
questions people face come specifically.75 If humanity refuses to recognize the
concreteness of the command, humanity has misunderstood its meaning, for as it
is given to us at each moment [it] is always and only
one possibility in every conceivable particularity of
its inner and outer modality....It is surely apparent
at once that the concept of an unconditional truth of
the divine is incompletely grasped at all, if its
definiteness is not taken into account.76
As the command is specific, it moves humanity to specific action — in
71We will be discussing the role of freedom in relation to the command later
in this chapter.
72Willis, 172; Ethics. 50.
73CD II/2, 587.
74Matheney, 179.
75"The Problem of Ethics Today," 143.
76CD II/2, 663-664.
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addressing the question of the response to the command, humanity is reminded that
it must respond to actual situations, rather than retreat into abstract moral
questions77 that serve as a shield from action. Indeed, Barth is very clear that
ethics is not obtuse speculation. It deals with "real options in the real sociopolitical
world. It is concerned with changing that world....There is no such thing as an
ethically neutral action. All activity is potentially ethical. And since a person is
what his actions are, there is no dimension of human being that is not essentially
ethical."78
Given that God speaks His command to humanity in a concrete and specific
way, how best does humanity hear God's word? Is Barth's ethic merely an
individual ethic in which each person hears God word in a personal way and acts
accordingly? It may seem so. However, when examining the command and how
it is most effectively and accurately heard, we believe that Barth views the church
as the most effective arena in which the command is heard.
Although Barth argues that the command of God has a uniquely personal
element,79 he also believes it finds its locus and authority in the church. If we
recall that he began a more intense study of the Creeds and Confessions of the
Church in the early Twenties, and was in dialogue with Roman Catholic
77Bettis, 170
78Ibid. See also CD II/2, 657-661.
79When Barth speaks of the command as being personal, he means that "it
claims our obedience in relations to this definite person, Jesus Christ." £D II/2,
609-610. Clearly, although the command is personal, it is not exclusively so:
"...the summons, even as it comes very directly and specifically to me, sets me
materially in a series with all others...a demand is made on me...as humanity."
Ethics. 72.
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theologians from which he gleaned a fresh perspective on the role of the Church,80
we do not find surprising that Barth would place the church in the position of the
focal point for receiving the command. We must emphasize that when speaking
of the church, Barth does not have in mind the ecclesiastical halls of power, but
rather the place in which the Scripture is preached and exegeted, and where
conversation and dialogue with the church of the past and present takes place:
We hear God's command under Scripture and we hear it
in the Church; that is, we hear it in conversation and
debate with fellow hearers of the God's Word as it is
attested in Scripture. These fellow hearers may be
contemporaries or they may not: The Church is not
only present, but also past....And...the extent of our
openness must be greater still. We are to hear God's
command in the Church. But if in the Church, also in
the world, because the Church is inseparable from the
world...81
For Barth, the church does not address the question of ethics if the
command of God is not heard. If the church does not exegete the Scriptures and
remain in dialogue with its present and past, it does not fulfill its task, for if the
church does not speak out, particularly in its ethical stance, then it fails to declare
to those outside of the church what it is.82 The church is, according to Barth, the
80We are not arguing that these two influences exclusively moved Barth towards
a renewed appreciation of the role of the Church. They are, however, two
important factors which we believe to be worthy of note. In Barth's debate with
Paul Tillich in 1923 (published in Theologische Blatter). Barth underlines the
importance of the church for theology and therefore, for ethics: "Not only God,
not only Christianity, by which I mean here 'one holy catholic Church,' and to a
lesser degree also the individual churches to which we belong, is the presupposition
of theology." From James M. Robinson, ed. The Beginnings of Dialectical
Theology. v.I (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1968), 154.
81Biggar, 109. See also £D iv/3, 493-494.
82Ethics. 82. See also Karl Barth, "The Possibility of A Universal Reformed
Creed," in Theology and Church. 132.
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place where culture is understood and represented,83 and therefore, the place
where humanity's existence is addressed.84
Barth's ethical approach naturally parallels his theological, in which the
church is the locus and authority of dogmatics.85 In the preaching of the Word
of God, in discussion, and in the Creeds and Confessions - here is where God's
command is heard, for the foundation of ethics is the constitution of the community
of faith as fellowship; community being fashioned from particular people in their
relation to God. Therefore, Barth argues that in the 'oneness' of each person, "this
relation is realized. Now Christ is the One-ness of each particular one, and He is
therefore, the fellowship of them all."86
Thus, the church is where God's command is heard and in this hearing,
humanity is confronted with the sovereign God and finds itself asking the question
of humanity's freedom under God's command, "what shall we do?"
The concept of freedom is crucial to understanding the relationship between
the hearing of the command and the action that follows, since for Barth, human
freedom is freedom for humanity to embrace its true role as children and covenant
83"Church and Culture," 341.
84At this point we would note that Robert Willis, in The Ethics of Karl Barth
(Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1971) states that "Barth's interpretation of
the definiteness of the command effectively sets aside.. .the necessity of deliberation
in ethics." (183) We believe that Willis misunderstands Barth's view of the
church, wherein this deliberation takes place as the fellowship hears and
appropriates the Word of God as exposited and as heard in the Creeds and
Confessions of the Church. In fact, Barth himself encourages deliberation:
"...ethical reflection may and must consult community in its past and present
history. It must do this in order to be admonished, nurtured, enriched, perhaps
stirred and warned by the use which the fathers and also brethren made and are
still making of Christian freedom. From The Humanity of God. 85.
85CD 1/1, 23; 1/2, 538ff.
86The Epistle to the Romans. 449-450.
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partners with God;87 to act in accordance with the role given us, that is, to act
as those who are free in their relation to God and free in their responsibility to
others.88
For Barth, freedom is a gift of God: in God's grace, humanity is chosen
and given the opportunity to choose.89 In its direct relation to God, humanity
finds its true liberation to be itself and thus, "freedom is understood totally in
terms of its origin. It is understood in the context of God's turning to humanity,
that is, in terms of God's call to humanity to turn to God in thankful response.90
Because Barth views freedom in terms of its origin, God, the responsibility implied
in ethics is to make clear that each move an individual makes involves a 'specific
and direct' responsibility towards God. Therefore, ethics is "reflection upon what
humanity is called to do with the gift of freedom."91 Clearly, what humanity
is called to do is accept its origin, which,
...does not mean creaturely autonomy in relation to
the Creator — not even under the title of the
'finite capable of the infinite,' least of all under
this title, we might say — but which means instead
the acknowledgement that our life belongs to God and
therefore the subjection of our own will, which is no
more grounded in its own reality today than it was on
the day of creation, to the will of the Creator.92
Thus, the creaturely freedom endowed to humanity by God is either negated
87Ethics, 175.
88Matheney, 43-44.





in disobedience93 or affirmed in obedience.94 In accepting its creaturely reality
and therefore its limitations, humanity opens itself up to hear the command ofGod.
Humanity must, before it can ever hear or understand God's command, recognize
that its freedom is not a result of human machinations, of reason or will or
otherwise, but is God's gracious gift. Herein lies the paradox of freedom that God
gives to humanity: in admitting it is unffee (in that human freedom is tied to
God's freedom in choosing humanity and not vise-versa), humanity finds true
liberation and permission to act.95 Thus, the dialectic of human existence before
God and in Christ is fleshed out: humanity is free, but only in its recognition of
its bondage is humanity able to know true freedom and fulfill its election, living
as God's covenant partner. In so doing, humanity is free to contribute creatively
93Ibid., 263.
94Ibid., 76, 79. An interesting parallel that exists between Barth and Kant lies
in Kant's understanding of the noumenal self and the concept of obedience. A
noumenal reality is, for Kant, that which adheres to ideas of pure reason.
Consequently, "the idea of self, for example, is a continuing permanent reality
underlying all our sense experience and as being able to act freely is the idea of a
noumenal self." Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology (London:
SCM Press, 1985), 217.
For Kant, human beings "so far as they are subject to moral obligations
have freedom....as moral agents they must be noumenal beings." (Allen, 218).
For Barth, freedom also is found in obedience, but an obedience of a different
kind. Unlike Kant, who argued that freedom is found in obedience to moral
obligation (moral obligation being means to ends, and our chief end, happiness.
They are categorical in form: one performs ones moral obligation because of
duty), Barth argues that freedom is found in obedience to God's command.
The parallel is striking: while the terms and starting points differ, there is
no uncertainty that in some way, Kant influenced Barth's view of freedom and
obedience. For further discussion of Kant's position see Kant's Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals. For a helpful analysis of this work, see H.J. Paton, The
Moral Law (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1947.
95CD II/2, 585-586.
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to the world in which it has been placed96 and act responsibly not only toward
God but also toward the neighbor.
Barth believes that freedom includes both our recognition of it as a gift, and
our willingness to allow for that gift to have been given to others, namely, to all
of humanity. The basic form of humanity is "Mitmenschlichkeit," a joyful being
together,97 realized not in isolation or detachment, but in the human encounter:
therein lies the realization of freedom, that is, freedom for others.98 Thus,
freedom implies community. But it also implies responsibility, for "in
understanding Barth's ethical thematic [we must] realize that freedom, as a
category of human nature, is described as a faculty of human responsibility before
another."99 In humanity's freedom for God, (as found in Jesus Christ), so too,
comes a correlative freedom for the neighbor.100
Barth's emphasis on the relationship humanity has with one another in the
ethical realm is closely knit to his belief of the church as the place where God's
command is heard. Yes, as God's individual covenant partner the command is
addressed to me — but not in an etherial, mystical way. God's voice does not
boom out of the heavens, instructing a person to do this or that deed. It is heard -
- in the community as it worships, upholds the Word of God to the exegetical and
96Ronald Goetz, "The Karl Barth Centennial: An Appreciative Critique," The
Christian Century 103 #6 (May 7, 1986): 462.
97Matheney, 122. See also Ray Anderson, "The Concept of the Neighbor in
the Ethics of Karl Barth." A paper presented at the Annual Congress of the





homiletical task. One does not receive the command haphazardly. To do so would
be completely contrary to Barth's entire approach to theology and ethics. God
speaks, and as the command is heard, it reflects the truth ofGod's sovereignty and
divine freedom, instructing humanity to thus act in such a manner that this eternal
grace might be displayed and upheld.101
Because Barth's entire theological and ethical emphasis revolves around
God's sovereignty, it follows that he would reject any kind of attempt to
'systematize' the ethical task. Therefore, Barth turns away from any kind of
casuistry or norms within ethics.102 For Barth, there is no room for a generalized
or universal set of principles within ethics outside of the command of God.103
101It would seem plausible, if not essential, having understood the place of
God's sovereign, eternal grace as manifested in the command, that Barth would
reject any attempt to upstage God's place of primacy. Hence, his rejection of the
National Socialist movement and the German Christians is right in line with his
ethical approach. However, we would argue that his encounter with the crisis of
the 30's did not create Barth's ethics. His ethical stance was set well before the
30's — in fact, before the ethics lectures of 1928-1930. Since we have argued that
Barth's theology and ethics are to be viewed together, we contend that his ethics
were, with some modifications to come, established by 1924 with the anhypostasis-
enhypostasis formula of Christology presented in the Gottingen Dogmatics. In the
scope of this paper, we do not have time or space to delve deeply into the critique
that Barth had little, if no ethic previous to the Kirchenkampf. However, we did
deem it noteworthy to draw the connection between Barth's theology and ethics in
this sense as a tangential thought.
102Barth does, as we will argue in Chapter 5, have of form of casuistry in what
he terms special ethics.
103For this reason, Barth rejects any form of casuistry or middle axioms. Nigel
Biggar presents an interesting case for the possibility of Barth allowing for
normative ethics in that they play a strictly preparatory and preliminary role. See
Nigel Biggar, "Hearing God's Command and Thinking about What's Right: With
and Beyond Barth," Reckoning with Barth. ed. Nigel Biggar (Oxford: A.R.
Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1988), 113ff.
Before continuing further, we believe it necessary to touch briefly on why
Barth does not consider things such as the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on
the Mount to be forms of universal principles or norms. In addressing these two
texts, he comments that they have two special features: (1) according to their
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Because God's sovereignty is so closely united with His command, and, therefore,
the ethical task, and because the command is concrete and specific, any attempt to
base ethical activity in human moral reason or rules is unacceptable:
the question of good and evil is never answered by man's
pointing to the authoritative Word of God as a set of
rules....Nothing can be made of these commands if we
try to generalize and transform them into universally
valid principles...the divine command does not take the
form of universal and general rules, but that of individual,
concrete, specific orders and directions.104
In denying the place of universal rules, Barth puts an end to any possibility
of an absolute ethic105 and the possibility of a human ethic of reason or morality.
Perhaps this is where Barth is the most frustrating and yet the most consistent in
witness, the command seems to be addressed to an indeterminate number of people
and (2) they appear to be concerned, generally, with certain possibilities of action
on the part of all kinds of people. tCD II/2, 681) Barth states that these passages
could be misconstrued to proclaim something like general principles of the
command of God.
Barth argues that these texts in no way lessen or compromise the
concreteness and specificity of the command. (II\2, 681-682) He concludes "that
what takes place in these proclamations is that God declares Himself to be the
Subject of all these special summons, the One who has the power and right to
confront the individual in these specific addresses with binding commands and
prohibitions because He is the Lord of the people or community to which the
individual belongs, whose property the individual is, and to whose control and
claim the individual is subject." (II/2, 682) Moreover, Barth views the passages
in which summaries are found as not being concerned with a special command
beyond the concrete and specific command of God. On the contrary, these texts,
according to Barth, speak of the commanding God and His relationship with the
committed person. These texts show "how God and man and man and God are
bound to one another — bound in exactly the same way as emerges in the other
texts with the descriptions of concrete and definite divine-human encounters, of the
definite and special divine commanding and forbidding." (II/2, 683)
Therefore, Barth contends, texts such as the Ten Commandments and the
Sermon on the Mount act as summaries of divine commands and not as universal
moral principles. (II/2, 700)
104The Humanity of God. 82; CD II/2, 672, 675.
105The Epistle to the Romans. 466.
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his thought. Barth's critics often denounce his ethic as non-specific, which results,
paradoxically, "from his failure to generalize. Barth's insistence that God's
judgement must not be limited and cannot be controlled makes it impossible to
draw conclusions from any particular experience of judgement that might allow us
to construct a systematic ethics."106 In refusing to generalize, Barth negates what
are, for him, human attempts to explain the question of existence, the very same
question he addresses in his theology. As humanity is called to 'bear witness' to
God's existence and the revelation of God in Christ, through its response,107 the
only appropriate form an ethic can take is one whereby the eternally revealed God
(in Christ) calls humanity to act: to live as free creatures — in their election, in
the being of Christ, responsible not only to their own election but also to the
election of others.
As we understand Barth's theology and its emphasis, is it really surprising
that his ethics are command-oriented? We think not. Whether they are acceptable
as an ethical choice is another issue. But since, according to Barth, humankind
forever struggles against its election in its attempt to seek and find God on its own
terms, the tension that exists regarding the Barthian ethic is not unusual. But to
term the ethic non-specific or too "Olympian" is to misconstrue the force in his
ethics, for specificity is, in Barth's mind, the command to live as God's chosen
partners, reflecting the eternal grace of God in all action. When humanity chooses
to neglect this partnership, this election of grace, then humanity acts in an unethical
way. Therefore, Barth's ethic insists that "at moments of moral certainty we are
106Robin Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1984), 24.
107Karl Barth, "Humanismus," Theologische Studien 28 (1950): 27.
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not dealing with a system of rules we could write out on paper and use to calculate
our next moral move. We are confronted with a living God who addresses us and
who refuses to be reduced to an object that our minds can easily grasp."108
If, ethics cannot be defined by a set of rules and principles, but rather by
the command of God, what kind of ethicist is Barth? Some scholars109 have
defined him as a divine-act deontologist. However, if Barth is in any way to be
considered a deontologist, divine act or other, he would have to uphold the
universality that accompanies a deontological approach to ethics. Because Barth
rejects any kind of universality, we cannot accept this definition. Rather, we
would affirm that Barth's ethic is best described as an ethic of command based in
the freedom of God. This approach best defines Barth's theological and ethical
position, whereby God in His freedom chooses humanity to be His covenant
partner and in so doing calls humanity to act in a way reflective of this choice.
Barth's theology, having found its fulfillment in the anhypostatsis-enhypostasis
Christological formula, thus sets the base for his ethics, formed in tandem with his
theology culminating in 1924.110
Barth's ethics have always been controversial. Consistently they have been
criticized and viewed as unhelpful in addressing issues within ethics. Are these
challenges to Barth's theology and ethics correct? Is Barth simply too etherial in
108Lovin, 22.
109Robert Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth. 171; Robin Lovin, Christian Faith
and Public Choices. 27; RdbBnt Preston as quoted in Fairweather and McDonald,
186
U0We recognize that Barth did make modifications in his ethics after the
Twenties, such as the dropping of the orders of creation after the National
Socialist's used the idea to support their government. However, any changes Barth
made would best be described as clarifications of his earlier thought.
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his approach for the challenges of daily life? Many would reply in the affirmative.
What are their complaints? Where might they help us in analyzing and
understanding Barth? As we seek to find answers to these questions, we turn our




Barth Encounters the Critics: Reinhold Niebuhr as a Paradigm
for the Ethical Critique of Barth
Throughout his theological career, Karl Barth was criticized for the way in
which he approached questions of ethics. One theologian who was vehement in
his critique of Barth was Reinhold Niebuhr,1 who particularly attacked Barth's
ethics. For this reason, and for the many similarities in their backgrounds, we
believe Reinhold Niebuhr provides an excellent paradigm through which to critique
Barth.2
Before engaging in some of the parallels that exist between Barth and
'Niebuhr's works are extensive; however, we cite his major works as follows:
Does Civilization Need Religion? (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927); Leaves
From the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic (New York: Willett, Clark and Company,
1929); The Contribution of Religion to Social Work (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1932); Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1932); Reflections on the End of an Era (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1934); An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1935); Beyond Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937);
The Nature and Destiny of Man. Volumes I&II (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1941, 1943); The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944); Discerning the Signs of the Times (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946); Faith and History (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1949); The Irony of American History (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1952); Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953); Pious and Secular America (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958); The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1959); A Nation So Conceived (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1963); Man's Nature and His Communities (new York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1965); The Democratic Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1969). For further works of Niebuhr, consult: D.B. Robertson, Reinhold
Niebuhr's Works: A Bibliography (Maryland: University Press of America,
1983).
2We are not attempting to give a comprehensive discussion of Reinhold
Niebuhr and his thought in this chapter. Space and the direction of this thesis does
not allow. However, we do find Niebuhr to be an excellent foil for Barth, and in
this manner we will be using the critique of Niebuhr to (1) outline the general
critique of Barth's ethics and (2) provide a launching point for our own critique of
Barth.
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Niebuhr, we first find it necessary to give a brief biographical overview of the
early Niebuhr.3 What were some of the primary forces that shaped the young
Niebuhr, and how did they impact the development of his theology?
Although Niebuhr never considered himself a theologian,4 from the time
of his birth he was surrounded by Christian doctrine, both in his father Gustav
Niebuhr and the denomination in which the elder Niebuhr served: The German
Evangelical Synod of North America. As was the case with Barth, Niebuhr's first
formative influence was his father,5 a man who combined personal piety with
freedom in his theological studies. Gustaf Niebuhr was
liberal in his conviction that the Gospel was social as
well as individual, that the Christian had to work for
social improvement, not simply religious conversion. He
was also liberal in his unconcern for doctrinal precision...
and....in his ecumenical interest, his determination to
break down artificial walls between denominations. But...
he insisted on the divinity of Christ, the supernatural
inspiration of the Bible, and the centrality of prayer in
religious life. He was a pietist, not a fundamentalist.6
Niebuhr's father was not alone in his influence on his son; so also was the German
Evangelical Synod of North America.
3We believe Niebuhr's early period begins with his background in the German
Evangelical Synod, moves to his theological training at Elmhurst College, Eden
Seminary, Yale Divinity School and culminates in his parish work in Detroit.
These were the years 1900-1928.
4In his intellectual autobiography, Niebuhr states that "it is somewhat
embarrassing to be made the subject of a study which assumes theology as the
primary interest. I cannot and do not claim to be a theologian." Reinhold Niebuhr,
"Intellectual Autobiography," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall eds.,
Reinhold Niebuhr: An Introduction to his Religious. Social and Political Thought
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956), 3. Hereafter cited as Kegley and Bretall.
5Ibid.
6Richard Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr. A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books,
1985), 7.
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This organization was a product of the sixteenth century Protestant
Reformation, which combined elements of the Enlightenment and traditional
piety.7 An indigenous American phenomena that arose out of German migration
into the Mississippi Valley after the Civil War, the Synod's main theological
positions upheld "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the Word
of God, the sole infallible guide of faith and life and...the interpretation of the
Holy Scriptures as given in the symbolic books of the Lutheran and Reformed
Church."8
Although the German Evangelical Synod of North America's roots were
closely tied to two major reformation traditions (Luther and Calvin) and adhered
to a distinctly Prussian model of union, the Synod placed itself within a
governmental framework characteristically American. This union of Luther and
Calvin — the Lutheran "innerlichkeit" and the moralism of American Calvinism —
became central in Niebuhr's own search for truth. Luther's thought was
particularly significant for Niebuhr because it modified his theology and
understanding of "the relation between Gospel and social ethics.. .without changing
his essential social concern."9
'William G. Crystal, ed. Young Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: The Pilgrim
Press, 1977), 19.
8F.H. Graeper, "The German Evangelical Synod of North America," in The
Evangelical Church (St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, 1912), 30-31. Like most
frontier faiths, the Synod cared less about "fine points of dogmatic theology than
about inner spirituality and practical results....The Evangelical Synod was typical
of much nineteenth century German and American Protestantism in its relative
neglect of the intellectual content of faith and its pietistic stress on heart. The
believer aspired above all to experience the immediate presence of Christ; doctrine
was secondary." Fox, 4.
9John C. Bennett, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics," in Kegley and Bretall,
62.
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In the fall of 1907, Niebuhr left his family in Lincoln, Illinois,10 and
headed to the small denominational college, Elmhurst, in Chicago. Upon
graduation in 1910, Niebuhr went to Eden Theological Seminary in Whellston,
Missouri, where he studied in a more traditional setting and flourished
academically. At Eden, Niebuhr's love for theology and desire for further study
was kindled, and in 1913, Niebuhr entered Yale University."
At Yale, Niebuhr began to formulate his early theological thought. Primary
to his early theology were the concepts of personality and experience, and their
relation to revelation: for Niebuhr, certainty in religion had to find its base in
human need and the actual experience of belief. At the most basic level, humanity
needed two things: "an assurance that the divine 'personality' has a place in an
apparently 'impersonal universe,' and an assurance of personal contact with that
eternal contact."12 For Niebuhr, as for most liberal Protestant thinkers,
personality was directly related to self-sacrifice and giving.13 There was,
therefore, no rational explanation or validation for religious belief. Niebuhr
asserted that religious ideas were ".. .based upon what man believes to be necessary
10Lincoln Illinois was a country town and commercial center of 9,000 in Logan
County. Roughly one third on those in Lincoln were either born overseas or were
children of immigrants.
"Niebuhr attended Yale from 1913-1915.
12Fox, 30.
13Richard Fox notes that Niebuhr's preoccupation with personality was typical
of Protestant thinkers in both America and Germany, as it was the banner under
which evangelical and modernist liberals could unite. Confronted in the nineteenth
century by Darwin's theories and Biblical Criticism, these two groups turned to
personality as a lifeline. The essential human being would not be subject to the
laws of nature: humanity occupied a privileged realm of spirit that scientific
naturalism could not touch. See Fox, 30ff.
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for the existence of personality in the universe.. .it is an induction based upon facts.
Future knowledge may change our conception of the nature of the facts from which
we start or may prove our induction to be false but the proceedings have been
entirely justified."14 Niebuhr firmly believed that personality was key:
Christianity was a religion of a person and not a book.15
More than any other concept, what arose from Niebuhr's schooling was the
idea of personality and the importance of personal struggles in the larger scope of
God's plan and dealings with humanity. This premise would be catapulted into the
realm of praxis as Niebuhr entered his pastoral post at Detroit's Bethel Evangelical
Church in 1915.16
At Bethel, as Niebuhr encountered the exhilaration and frustrations of parish
work,17 he began to question many of his liberal presuppositions. Like Barth,
much of Niebuhr's frustration arose from the horror of the First World War. For
Niebuhr, however, what was even more disturbing than the war was the peace, as
expressed in the Treaty of Versailles. Disillusioned by what he believed to be
selfish and destructive conditions of revenge, Niebuhr began to rethink positions
associated with liberal thought. Liberalism lacked
...the spirit of enthusiasm, not to say fanaticism,
which is so necessary to move the world out of its tracks.
14Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Validity and Certainty of Religious Knowledge,"
B.D. Thesis, Yale Divinity School, 1914: 35-36.
15See Niebuhr'sM.A. Thesis, "The Contribution ofChristianity to the Doctrine
of Immortality," Yale Divinity School, 1915.
16Bethel Evangelical Church was founded in 1912 by 13 lay persons, most of
whom were middle class German-Americans, and was designed to serve Detroit's
North-West residential frontier.
"See Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic (New
York: World Publishing Co., 1957), 45ff.
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|It| is too intellectual and too little emotional to be an
efficient force in history. It is the philosophy of the
middle aged, lacking the fervency of youth and its willingness
to take a chance a nd accept the challenge....We need something
less circumspect than liberalism to save the world.18
Although Niebuhr was not abandoning his liberal roots, he was searching for a
different kind of theology placed between traditional liberalism and orthodoxy,
both which he felt fell short of the theological task. In his diary, Niebuhr
underlined this frustration: "It seems pathetic to me that liberalism has too little
appreciation of the tragedy of life to understand the cross and orthodoxy insists too
much on the absolute uniqueness of the sacrifice of Christ to make the preaching
of the cross effective."19 Niebuhr's unrest with liberalism and orthodoxy is
significant: no longer was he satisfied with a classic liberal 'optimistic' view of
humanity; rather, he began to see the element of the tragic in human life and its
impact on theology.
Niebuhr's sense of the tragic is best described as the separation between
what is real and ideal. Stressing the brokenness of human life and juxtaposing it
with the idealism inherent in liberalism's quest for a new society, Niebuhr posited
18Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Twilight of Liberalism," The New Republic June 14,
1919: 218.
19Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic. 107. Niebuhr's view
of orthodoxy was primarily structured vis-a-vis his background in the Reformation
theology of Luther and Calvin as expressed by the German Evangelical Synod.
See Young Reinhold Niebuhr. ed. William G. Crystal (New York: The Pilgrim
Press, 1977), 19, 23. See also Bennett in Kegley and Bretall, 62. Niebuhr's later
views on orthodoxy would be shaped primarily by the continental "neo-orthodox"
theologians such as Barth and Brunner. In a letter to John Bennett, Niebuhr,
referring to Barth and Brunner wrote, "I have never thought of myself in their
category. I think when it comes to the crux I belong to the liberal tradition more
than to theirs" Letter dated March 13,1943 in Fox, 214. Helpful in understanding
Niebuhr's critique of orthodoxy are his An Interpretation of Christian Ethics
(London: SCM Press, 1935) and The Nature and Destiny of Man vols. I&II
(London: Nisbet and Co., 1941 & 1943). Hereafter cited as NDMI and NDMII.
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a new starting point for his theology. He addresses the dialectic of the tragic in
this way: "Christianity's view of history is tragic insofar as it recognizes evil as
an inevitable concomitant of even the highest spiritual enterprises. It is beyond
tragedy insofar as it does not regard evil as inherent in existence itself but as
finally under the dominion of a good God." 20 However, despite his frustrations
with liberalism and his newly found place for the tragic in his theology, even in
1925, Niebuhr still believed religion's role was to project ideal ends into society:
service, benevolence and sacrificial love.21 By embracing the role of the tragic
and fusing it with his liberal leanings, Niebuhr concluded that the most effective
way to reconcile life as it was experienced, with the presence of God in the world,
was to unite the concepts of love with some form of a democratized industry and
socialization of property as the solution to the social problem. Much of this
thought came in direct relation to Niebuhr's pastoral work as well as his
confrontation with Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company over its oppressive
work conditions and pay policy. From 1925, Niebuhr attacked, with vengeance,
industrialism and its impact on humanity's personality.22
The need for the establishment of a form of justice in social relations came
to the forefront of Niebuhr's thought, taking the form of a polemic against Henry
Ford and the Ford Motor Company. Aware of Ford's unfair labor practices,23
20Bevond Tragedy (London: Nisbet and Co., Ltd., 1938), x-xi.
21See Reinhold Niebuhr, "Can Christianity Survive?," Atlantic January, 1925:
87-88.
22Especially powerful is his argument within the pages of Moral Man and
Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932).
23During Niebuhr's years in Detroit, the population grew three-fold, from 1/2
to 1 1/2 million, a large proportion of the population being Afro-American.
Industrialists took advantage of this statistic and hired Afro-American laborers at
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Niebuhr began to confront social injustice.
For Niebuhr, Ford symbolized "America's technical genius and social
ineptitude,"24 and while Niebuhr was not opposed directly to Ford the man,
Niebuhr was disillusioned by the abuses of an industry Ford had almost single-
handedly created. Niebuhr's fight was against industrialism:25 its emphasis on
over efficiency and production and the lack of interest in stimulating worker's
creative energy had destroyed, in Niebuhr's view, the human personality he had
defended since his days at Yale. Niebuhr argued that the machine and
industrialist's obsession with efficiency had numbed the worker's intellect, taking
away the joy of creative work, thus diminishing the critical element of personality.
Niebuhr believed that the entire industrial process could be used to enhance
personality if men such as Ford would cooperate:
We should try to save the machine process for the use
of personality....if some of the efficiency of industry
is sacrificed for the sake of inducing democratic
procedure in the factory, it may be possible to give the
worker some sense of personal relationship to the entire
manufacturing process, and some satisfaction in the total
product management.26
The encounter with Ford, as well as with the labor movement in general,
heightened Niebuhr's awareness of the problems associated with power —
extortionist wages with little or no benefits. See Reinhold Niebuhr, "How
Philanthropic is Henry Ford?" The Christian Century December 9, 1926, 1516-
1517.
^Ronald Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 27.
25See William Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).
26Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Effects of Modern Industrialism on Personality,"
Student World 20 (October, 1926): 304-305.
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specifically social collective power. Niebuhr began, therefore, to formulate the
concept that within society, the only norm towards which to strive was the equal
distribution of power. Henry Ford represented the antithesis:
The hope of an ethical civilization rests not upon
the possibility of making power completely ethical,
but upon the possibility of creating enough intelligence
and conscience among the holders of power to make a
gradual equalization of power possible....The fact that
Henry Ford has been accepted by the American public at
his own evaluation is the best proof of the general
incompetence of the American mind and conscience for
the intricate problems of modern industrial society.27
The frustration that arose for Niebuhr centered around the dichotomy of
Ford's technical brilliance and social irresponsibility, coupled with American
society's enthusiastic embracing of the advancements of an industrial civilization
without thought for the consequence of human struggle.28
Issues of industrial relations catapulted Niebuhr into formulating an ethic
that could accommodate the immediate frustrations of humanity in its sin with the
greater realities of responsibility before them — Niebuhr would find himself asking
the question, "what kind of ethic works in a cruel and unjust world?" as he left the
27Reinhold Niebuhr, "Henry Ford and Industrial Autocracy," The Christian
Century (November 4, 1926): 1355.
28Niebuhr complained in the pages of The Christian Century that "if Ford is the
symbol of an America with its combination of sentimentality and shrewdness, he
is also the symbol of an America which has arisen almost in a generation from an
agrarian to an industrial economic order and now applies the social intelligence of
a country village to the most complex and industrial life the world has ever
known." ("How Philanthropic is Henry Ford?, 1516-1517). Again, in June of
1927, Niebuhr stated "In our day of enlightenment it is possible for a man to amass
billions and be praised at the same time for the astuteness of his business mind and
the generosity of his impulses, even though the groans of his workers may be heard
above the din of his machines. Will we ever acquire enough social intelligence to
match our mechanical achievements?" Reinhold Niebuhr, "Ford's Five-Day Week
Shrinks," The Christian Century (June 9, 1927): 714.
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pastorate of Detroit and headed to the academic world of Union Seminary in New
York.
When Niebuhr arrived at Union Seminary in 1928, he continued to wrestle
with issues of collective justice. By the 1930's, America was in the midst of a
depression ~ economically and socially, the country was in shambles. Clearly
Niebuhr knew that liberal theology, especially as espoused in the Social Gospel of
Shailer Matthews, Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbusch, as well as the
secular liberalism of Locke, Jefferson, Mill and Dewey was not effective in
meeting the needs arising from the social disorder in which American found itself.
Niebuhr believed that the Social Gospel29 served only to make religion an
adornment of conventional society and despite its service motif, did not deal with
issues of exploitation. Secular liberalism, that argued that social disorder lay in
a cultural lag whose alleviation awaited an enlightenment vis-a-vis such vehicles
as educational opportunities, failed to meet social challenges because, according to
Niebuhr, secular liberalism did not deal realistically with the complex issues
involved in collective justice.30 For Niebuhr, the moralism of the Social Gospel
and the rationalism of secular liberalism proved irrelevant, since neither addressed
the central ethical issue of collective justice — namely, the "necessity arising when
29The term Social Gospel refers to "a type of social Christianity which grew up
in the last half of the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century.
It involved a mixture of social and theological liberalism....and may be
characterized as the response of morally sensitive Christian's to the vast new
problems of industrial America. It was an effort to bring what was conceived to
be Christian morality to bear upon social problems ranging from corruption in
government and business to immigration, housing and labor organizations." John
A. Hutchison, "Two Decades of Social Christianity," in Christian Faith and Social
Action, ed. John A. Hutchison (New York: Charles Scribners Son's . 1953), 8.
30See The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr. ed. Nathan Scott, Jr. (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1974), xii.
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large numbers of men are the victims of social and economic disinheritance of
serious reassessment of the established allocations of power. "31
Niebuhr's response to the problem of collective justice was to embrace a
Christian-Marxist interpretation of ethics in order to confront the mounting
inequalities in America. With the adoption of the Christian-Marxist approach,
Niebuhr would begin to clearly formulate the basis for his ethics.32
In addressing Niebuhr's Christian-Marxist approach, clarification is
necessary in order to understand what Niebuhr means by an ethic rooted in a
Marxist perspective. Within the pages of Moral Man and Immoral Society.33
Niebuhr makes it clear there are certain aspects inherent within Marxist ideology
he finds compelling — the focus on injustices and inequities of class systems,34 the
organic nature of society in which class conflict becomes the seat of dynamism.35
31Ibid., xii-xiii.
32We believe there are three decisive periods in Niebuhr's ethical development:
(1) The pre-Marxist period that existed from the time of Niebuhr's education at
Yale (1913-195) to the beginnings of his pastorate in Detroit (1925ff). (2) The
Christian-Marxist period from 1928-1936. (3) The re-orientation of a radical
Christian-Marxism to a more pragmatic, conservative base. This period is marked
by Niebuhr's focus on sin and the movement of the social-ethical from the problem
of workers seeking change to the ability to deal with the complexities of a mixed
economy.
"Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932)
was written by Niebuhr primarily in response to his frustration over the lack of an
applicable ethic to question of collective justice. Niebuhr states that the thesis of
the book is "that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social
behavior of individuals and of social groups...and that distinction justifies and
necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find
embarrassing... .The ultimate purpose of this task is to find political methods which
will offer the most promise of achieving an ethical social goal for society." From:




However, Niebuhr does not embrace the Marxist interpretation of history36 nor
does he affirm the moral cynicism arising from a Marxist analysis.37 For Niebuhr,
hope was to be found in the Judeo-Christian religion: while a Marxist analysis
poignantly revealed social injustices in society as well as the collective and often
immoral power inherent in groups, Niebuhr upheld a Christian interpretation of a
Marxist ideology.38
Therefore, Niebuhr began to formulate an ethic whose content was based
on principles he saw lacking in society: justice and love.
Because for Niebuhr social collectives are incorrigible and self-regarding,
justice must act as the appropriate norm for the ordering of society and power must
be distributed equitably within the body politic.39 This justice is found in what
Niebuhr terms a 'rational' ethic; prompted by reason, it aims at justice and
attempts to place the needs of others in equal stature to the needs of the self.40
However, this rational ethic must exist in tension with a religious ethic — that
which aims and emphasizes love.
For Niebuhr, the tension that exists between individual and collective justice
created a dualistic ethic that found much of its impetus in a Marxists analysis of
36Ibid., 155-156.
37Ibid., 160. Charles West points out that the picture of revolutionary Marxism
was not that of "the closed system of power and ideology centered in Soviet
Russian which today goes by the name of Communism. His encounter was rather
with the ideology of a social class whose insights expressed, he believed, a valid
judgement on present society." Charles West, Communism and the Theologians





society. But in formulating a Christian ethic, Niebuhr needed to create a
theological base for his critique of society and his passion for collective justice.
For Niebuhr, much of his Christian-Marxist analysis began to undergo a
modification: thoroughly convinced that a strong proletariat was not the answer
to injustice, increasingly aware and disturbed by the Communist influence41
(particularly in Europe), Niebuhr returned to the question that prompted the writing
of Moral Man and Immoral Society: what is the moral responsibility of the
Christian in the face of injustice? Niebuhr believed the moral person was one who
upheld and fought for justice: his concern was less with the classes and structures
that framed individuals; (as he had been in Moral Man and Immoral Society1 now
he concerned himself with how justice worked itself out in society within the realm
of moral responsibility.42
For Niebuhr, moral responsibility as a marker for ethical behavior calls the
Christian to live within history but not be swayed by historical or cultural trends.
The Christian must think and act responsibly as he/she seeks to live justly within
society. This call to responsibility finds in base in what Niebuhr terms the love
ethic of Jesus. Keenly aware that this ethic is unattainable by humanity, Niebuhr
believes the norm of love must be sought by humankind in spite of its limitations:
the seeking of an approximation of love's norm inspires humanity to act
responsibly in society and therefore justly, balancing power in such a way as to
41Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (London: SCM
Press, 1936), 145. Hereafter cited as ICE.
42Niebuhr discusses this idea in great detail within the pages of ICE. He
criticizes both the failure of liberal and orthodox theology to provide society with
a norm for ethics. For this critique see pages 149-208.
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create mutually satisfying relationships.43 The law of love, therefore, compels
humanity to stand under the reality of its sin, understanding, however, there is
always the possibility of a higher good. The law of love is a scrutinizer of
humanity's intentions.44
The paradox humanity faces in living under the norms of love and justice
is found in humanity's constant betrayal of love's norm.45 Niebuhr emphasizes
that the Christian view of history passes through 'the sense of the tragic to a hope
and assurance that is beyond tragedy.' For Niebuhr, the cross acts as the ultimate
symbol of the paradox of human sin and God's willingness and ability to overcome
evil. He states, "The cross, which stands at the center of the Christian world
view, reveals both the seriousness of human sin and the purpose and power of God
to overcome it.1,46
Niebuhr's commitment to examining the paradox between love and the
betrayal of love arose from the painful reality of the outbreak ofWorld War II and
Japan's invasion of China. Within the context of the war, the reality of human
tragedy became more pronounced than ever. While Niebuhr had previously
embraced the sinfulness of humanity, with the war came a new appreciation for the
locus of sin — it was pervasive in all classes and aspects of society.
Niebuhr's move away from liberal optimism and the reshaping of his radical
Christian Marxism had reached a new plateau: with his espousal of the universal
43See Reinhold Niebuhr, "Socialist Decision and Christian Conservatism,"
Radical Religion. Spring 1938.
44ICE. 70ff.




sinfulness of humanity, Niebuhr began to modify his concepts of justice and love
in order to address ethical questions in a multi-sinful, economic and cultural
society. He did this by developing a theological anthropology47 in which he
expanded his analysis of sin and its relationship to the ethical norms of justice and
love.
Despite humanity's inability to conform to the undiscriminating selfless love
of agape, Niebuhr is not content to do away with agape as the norm of life because
it is not a possibility within history. Niebuhr retains agape through the reality of
the cross, a symbol that displays humanity's own true nature:
The norm of agape revealed in the Cross is not an alien
norm imposed in external, authoritarian fashion. On the
contrary, he is seeking to show that the agape of the Cross
is verily of law of man's true nature. In this sense, the
Cross clarifies, but does not create, a norm which is given
by the very constitution of selfhood.48
For Niebuhr, humanity cannot understand its true nature except as it
understands itself from an external vantage point: the cross. The cross, argues
Niebuhr, points us not to the historical possibility of agape, but to its relevance as
a norm for humanity's life; the law of love is therefore, "clarified but not created
by the Cross."49
If the cross does not point us to the historical possibility of agape, how is
the law of love related to a historical reality? For Niebuhr, the connection between
the unhistorical and historical is found in the norm of justice. For Niebuhr, justice
47Niebuhr's theological anthropology is best understood in his work The Nature




and love are always interrelated, like two sides of one coin. Justice is the social
embodiment of love; love is the fulfillment and negation of justice
Love is thus the end term of any system of morals. It is the
moral requirement in which all schemes of justice are fulfilled
and negated. They are fulfilled because the obligation of life
to life is more fully met in love than is possible in any scheme
of equity and justice. They are negated because love makes an
end of the nicely calculated; (less and more of structures of justice.
It does not carefully arbitrate between the needs of the self
and of the other, since it meets the needs of the other without
concern for the self.50
Love demands justice and prompts humanity to seek justice in society;
justice embodies love and so manifests itself through its obedience to the claim of
love. Although Niebuhr is quick to point out that justice is always negated by
love, he also argues that love redeems justice through the vantage point of the cross
that fulfills what has been destroyed by sin. Love acts as the motivator for justice,
keeping it balanced and giving it the redemption it needs to work effectively within
society. Thus for Niebuhr, in the face of the radical sin that permeates the human
race, justice is the norm that is, in his mind, attainable, although love is the ideal
and perfect norm. The tension between these two norms must always be
maintained:
For to understand the law of love as the final imperative
but not to know about the persistence of the power of self-
love in all of life...results in an idealistic ethic with
no relevance to the hard realities of life....to know both
the law of love as the final standard and the law of self-
love as a persistent force is to enable Christians to have
a foundation for a pragmatic ethic in which power and self-
interest are used, beguiled, harnessed, and deflected for
the ultimate end of establishing the highest and most
50The Nature and Destiny of Man, v.I. 313.
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inclusive possible community of justice and order.51
The Nature and Destiny of Man I&II represent the culmination of the
development of Niebuhr's ethics: justice and love become the norms by which
humanity seeks, both individually and corporately, to live# their lives within
society — lives characterized by egalitarian standards and the equitable distribution
of power — goals only achievable beyond the tragedy of human sin, but given hope
in the Cross of Christ. For Niebuhr, ethics is a part of his theological
anthropology: beginning with questions of injustice, Niebuhr sought to establish
justice, creating a theological base for his ethical criteria.
Intriguing parallels exist between Barth and Niebuhr. Both were raised in
an atmosphere that upheld theology as highly important, both had fathers who
•or*
impactecftheir life decisions; as young pastors both encountered industrial struggles
and the disillusionment with certain aspects of the First World War, and were
forced to reassess their theology. Yet two men with similar backgrounds landed
theologically in completely antithetical places. We believe the primary reason for
this difference, and the reason Niebuhr is so critical of Barth, lay in how each man
approached the doctrine of revelation.
As stated previously, we believe Niebuhr's (and other critics of Barth)52
51Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Social Action," in Christian Faith and
Social Action, ed. John A. Hutchison (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1953),
241.
52It would be incorrect to state that all critiques of Barth are based on
differences surrounding Barth's approach to the doctrine of revelation. Certainly
there are other areas and focal points of critique (for a scathing critique of all of
Barth's theology see Cornelius Van Til's "Barth's Christology" International
Library of Philosophy and Theology ed. Marcellus J. Kik [Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing Company]) However, in the case of Niebuhr, we believe his
critique stems primarily from a difference in revelatory emphasis. Therefore, we
will be focusing on this aspect of his paradigmatic critique.
166
polemic against Barth's ethic is one of theological, not ethical reflection; more
specifically, one of revelation. We believe that as Barth's doctrine of revelation
shaped and defined his approach to ethics, so too, did Niebuhr's. Within that
framework of revelation, therefore, we find our starting point for Niebuhr's
critique.53
For Niebuhr, the doctrine of human nature plays die determining role in the
development of an ethic. While revelation is the first datum of human experience
for Barth, for Niebuhr, "human experience in society, as a reality independent of
all preconceptions of its meaning and incapable of being reduced to any system of
53For further helpful discussions on Niebuhr and his ethics see the following:
John C. Bennett, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics," in Reinhold Niebuhr: An
Introduction to his Religious. Social and Political Thought, ed. CharlesW. Kegley
and Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956); Joseph Bettis,
"Theology and Politics: Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr on Social Ethics After
Liberalism," Religion in Life 48 (1979): 53-61; June Bingham, The Courage to
Change (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961); Edward J. Carnell, The
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1951); Kenneth Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989);
Richard Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books,
1985); James Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in Religion, ed. Paul Ramsey (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); "Theology in the Service of Ethics: An
Interpretation of Reinhold Niebuhr's Theological Ethics," in Reinhold Niebuhr and
the Issues of Our Time, ed. R. Harnes (Oxford: A.W. Mowbray and Co., Ltd.,
1986); Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1960); Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, eds. Reinhold
Niebuhr: An Introduction to his Religious. Social and Political Thought (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1956); Paul Lehmann, "The Changing Course of
Corrective Theology," Theology Today 13 (1956): 332-357; Paul Merkley,
Reinhold Niebuhr: A Political Account (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1975); D.B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism 1919-1941
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1960); Priscilla
Richards, Annotated Bibliography of Reinhold Niebuhr's Works (New Jersey:
American Theological Library Association, 1984); D.B. Robertson, Reinhold
Niebuhr's Works: A Bibliography (Maryland: University Press of America,
1983); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in Political Thought," in
Kegley and Bretall.
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rational coherence, "54 is the base of all thought. Reason is constantly involved in
a dialectical struggle with ideology55 and therefore, truth, as contained in Christian
revelation, includes and recognizes this tension: while humanity can never fully
know the truth, humanity continually imagines and lives as if it has apprehended
and mastered truth.56 Therefore, Niebuhr's origin for his doctrine of revelation
lay in human ability to intuitively know some kind of truth, but an inability to fully
comprehend it.57
According to Niebuhr, revelation is comprised of two distinct, yet united
principles: the personal-individual (general), and the social-historical (special).58
Niebuhr insists that the first type of revelation, the personal-individual, is a
universal experience of all humanity, meaning that the knowledge ofGod is not an
aspect of supernatural grace but a constituent element within humanity.59 All of
humanity, therefore, experiences personal-individual revelation: "the testimony in
the consciousness of every person that his life touches a reality beyond himself, a
reality deeper and higher than the system of nature in which he stands....The soul




57We can see how this position is antithetical to Barth's, which has as its
starting point in no form of human understanding but in God's sole act of
initiation.
58NDM I. 136. See also Kenneth Hamilton, "Revelation's Supreme
Dimension," Canadian Journal of Theology 10 (1963): 150.
59NDM I. 281f. This idea of knowledge inherent within humanity is closely
related to Brunner's natural theology as well as to strands of Thomistic thought.
Niebuhr stated, "...the creation is contemplated as pointing to a Creator, already
known in man's moral experience." NDM I. 143, 146.
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which reaches the outermost rims of its own consciousness must also come into
contact with God, for He impinges on that consciousness."60 Here we see
Niebuhr's connection to Schleiermacher, in terms of the consciousness and its
leading humanity to a reality of a type of dependence.61
The personal-individual realm of revelation contains three main aspects: (1)
a sense of reverence for a majesty and a dependence upon this ultimate source of
being62 (2) a sense of moral obligation laid upon individuals from beyond and of
moral unworthiness before a judge63 (3) the longing for forgiveness.64 The first
two elements are the catalysts for the third dimension of revelation, which cannot
be completed in the personal-individual realm alone: there must be a place which
reveals the merciful, forgiving knowledge of God. This 'place' is the social-
historical.65
While all humanity experiences a general form of revelation, no matter how
vague or undefined, special revelation is, by its very nature, not a universal
aNDM T. 136-137.
61Niebuhr does not employ the term 'utter dependence' but does credit
Schleiermacher with influencing his concept of consciousness, although Niebuhr
does not adhere fully to Schleiermacher's thought. See NDM I. 137, where
Niebuhr writes "Schleiermacher describes this experience of God (the
consciousness and its relation to God) as the experience of 'unqualified
dependence.' This is one of its aspects but not its totality. It is one of its aspects
because there is, in all human consciousness, at least a dim recognition of the
insufficient and dependent character of all finite life, a recognition which implies
the consciousness of the reality upon which dependent existence depends. An
equally important characteristic of the experience of God is the sense of being seen,






phenomenon, because while all long for forgiveness, many are not assured because
the assurance of forgiveness has, as a part of its content, the context of faith.
Niebuhr calls faith the correlate of revelation,66 their mutual relation being so
close that revelation is not known or complete save its relation to faith.67 For
Niebuhr
the revelation of God in Christ, the disclosure of God's
sovereignty over life and history, the clarification of
the meaning of life and history, is not completed until
man is able, by faith, to apprehend the truth which is
beyond his apprehension without faith....It is a truth
capable of apprehension by faith; but when so apprehended
there is a consciousness in the heart of the believer that
he has been helped to this apprehension.68
Therefore, the revelation of God in Christ (social-historical revelation) not only
gives humanity more information about who God is, but it also, most importantly,
initiates for Niebuhr the relationship of God as 'Thou'69 that for Niebuhr means
the final revelation of the personality of God, i.e. the mercy and forgiveness so
acutely missing in general revelation, and the full revelation of God Himself in
Christ. This unique relationship, in which God reveals Himself to humanity is for
Niebuhr, God's final word to humanity,70 a word that explains the beginning, the
present order, and the end of history.71 Within the social-historical, the question




69See NDM I. 153.
70NDM II. 69.
71Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (London: Nisbet and Co., 1949), 119.
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of divine sovereignty over history is "in the self-disclosure of a divine love, which,
on the one hand, is able to overcome the evil inclination to self-worship in the
human heart and which, on the other hand, takes on the evil of history into and
upon itself. These two facets of love establish the two most important aspects of
the Biblical interpretation of history."72
The relationship that exists for Niebuhr between the personal-individual and
the social-historical aspects of revelation is rooted in Niebuhr's unique combination
of the idea of a point of contact and an adherence to certain aspects of natural
theology. In his approach to the point of contact, Niebuhr is like Emil Brunner
and unlike Barth, in that Niebuhr believes there to be a justitia originalis: an
original righteousness not obliterated by sin, which is available and present within
all humanity.73 Niebuhr defines humanity's essential nature in this way:
To the essential nature of man belong, on the one hand,
all his natural endowments and determinations, his
72Faith and History. 142. Niebuhr goes on to assert that this love has more
than just a historical dimension — it contains the revelation of divine mercy that
overcomes the contradictions of human life. (Faith and History. 154). Moreover,
special revelation not only serves to reveal the Thou of God in Christ but also
establishes the norm of all Christian ethics. SeeWilliam A. Greenlaw, "Revelation
and the Problem of Apologetics: An Exploration in the Theology of Reinhold
Niebuhr," Dialog 15 (1976): 255.
73NDM II. 289. Earlier in this work Niebuhr states, "If it be true, as we have
maintained, that no sinful self-centeredness can ever destroy the structure of
freedom and self-transcendence in man, it must follow that there is some inner
testimony from the very character and structure of the human psyche against the
strategy of sinful egotism. The finite mind has some understanding of its own
finiteness; and therefore, it cannot escape an uneasy conscience over its sinful
effort to complete its own life about 'itself and its own.'(Luther) This is the point
of contact between grace and the natural endowments of the soul which even
Luther, despite his doctrine of total depravity, admits and which Karl Barth seeks
desperately to deny. As long as there is such a point of contact there is something
in man to which appeal can be made; though it must be admitted that men may be
driven to despair, rather than repentance, either by the events or the appeals which
shake the self-confidence of the sinful self." NDM II. 121
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physical and social impulses, his sexual and racial
differentiations - in short his character as a creature
imbedded in the natural order. On the other hand, his
essential nature also includes the freedom of his spirit,
his transcendence over natural process and finally his
self-transcendence.74
Niebuhr continues his argument by stating that sin does not destroy the structure
by which humanity is humanity, nor does sin eliminate the sense of obligation
towards the essential nature of humanity.75 Although this kind of thought may
ring of a Thomistic adherence to natural law, Niebuhr is quick to refute any kind
of natural law theory that does not look beyond the world to understand the world.
While individuals have, for Niebuhr in some measure, an experience beyond
themselves, reason, for example, is able to exercise only a minimal empirical
function in the face of conflicts of interest76 and cannot alone prove the meaning
of human life in history. Thus, Niebuhr adheres to a relative form of natural law
but tempers it with his 'suspicion of humankind.'77
Where natural theology works for Niebuhr is primarily in its adherence to
the point of contact: because Niebuhr upholds a view, which despite sin, still




It should be noted here that while Barth disallowed any form of cultural
disciplines to inform the theological task, he did view them as useful when held
under the microscope of theology. For example, Barth would affirm the
contribution of philosophy but only as it is informed and interpreted by theology.
Of course, this very idea is what irritated Niebuhr and led to what we perceive to
be, at one level, an accurate questioning of the role of human freedom and
responsibility, for it seems that Barth's absolutism relegates humanity to the role
of a pawn in an heavenly game of chess - a pawn unable to strategise, let alone
move, except by the hand and act of God.
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great deal of room for the place of input from sources other than Christian
theology. He does, in fact, insist upon the place and relevance of any norms
which come out of the broad sweep of a classical, European or modern cultural
history. In no way, however, is Niebuhr arguing for a theology based only on
reason and nature — he is not. However, he does see a place for a point of contact
based on an imago tarnished rather than destroyed by sin. Theologian Charles
West describes this modified form of natural law as that which all humanity the
capacity to understand its relativity and sin. But, West argues, there is no
incorruptible natural truth for Niebuhr and no unqualifiedly good aspect of man.78
Thus, for Niebuhr, the point of contact allows for humanity's active participation
within history rather than simply focussing on what God has already done,
negating, at one level, any input form humanity other than that which affirms only
God's eternal work.
Niebuhr is a helpful paradigm for assessing Barth because Niebuhr
approaches the theological task from such a different point of origin, thus
presenting us with a different set of questions and perspectives. For Niebuhr,
theology was best expressed in terms of the real and ideal, whereas Barth thought
in terms of the real and unreal.79 In his doctrine of human nature/revelation, we
78West, 246.
79George Hunsigner states that "Niebuhr's concept of the real was ground in
his anthropology of sin so that love, being unattainable in its essential fullness,
could only be conceived as a critical but elusive ideality....Whereas Niebuhr's
thinking about reality was anthropocentric, Barth's was theocentric. It was God
who set the terms for what was real... .What for Barth was the touchstone of reality
(love) was for Niebuhr the 'impossible-possibility,' whereas what for Barth was the
'impossible-possibility' (sin) was for Niebuhr the touchstone of reality." George
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 38-
39.
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see Niebuhr's starting point for his evaluation of Barth, a point that will ask
difficult and pointed questions to the Barthian ethic.
Niebuhr's critique highlights several key issues regarding Barth's ethics,
primarily those surrounding absolutism and eschatology, best expressed in
Niebuhr's criticism of Barth's response to communism, with particular reference
to Hungary. In order to understand Niebuhr's critique of Barth, we must first
briefly examine Niebuhr's view of, and polemic against communism.
Charles West points out that at least since Niebuhr's genesis as a teacher,
he viewed communism as a religion.80 Central to the communist "faith" was a
pessimism regarding the present and an eschatological vision of a classless society.
For Niebuhr, communism's approach to its faith is "dogmatic rather than scientific.
Like all vital religions it engages the entire human psyche and offers its
interpretation of life and the world in order that it might challenge to action in
conformity to its truth."81 In this sense, communism is a religion, but not,
according to Niebuhr a 'high' religion82 because communism does not give
attention to the freedom and destiny of individuals nor does it address issues of
time and eternity. For Niebuhr, communism is a 'religion' limited to history and
the temporal world.
80West, 132.
81Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christian Politics and Communist Religion," in
Christianity and the Social Revolution, ed. John Lewis (London: 1936), 46Iff.
82Niebuhr ascribes the following attributes to high religion: transcendence (i.e.
the knowledge of an absolute who has a will higher than that of humanity, not
limited to human history), the love that validates human personality in all lives,
and the knowledge of repentance and grace. For further insight see Reinhold
Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era (New York: Charles Scribners Son's,
1934). See also Charles West, 134ff.
174
Niebuhr's polemic against communism is two-fold: first, Niebuhr argues
that the Utopian ideology inherent within communism removes the controls on the
conscience of a ruling group because of communism's inadequate doctrine of
humankind. Because a Marxist analysis of society presumes the proletariat to be
the sinless carrier of revolution, communism has no resource for self-reformation:
the power that the proletariat gains from the revolution within society does, in fact,
become a form of what Niebuhr calls an unbalanced power — a dangerous self-
righteous power. Because Niebuhr adheres to the idea of the collective evils of
society, he cannot, in good conscience, or in congruence with his theology, affirm
communism. Indeed, he must take a vehement position against communism for
this reason: although the elimination of economic oppression resulting from
capitalism will advance humanity to new levels of maturity, humanity will not
move to new levels of frictionless unity and tensionless innocency.83 This
centralization of power to what Marxism believes to the 'sinless proletariat' will,
therefore, end only in an imbalance of power that will, for Niebuhr, end in
tyranny.84
Second, Niebuhr opposes communism because its utopianism has a
seductive appeal to liberal and idealistic views. Niebuhr describes communism as
83See Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Idea of Progress and Socialism'" Radical
Religion (Spring, 1936): 28-29.
84Niebuhr argues that "the real ideological content of modern communism
is...the power structure based on this dogmatism in a managerial society in which
a political party holds a dangerous amount of power....The important point is that
the ruthless power operates behind a screen of pretended ideal ends, a situation
which is more dangerous and more evil than pure cynical defiance of moral ends."
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Democratic Experience (New York: Frederich A. Praeger
Publishers, 1969), 10 and Christian Realism and Political Problems (London:
Faber and Faber, 1953), 43.
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a very modern kind of religious apocalypse; for it
contains the dearest hope of all typical moderns,
Marxist or non-Marxist. That hope is that man may
be delivered from his ambiguous position of being
both creature and creator of the historical process
and become unequivocally the master of his own
destiny. The liberal culture has been informed by
similar hopes since the 18th century.85
Because of its appeal to idealism, argues Niebuhr, communism is
particularly attractive to liberal minds. Understanding thatWestern Liberalism had
held to the hope of creating 'perfect' people by eliminating the social sources of
evil and purifying human reason through such techniques as education, as well as
the desire to form a universal human will that would be informed by a universal
mind, liberal thinkers in the West could, according to Niebuhr, be allured into the
Utopian ideology of a Marxist interpretation of society. However, where liberal's
in the West had always been ambiguous as to how power might be related to
'universal values' of humanity, communism was not nearly as vague or ambiguous.
Niebuhr reveals that communism, in contrast to Western liberalism is distinguished
by a sharper, more precise definition of (1) the elite, who act as a surrogate for
humankind86 (2) schemes for endowing the elite with actual political power87 (3)
the end towards which history should move,88 (4) the readiness needed to sacrifice
every value of life for the achievement of its ends.89
Herein lay the tension for Niebuhr: liberalism, with its great hopes and its
85Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles
Scribners Son's, 1952), 66-67.





ambiguous plans for the implementation of those hopes was free from the cruelties
that, according to Niebuhr, had permeated communism — primarily because of its
combination of utopianism and fanaticism. Niebuhr views utopianism as a
"consequence of fleeing from the cross-purposes in history to an imaginary ideal
future of a heaven on earth.90 Fanaticism, he argues, is "the consequence of
ascribing ultimate significance to proximate and historically contingent ends and
goals."91 This utopianism and fanaticism generates a sense of meaninglessness in
history and provides a rationalization for acts of tyranny in the name of creating
an ideal society. For Niebuhr, a Utopian society at any cost, is by far a too high
price to pay.
Niebuhr's polemic against communism arose out of his concern for
communist dogma and Utopian ideology. For Niebuhr, the evil of communism
arose from political as well as spiritual elements;92 the combination of these
factors proved to Niebuhr that power and pride within society, specifically within
a Marxist analysis of society, "is responsible for turning the illusory dreams of
yesterday into the present nightmare, which disturbs the ease of millions...in our
generation. "93
Bearing in mind Niebuhr's strong opposition to communism, we now turn
to his critique of Barth, that found its basis in Barth's approach to the issue of
90The Democratic Experience. 11-12.
91Ibid.
92John C. Bennett emphasizes this point: "Communism...creates a vast
totalitarian empire and threatens the political and spiritual and cultural freedom of
other nations. It is this fact that makes political resistance to communism urgent."
John C. Bennett, "The Church Between East and West," in Christian Faith and
Social Action. 78.
"Christian Realism and Political Problems. 47.
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communism, specifically in Hungary.
On October 23, 1956, a rebellion against Russian despotism occurred that
ended in a bloodbath for the Hungarian nation. For Reinhold Niebuhr, this act of
Russian tyranny was enough to destroy "permanently, whatever prestige is still
adhered to the Communist ideology in Eastern Europe and among intellectuals and
neutralist theologians of the Continent."94 One such neutralist was Karl Barth.
For Niebuhr, Barth's 'quietism' on the Hungarian situation was puzzling,
if not exasperating. Barth had strong links with the Hungarian Reformed church,
particularly in the area of advising and counseling its leaders. His most active role
came during his tour ofHungary, where he lectured to pastors, professors, students
and church leaders.
According to Barth, while the political situation in Hungary was less than
adequate, he perceived the Hungarian Christians to be less concerned with the
Russian influence that the West believed
...I discovered they did not share the nervousness about
the Russians, the 'peoples' 'democracies' and the whole
problem of Eastern Europe....They are not so frightened
and despairing as one might imagine from a distance....
I met no responsible Reformed Hungarian who considered it
right from a Christian point of view to take the line of
fundamental, out and out political resistance. My impression
is that they will not be silent when they are forced to
speak.95
Barth's concern for the Hungarian Reformed Church was two-fold. First,
he was clear that in facing the political crisis of the Russian oppression, the
94Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why is Barth Silent on Hungary?," in Essays in Applied
Christianity, ed. D.B. Robertson (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 183.
95Karl Barth, "The Reformed Church Behind the Iron Curtain," in Against the
Stream (London: SCM Press, 1954), 103-104.
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Hungarian Christians not align themselves with the activity of the Roman Catholic
Church that was promoting nationalism as a religious-political statement of
opposition.96 Second, Barth's call to Hungarian Christians was one of spiritual
growth and perspective: for Barth, the role of the Church in the midst of political
change is to be interested in that change, but to first and foremost uphold the
concerns of the Church. Thus for Barth, the political change in Hungary could
only be understood under the "greater eschatological change of Jesus Christ."97
Believing that political changes lie within the realm of the 'now and not yet' of
eschatology, Barth views their significance only within the realm ofHeilsgeschichte
and therefore, encourages the Hungarian Reformed Church to do so as well,
looking upon the changes in a political system as an opportunity to 'change' the
Church: to ask itself the question, where does the Church need to perform acts of
penance?; how can it better serve its call to witness to the world as well as its own
fellowship?; how, in midst of political change can the Church take occasion to
'revise the foundations of its own activities?'98 Barth admonished the Hungarian
Church to unjudgementally
summon all involved in political changes to humility
and modesty with one another and to the praise of God...
and call them to humanity, that is, to a situation in
which they not only dispute but are tolerant with one
another.99
Thus, in approaching the Hungarian situation, Barth refused to urge the Hungarian
96lbid.
97Karl Barth, "The Christian Community in the Midst of Political Change," in




Church to speak or act out against communism under the assurance that no
'absolutely good or absolutely evil' government would appear in history, a position
Niebuhr categorized as religious truism and political irrelevance.100
Niebuhr's greatest frustration lay in his critique ofBarth's misunderstanding
between Nazism and Communism. Niebuhr argues that Barth did not understand
fully the evils of communism and came to the rather capricious conclusion that
Communism could not be as evil as Nazism because Communism did not contain
a spiritual crisis
Communism, as distinguished from Nazism, has not done,
and by its nature cannot do one thing; it has never
made the slightest attempt to reinterpret or falsify
Christianity, or to shroud itself in a Christian garment.
It has never committed the basic crime of the Nazis, the
replacement of the real Christ by a national Jesus, and
it has never committed the crime of anti-Semitism. There
is nothing of a false prophet in it.101
Therefore, for Barth, the difference between Communism and Nazism is based
around the first Commandment. While National Socialism attempted to replace the
God of the first Commandment, Communism does not. It is godless and therefore
the role of the Christian is not to rise against it, but rather to preach the good news
of Christ. For Niebuhr, such an attitude rings of blatant ignorance: according to
Niebuhr, the "Marxist dogma....denies the possibility of making ethical
choices... .it is this potent dogma that color and confuses judgements and.. .is partly
responsible for the neutralism of European intellectuals...and it colors the attitude
I00Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Moral and Political Judgements of Christians," The
Christian Century 19 (July 6, 1959): 101.
101Barth, "The Church Between East and West," in Against the Stream. 140.
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of such diverse intellectuals as...Karl Barth."102 Barth's insistence on disavowing
moral principles103 reflects, for Niebuhr, Barth's absolutism in approaching ethical
questions.
Barth's absolutism in addressing the issue of communism leads to an
isolationism and subjectivism within ethics. For Niebuhr, Barth's failure to deal
with the evils of communism tm confirmed the irrelevance of Barth's ethic, for
humanity cannot "protect the truth of the gospel by separating it from all the
disciplines of culture and all the common experiences of our ethical life."104
How, argued Niebuhr, can an ethic be sensitive to the daily needs of life if it
chooses to place itself, in a sense, above that life?105 How can God's interaction
with humanity have any relevance if it is only an interaction based primarily on an
ahistorical event, transcending any cultural or historical impact? In dismissing the
place of human achievement outside of revelation, in insisting on absolutism, Barth
has, according to Niebuhr, created a vacuum within which the church functions,
and one which, in facing human need, is incapable of acting. In his Amsterdam
102Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems. 52-53.
103Because Barth believes that in approaching ethics each situation is to be
approached in light of a 'fresh hearing' of the Word of God, he will not accept any
kind of structure of moral principles. This concept Niebuhr finds extremely
irritating, if not useless.
104Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Quality ofOur Lives," The Christian Century (May
11,1960): 571.
105Niebuhr stated that "we cannot, in short, make the Christian faith relevant
to the collective problems of our day without more modesty in recognizing past
mistakes, present difficulties, and the need of religiously neutral instruments of
judgements. We cannot achieve this modesty if we insist on regarding the
Christian faith as a simple panacea for all human ills, individual and collective."
From "The Moral and Political Judgements of Christians," 103.
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address, "The Christian Witness in the Social and National Order,"106 as well as
within the pages of an article in The Christian Century. Niebuhr stated his concern
this way:
It is true that.. .repentance is always required as evil
always flourishes. But it is wrong to preach this Gospel
sub specie aeternitatis as if there were no history with
its time and seasons....Yesterday they [Barthians]
discovered that the Church may be an ark in which to
survive a flood. Today they seem so enamored of this
special function of Church that they have decided to
turn the ark into a home on Mount Ararat and live in it
perpetually.107
Because Barth refused in the Hungarian situation to make comparative
judgements (i.e. Barth's unwillingness to distinguish between moderate opposition
to communism and primitive anti-communism), Niebuhr concludes that Barth's
ethic ends in a subjective, complacent approach toward Communist tyranny,
particularly in Hungary;108 a complacency that Niebuhr believed arose from
106This address was delivered at the meeting of the First Assembly of the World
Council of Churches in Amsterdam in the summer of 1948.
107Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Christian Witness in the Social and National Order"
in Christian Realism and Political Problems (London: Faber and Faber Ltd.,
1953), 108-109. Also, "We Are Men and Not God," The Christian Century
October 27, 1948. 1139.
108Niebuhr saw the incongruousness of Barth's positions in statements made by
Barth like the following: "I am of the opinion...that the Church today, contrary
to its action between 1933-1945, ought to stand quietly aloof from the present
conflict and not let off all its guns before it is necessary, but wait calmly to see
whether and in what sense the situation will grow serious again and call from
speech." Karl Barth, "The Christian Community in the Midst of Political
Change," 117. What Niebuhr finds disappointing is Barth's complete disregard for
the evil of Communism, as well as his unwillingness to engage politically in the
Hungarian dispute. Niebuhr makes a good point when he queries Barth's
understanding of the issues.
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Barth's eschatological approach to ethics.109
Barth's eschatology, as the key to understanding what he terms as divinely
determined freedom, engages the question of human responsibility vs. the
command of God. Niebuhr argues that Barth is too eschatological in his thinking -
- the eternal perspective has "overshadowed and obscured the temporal reality of
man's need."110 Where this critique is crucial is in approaching the area of
responsibility and, therefore, freedom. For Niebuhr,
the freedom which man has in Christ is a freedom from
the distortions of pride and self-interest and from the
ideologies which cover them, to see the neighbor as he
is, in the social reality which stands under God's
gracious providence. It is therefore a freedom which
affirms human experience, and so far as it is relative
and objective, human thinking about that experience, by
virtue of its standard and source in Christ. This is
a freedom which is in no sense a substitute for the
careful understanding of the social and political situation
in which the Christian has to act, but frees the
Christian for this understanding.111
Barth's eschatological approach severely limits human freedom112 and is, for
109See Reinhold Niebuhr, "Barthianism and Political Reaction," in Essays in
Applied Christianity. 1154. See also Donald B. Meyer, The Protestant Search for
Political Realism 1919-1941 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of
California Press, 1960), 247.
110Klem, 72. Niebuhr believed that "Karl Barth's theological framework is
defective for wise political decisions for two reason: the first is that he is too
consistently 'eschatological' for a 'nicely calculated less and more' which must go
into political decisions. The second defect...is his extreme pragmatism which
disavows moral principles....Barth's view makes no provision for discriminating
judgements, both because of its strong eschatological emphasis and because of the
absence of principles and structures of values." (Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why is Barth
Silent on Hungary?" in Essays in Applied Christianity. 186ff.
"'West, 316-317.
112Niebuhr does credit Barth's eschatological approach in its effect on East
German Christians: "In fairness to Barth, it must be said that his approach to
things has been more creative in East Germany, where Political resistance is
absolutely impossible because of the weight of the Russian military upon that
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Niebuhr, incongruous with Barth's theology. If, as Barth argues, divine
determination is true freedom and if this freedom is freedom to act responsibly -
to live life as a reflection of what lies behind election, that is grace, and treat
others under that same elective grace — how could Barth be silent regarding the
Hungarian situation? How could communism reflect in any way, shape or form,
God's grace, when in fact, the situation in Hungary was proof enough that an
absolute monopoly of power leads to grievous injustices? Barth has failed Niebuhr
in his inability to understand communism and its propensity toward evil. Barth's
absolutism and eschatological approach to ethics has blinded him to the pressing
need in Hungary, paralyzing the Protestant Christians from determining choice and
action in the ethical realm.
While Barth upheld the sacredness of the first Commandment on his attack
on National Socialism, he did not remain congruent theologically or ethically in
dealing with communism, for is not the proletariat and the Utopian dream of society
a replacement for the real Christ and God's kingdom? Is not the secular religion
of communism with its dogma and 'despotism' a form of idolatry? For Niebuhr,
Barth's inability to see the parallels that exist between Nazism and Communism
acts, therefore, as a reflection of Barth's lack of political ethic:
In each case a different element of his theology predominates.
In no case does he adequately relate them to produce a fully
convincing political ethic. In one situation we are confronted
with an unmodified declaration of crisis and status confessionis
against the political demons of our day, and in another we find
Soviet outpost. There Barth's eschatological emphasis has inspired a kind of
religious resistance which has permitted the East German christians to bear witness
to their faith and to assert their dignity...without raising false hopes and fears in
the political realm." "Why is Barth Silent on Hungary?," 188. See also Karl
Barth, "Einen Brief an einen Pfarrer in der DDR" Evangelischer Verlag Zollikon,
1958.
184
counsel to wait, reserve judgement, and remember that God's
grace rules even the demons....Barth seems...to neglect his
responsibility for that difficult empirical analysis of real
human relations.113
Niebuhr's dissatisfaction with Barth's ethic began long before the issue of
Hungary ever arose. In fact, Niebuhr's critique of Barth spans 30 years, beginning
in 1928 after the publication of Barth's The Word of God and the Word of Man
arrived in America. Over the period of these 30 years, Niebuhr's critique focussed
on two main issues: what he perceived to be Barth's absolutism and eschatological
emphasis within theology and ethics. The only modification of Niebuhr's critique
came after a visit to Barth in 1947; writing of his meeting with Barth, Niebuhr
stated that he "disassociated Barth from the Biblicist literalism or
fundamentalism...[that] seems to grip his followers."114 Despite this reprieve,
Niebuhr's frustration was re-ignited at the 1948 meeting of the World Council of
Churches in Amsterdam, where Niebuhr again criticized Barth's eschatological
approach to questions of economic and political injustices.115 By 1960 Niebuhr
had no use for Barth or his theology: "I record these developments without too
much animus because Barth has long since ceased to have any effect on my
thought.1,116
Barth's response to Niebuhr's critique varied. Little was said about
Niebuhr's attack on Barth's theology until the Amsterdam Assembly where Barth
113West, 313.
114Reinhold Niebuhr, "European Impressions," The Christian Century (May 12,
1947): 2.
115See Reinhold Niebuhr, "We are Men and not God," The Christian Century
(October 27, 1948).
116"The Quality of Our Lives," 570.
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rebutted Niebuhr
It is obvious that, so far as Niebuhr is concerned I did
not express myself clearly. I clearly did not succeed in
expressing my quite simple thought and quite simple purpose
in such a way that my meaning as it travelled from my brain
and manuscript to the ear and thought world of Niebuhr,
conveyed what I intended. When I read his exposition, I
cannot help recalling the concave mirror in which I recently
saw my reflection in the Musee Crevin in Paris, and I did
not know whether to laugh or cry.117
For Barth, much of the confusion surrounding his position came from what he
believed to be a misunderstanding of Continental theology by the Anglo-Saxon
world.118
It would be incorrect to state that Barth was silent when confronted by
Niebuhr's critique-he was, in fact, anything but silent when Niebuhr attacked him
on his position in Hungary. Labeling Niebuhr as a 'hard boiled' Western politician
who wanted him to accept a primitive form of anti-communism, Barth argued that
his position on Hungary was absolutely congruent with his theological approach;
given the opportunity, he would not have changed his decision to 'remain silent'
...my stand on the Hungarian problem proved highly offensive
in my homeland and perhaps elsewhere too....I maintain that
the positive way taken by the Hungarian Reformed people is
preferable to the glory they might win as standard-bearer
for the so-called "Christian West...." We shall see who was
right in the long run.119
Realistically, Niebuhr's critique of Barth did little to change Barth's
approach to theology and ethics. Perhaps Niebuhr's polemic served primarily to
117Karl Barth, in The Courage to Change. 341.
118We will be investigating this concept in our next chapter.
119Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind (Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press,
1966), 57.
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emphasize the differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental theology; perhaps
Niebuhr compelled Barth to create his 'special ethics' as a means to address claims
of olympianism and absolutism. One thing is clear: Niebuhr does point out
significant challenges to Barth's ability to maintain a political ethic. But there is
more to examine that Niebuhr's critique allows. Not only does Barth's absolutism
and eschatological emphasis serve to limit the practicality of his ethic, but also his
doctrine of church and state? history, as well as his unwillingness to accept any
form of norms as well as the role of the Holy Spirit within ethics.
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CHAPTER SIX
How Well Does the Barthian Ethic Serve Us?
In his critique of Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr presents us with a helpful
paradigm for assessing the Barthian ethic. Believing that Barth's ethic is too
eschatologically based and absolutist, Niebuhr concludes that Barth's ethics simply
do not work. In discussing Barth's approach to Communism, Niebuhr emphasizes
not only the 'loftiness' of the Barthian ethic but also the seeming incongruity.
While we find Niebuhr's critique helpful, we believe there are several other
areas that must be discussed in an examination of Barth's ethics. These areas
include Barth's approach to the relationship between church and state, his doctrine
of history, the place of norms within ethics and the role of the Spirit in guiding
Christians as they make ethical decisions.1
I. The Relationship Between Church and State
Barth's approach to questions of the relation between church and state (the
political/ethical realm of life) is grounded in his view of history2; the combination
of the two, Bundesordenung (church and state), which belongs to the sphere of
redemption is the driving force behind the structure of social responsibility.
Moving away from the classical Lutheran doctrine of Two Kingdoms,3 Barth
'These four areas cannot be analyzed in great detail in this chapter. However,
we will be focussing on the element of each we deem most significant as we
critique Barth's ethic.
2Later in this chapter we will be discussing how Barth's view of history
impacts his ethics.
3The doctrine of Two Kingdoms asserts that there exist two separate kingdoms
in which a human is subject: heaven and earth. Humanity is, therefore, subject
to the spiritual and civil realms, the eternal and temporal. Ancient Reformers like
Martin Luther made it clear that two Scriptural principles must be established in
the relationship between church and state: (1) the divine sanction of civil
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sought to establish a link between the two realms in which humanity functioned.
Barth's frustration with the classical Reformed position was that it did not have
what he perceived as a strong enough gospel foundation; that is to say, for Barth,
a Christological base as the grounding between the 'secular' and the 'sacred.'4
Therefore, because Barth bases his view of responsibility within ethics as a
corollary of God's grace,5 his approach to how the church and state function
government and its independence from church control, (2) the limits of civil power
that cannot extend to the realm of conscience, where each individual is accountable
only to God.
For Luther, humanity was to "distinguish between the sphere of sin where
force operates in the name of Law; and the inner life of evangelical freedom where
God operates in the name of grace." [J.S. Whale, The Protestant Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 295], Luther attributes
completely different functions to the church and state, and while the two are not
in conflict and can exist side by side, Luther calls for a strict adherence by the
church and state to their God ordained roles. These realms are not totally isolated
from one another; in fact, they are complementary. Yet the consummation of their
relationship will not occur until the eschaton, and Christians must constantly be
wary of what Martin Luther coined the 'devil's' attempts to confuse the two realms
of the sacred and secular, for "onu the one hand the secular power may seek to
control the Church and dictate what is to be believed and taught; or the pope may
seek to assert that all earthly authority flows through him." Duncan B. Forrester,
"The Political Teaching of Luther, Calvin, and Hooker," in History of Political
Philosophy, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Co., 1963), 285.
Barth's approach to the doctrine of Two Kingdoms was not to refute the
existence of two kingdoms but to establish how they are integrally connected (in
terms of their inward and vital relationship) rather than placed only side by side.
For further discussion on the doctrine of Two Kingdoms, see Paul Althaus,
Paulus und Luther iiber den Menschen. 1938; Gerhard Ebeling, "The Necessity of
the Doctrine of Two Kingdoms" and "Reflexions on the Doctrine of Law," in
Word and Faith (London: SCM Press, 1963); Johannes Heckel, Lex charitatis:
Eine juristische Untersuchung iiber das Recht in der Theologie Martin Luthers
(Abh. d. Bayernf. Wiss. Phil-hist. Kl. Neue Folge, Heft 36 [1953]). See also
Martin Luther, Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (London: James
Clarke and Co., 1953).
4See Karl Barth, Church and State, trans. G. Ronald Howe (London: SCM
Press, 1939), 6ff.
5See CD II/2, 552ff.
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within society is worthy of examination.
A. The Role of the State
For Barth, the state acts as a tool whereby limits are set on the capacity of
sinful humanity to destroy time and common life. As such, the state functions as
a parable of the heavenly kingdom, "capable of reflecting indirectly the truth and
reality which constitute the Christian community,"6 forming the outer circle of
humanity's existence in grace, concentric with the inner circle of the church. The
state is not, however, the kingdom of God, but an order of redemption that God
uses in a world not yet fully redeemed.7 Barth makes it clear that although the
state may be seen as a parable of the divine kingdom, the state can never become
fully holy: deification of the state is impossible because the full eschatological
expression of the kingdom of God cannot be belong to any earthly dominion. This
fact results in two significant points: first, as the state can never be fully deified,
neither can it be fully diabolical. No matter how evil a state may be, every state
"possesses its imperishable destiny in the fact that it will one day contribute to the
glory of the heavenly Jerusalem and will inevitably bring its tribute thither. "8
Second, as the state is to reflect the heavenly kingdom (and the church is
5See CD II/2, 552ff.
6Against the Stream. 33.
7Barth states that the state is "an order of divine grace inasmuch as in relations
to sinful man as such, in relation to the world that still needs redeeming, the grace
of God is always the patience of God. It is the sign that mankind, in its total
ignorance and darkness...is yet not forsaken but preserved and sustained by God.
It serves to protect man from the invasion of chaos and give him time: time for
the preaching of the gospel; time for repentance; time for faith." Against the
Stream. 21.
"Church and State. 42.
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to aid in nurturing this reflection), the state's primary role becomes that of building
up society in such a way that the state functions as an external means of grace and
a sign of how individuals are to serve one another in the civil community.9 The
decisive functions of the state therefore, include government, legislation and
justice, the provision and protection of national labor, the promotion of free
learning, education and culture, and a concern for the freedom of action and
expression of individuals and groups, in so far as this concern can be understood
as an affirmation of the purpose of the state. Lastly, and most importantly for
Barth, the state is to publicly acknowledge and support the church as the society
in which "the recollection of the ultimate purpose of the state particularly
resides."10
As a sign of redemption, the state derives its task, promise and power from
God alone: "The power of the State as such, belongs originally to Jesus Christ;
that in its comparatively independent substance, in its dignity, its function and in
its purpose it should serve the person and work of Jesus Christ and therefore the
justification of the sinner."11 When the state loses sight of the root of its power -
- Jesus Christ — when it renounces it true substance, dignity and purpose, only then
does the state become demonic. For Barth, this transition takes place when the
state seeks to take over the role of the church, attempting to replace the true gospel
of Jesus Christ with a worldly gospel, that is, the 'gospel' of the state itself. When
the state, through overt or covert means, claims what belongs to the church, the
9Ethics. 445.
'"Ethics. 520.
"Church and State. 29. See also CD 11/2, 721; Ethics. 448.
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state rejects its God-given mandate. Only when the state acts as a safeguard to
society, guarding and enforcing the concepts of order, freedom, responsibility and
community in an egalitarian fashion, will the state fulfill its true role. Therefore,
for Barth, the state acts justly when it protects and maintains the relative and
provisional freedom of individuals and the peace of the community.
Barth believes the state finds its place as it embraces its unique relationship
with the church, in which the state affirms and protects the right of the church to
fulfill its task: the preaching of the gospel. Barth states that "the Church must
have the freedom to proclaim divine justification. The State will realize its own
potentialities, and thus will be a just state in proportion as it not merely positively
allows, but actively grants, this freedom to the Church.'"2 Thus, the state
experiences fulfillment only as it understands and accepts its distinctive inter¬
relationship with the church. Before examining the ramifications of this
relationship, we must first explore briefly how Barth views the church and its
function.
B. The Role of the Church
Like the state, the church is, for Barth, an order of redemption and witness
to divine justification.13 The church is a fellowship of believers, united under the
common bond of the Lordship of Jesus Christ, as well as a universal community
without limits or competition with other communities. The primary functions of
the church are those of divine service, which include for Barth, the transmission
"Church and State. 83.
13Barth calls the church a witness to the "act in which God in Jesus Christ
established and confirmed His original claim to man and hence man's claim against
sin and death... .The Church is witness of the fact that the Son of man came to seek
and to save the lost." Against the Stream. 35-36.
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of the Biblical witness to Christ in the preaching of the Word and administration
of the sacraments (worship), pastoral care, Christian nurture and education of
youth, evangelism and missions, and theology — the self-examination of the church
on its "origin, on the promises and warnings of history, on its nature, and on its
central and also its peripheral task."14
Apart from its divinely appointed functions, the church ought to be a
'seeing' community in that the church knows of God's gracious plan for humanity
in a way to which the civil community is blind. Therefore, the church has a
unique relationship to God in a way that the state does not, in that the church, vis-
a-vis God's revelation in Christ, understands the greater purpose of creation and
society. However, just as the state can never be deified, Barth is clear to elucidate
so also the church cannot, out of its knowledge of revelation, create a Christian
form of the state. Like the state, the church finds its meaning, purpose and power
only in Jesus Christ and is to mirror the message of God's gracious revelation in
Christ to the world. For Barth, the center of the church is "outside itself, like the
center of a beam of light. The outer and inner brilliance of this light depend
utterly on the source, the grace of a living God.'"5 Therefore, while the state and
church form outer and inner concentric circles respectively, both are reliant upon
a third larger, all encompassing circle: Jesus Christ.
Understanding its being as rooted in the love and mercy of God — a
reflection of God's revelation in Christ to humanity — the church is to make




Politically, this process is accomplished as the church helps society search for the
most fitting system of political organization. In this way, the church is involved
in the political process and reminds the state of the primary and indisputable fact
that the state is unable to remind itself: the fostering of its connection with the
order of divine grace and redemption. Thus, the church acts, even in its political
activity, as an arm of proclamation of God's plan and purpose for society : over
and above any cause, the church is to place its emphasis and interest in
humanity.16
The primary way that the church serves the state and upholds God's justice
in society is, according to Barth, through the preaching of the gospel and through
prayer for the state.17 As the church proclaims the good news of Jesus Christ and
prays for the state, the church reminds the state of its temporary nature and
responsibility to God, thereby moving the state towards becoming an allegory of
the heavenly kingdom, capable of reflecting directly and indirectly the truth and
reality that constitute Christian community. For Barth, the way in which the state
is able to become this parable of the kingdom is through the inter-relationship with
the church, and the church's inter-relationship with the state.
C. The Inter-relationship of the State and the Church
Barth makes it clear that while the state and church are different, they
function most fully in an association of inter-dependence. This special relationship
is defined so that the church maintains a unique responsibility (as it has a special
16Against the Stream. 35. Barth makes it clear that "man has not to serve
causes; causes have to serve man."
"Church and State. 62. See also: CD 11/2, 726; Against the Stream. 34;
"Letter to an East German Pastor," in How to Serve God in a Marxist Land. 69.
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relation to the truth in Christ) for the independent functioning of the state. Because
the state is without divine revelation and therefore leans towards injustice,18 the
church has the important role of witnessing to the ephemeral nature of the state.
In so doing, the church serves the state by reminding the state of the true function
God has given to it. Lest the state forget its God-given order and purpose, the
church is present as a force of exhortation.
Although the church, because of its knowledge of revelation and eternal
authority,19 is superior to the state, the church is still subject to the governance of
the state. Because the state has been established by God as a means by which
humanity's tendency toward evil and destruction of human freedom may be
checked, the church is called by Barth to respect the authority of the state. What
Barth means by this respect for authority is that Christians are called to carry out
what is required of them for the establishment, preservation and maintenance of the
civil community for the execution of its task.20 However, the church is not called
to blind submission. The subjection required by Christians
cannot mean that they accept and take upon themselves
responsibility for those intentions and undertakings
of the state which directly or indirectly are aimed
against the freedom of the Christian message. Of
course it must be understood that even then the
'subjection' will not cease. But their subjection...
will consist in becoming its victims, who in their
concrete action will not accept any responsibility who
cannot inwardly co-operate....All this will be done
not against the State, but as the Church's service for
18Barth believes that because the state is without revelation, the state is neutral,
pagan and ignorant, authoritarian by habit, inclined towards tyranny and anarchy.
See Church and State. 66ff.
19Ethics. 449; CD II\2, 720.
20Against the Stream. 24.
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the State!21
Yet because the church is called to respect the divine ordinance of the state, the
church, even in the midst of injustice must esteem the state — expecting the best
from it, the church submits to the state trusting that the state will give legal
protection for the proclamation of the Gospel.
Herein lies the complexity of the relationship between the state and the
church: the state cannot become the church, and the church cannot become the
state — to do so would be to deny the true existence of both. Therefore, church
and state live together in a kind of creative tension. Earth proclaims the role of
the state as an order of redemption established to foster and keep peace in society,
at times by force; the church is to submit to this authority and, in so doing,
reminds the state of God's eternal purpose. However, when this authority of the
state challenges or repudiates the truth of the Christian message, the church is to
'serve' the state, primarily through the ministry of preaching and intercession.
This call to preaching and prayer does not mean, for Earth, that the church is to
work with the state in a spirit of acquiescence, particularly in the face of injustice.
It does mean, that according to Earth, the most informed ethical response to an
unjust state is to heed the greater sovereign power of God as witnessed in the
gospel and prayer: "If the state has perverted its God-given authority, it cannot be
honored better than by this criticism which is due it in all circumstances. For this
power that has been perverted what greater service can we render than that of
intercession?"22 In answering practical ethical questions, Barth's call to
21Church and State. 67-68.
22Church and State. 69.
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proclamation and intercession — while important — is less than satisfying. In fact,
in the case of communism, this bidding to pray against an evil state seems
incongruent with Barth's earlier approach to the evils of the National Socialism in
the 1930's.23
Barth's view of the relationship between church and state impacLs^his ethics
in several ways. First, because Barth places the state and church under the order
of redemption, difficulties arise when his ethics face the task of analyzing human
relations. If all humanity stands under the order of redemption, then who among
us has the ability to render judgments about ethical or non-ethical behavior.
Because of Barth's all encompassing doctrine of divine grace, a doctrine of church
and state arises that seemingly creates a politically powerless church, except in the
realm of intercession. However, in the case of Hungary and even East Germany,
intercession could have been one of several tools of ethical response rather than the
only tool. Unfortunately, in his desire to protect the sovereignty of God, Barth
negates the viability of human input within the realm of ethics. But human life and
decisions are far more complex and complicated. In placing his entire doctrine of
church and state under the umbrella of God's all enveloping grace, Barth seems to
have forgotten that God can work within "human structures of power, order and
justice.... [he] neglects his responsibility for that difficult empirical analysis of real
human relations, especially in politics, which the Christian just because of his faith,
23Clearly, Barth's stand against the National Socialists was one of his greater
contributions to ethics. Based upon the Nazi desire to replace Christ as Lord,
Barth called the state a form of evil and called Christians to view it as such. Yet
in the case of communism, equally evil in its denouncement of any God at all,
Barth is far less polemical in his writings. We, like Reinhold Niebuhr, find this
incongruity intriguing and join in the challenge to Barth to give us more than a
conceptual approach to ethics, which often does little to outline practical ways to
resolve ethical dilemmas.
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should take more seriously than others."24
Another way that Barth's view of the relationship between church and state
impacts his ethics relates to his notion about a 'just' state. Because of Barth's
insistence upon the state as being an order of redemption, he negates the concept
of a truly evil state. Clearly, this position arises out of Barth's doctrine of
revelation and ordering of gospel over law. Because Barth's view of revelation is
first and foremost a God-initiated and sustained event — because from eternity the
YES of God (gospel) is the first word of God to humanity (even before the NO of
law) — Barth believes that the transcendent, omnipotent, sovereign God overrides
any kind of unjust or evil state. Thus, because from eternity God has, for Barth,
already achieved a victory over evil, a fully demonic state is impossible. While
the state may have elements of evil within it, there is no such thing for Barth as
a purely diabolic state. Barth states that
...we shall not meet a perfect Christian state until the
day of judgement, nor the devil's state either. We shall
be always moving between the two. And so, even if the State
begins to show signs of the beast from the abyss, as
Christians we shall not immediately clutch at the ultima
ratio: Yes or No - consent or martyrdom. Just because we
are Christians we shall be free to wait a little and give
ourselves time to examine the whole situation in detail.25
Barth's refusal to admit the power and depth of evil — his oversight regarding the
strength of a 'state' religion over human lives — permits Barth to neglect questions
of inequity. In his approach, Barth seems to have dismissed the reality of
individuals who suffer injustice, torture, perhaps death, all in the cause ofjust
state.' Barth's 'just state' is, in a sense, an oxymoron, leaving little room for
^West, 313-314.
25Against the Stream. 98.
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political action and large gaps for political injustice.26
Barth's doctrine of church and state is helpful in underlining the unique
relationship between the two. However, the translation of his theology to praxis,
reveals that Barth's approach to church and state leaves us with little that is
tangible in solving ethical problems, primarily because of his doctrine of history.
II. Barth's Doctrine of History
As discussed previously, Barth's view of church and state is highly
influenced by his view of history. This relationship "must always be understood
as historically dynamic, never endowed with a moral or social being of its own
apart from history."27
Barth bases his entire view of history on one principal concept: all events
must be defined not through some form of human reason or will but through their
starting point — God's gracious, eternal election in Jesus Christ. History thus finds
a concrete reality in God's freedom to choose for humanity: because God initiates
relationship with humankind, thus breaking the eschatological barrier between time
and eternity, all history is encompassed within what Barth terms "created time,"
the form by which humanity enters into relationship with God — the very same
form that Barth calls history.28 For Barth, history falls within the category of
26William Pauck, commenting on Barth's concept of church and state stated,
"I do not find Barth's doctrine of the 'righteous state' acceptable...It is derived
from his concept of revelation and thus placed on too narrow a base. This opinion
can be proved.. .by the fact that he cannot find a proper interpretation of the Soviet
state." William Pauck, "Comment by Pauck," Christendom 8 (1943): 469.
"Ibid., 291.
28Barth distinguishes between eternal time and created time. Eternal time can
be considered, in fact, as God's time that enfolds all time. However, the created
time that exists within eternal time has a different emphasis: created time is the
time ofGod's revelation, the time that God gives to humanity, the time that defines
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eternal time, yet exists as created time:
What is meant is the history of the covenant of grace
instituted by God between Himself and man; of the sequence
of the events in which God concludes and executes this
covenant with man, carrying it to its goal and thus
validating in the sphere of the creature that which from
all eternity He has determined in Himself.29
Thus we see that for Barth, history is truly the story of God's eternal covenant of
grace with humankind.
Barth recognizes, however, that there do exist human attempts to define
history through reason and other machinations that he believes are based in
humanity's rejection of the will, the word, and the work of God. For Barth, this
willful disregard for God's history characterizes humanity's struggle to understand
history.30 Barth calls this human attempt at defining history Weltgeschichte: that
which is determined by human pride and places humanity as the subject, creator
and endower of meaning for all events. This type of history must be understood,
argues Barth, in light of Weltgeschehen — that which "happens in the world of
God's creatures...the objective reality of the events which make up the history of
man on earth, his life cycle, his attempts to set up order, his sinful destruction of
our relationship with God. Created time is, therefore for Barth, historical time.
29CD III/l, 59.
30Barth emphasizes this point: "It is our true history (incomparably more direct
and intimate than anything we think we know as our history). Jesus Christ comes
to us. In Him we are quite alone, torn away originally and finally from the whole
world of fairy tale and myth, taken right beyond all our empirical and ideal
pictures of ourselves....It is the knowledge of this Other....It is a matter of the
knowledge of His history, which will always be a strange history although it is our
history." CD IV/1, 548-549.
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order, his relations with his neighbor and the rest."31 Because all history is for
Barth, Heilsgeschichte, Weltgeschehen does not conflict with God's eternal
purposes because Weltgeschehen reflects
God's faithfulness, that He orders creaturely events under
His Lordship into and under the event of the covenant and
the grace of his salvation, and lets them serve it; that
he adds them to the coming of his kingdom, in which the
whole reality which is different from himself gains its
historical substance, and lets them have a part in this
coming.32
Therefore, for Barth, Weltgeschehen, or human activity within God's eternally
ordained covenant of grace, is a tool God has chosen to use in history. In this
way, human events have constitutive meaning for events in the history of the
Covenant.
The greatest point of importance for Barth in discussing the role of
Weltgeschehen,is the passion and resurrection of Christ. In Christ's Lordship,
history finds its true meaning; while the Christ event is not dependent on
Weltgeschehen, Barth argues that Christ's life, death and resurrection define history
The Christian Church knows that not only itself but the
whole world exists...between the action God has already
taken and the action he has still to take for man through
his only Son. Political changes, along with all other
changes...are significant because they take place in this
framework. The beginning and goal of what we call world
history is at all events the history of God's salvation
of man.33
Therefore, Christ is the be-all and end-all of human existence and the content of
31West, 263. West points out that Weltgeschichte refers not to the events that
lie in the hand of God as such (i.e., those events that make up the history of
humankind), but to these events in so far as humanity is their subject.
32CD III/3, 47.
"Against the Stream. 78.
201
all history — He is the past as well as the present and future — the One who
bridges the gap between time and eternity.
Barth's entire approach to history significantly impacts his doctrine of
church and state. Because Christ is the fulfillment of all history, the church is
precluded from becoming an end in itself — its role is to reflect and bear witness
to the Christ event. Yet although the church cannot function outside of the
parameters of its given role (i.e. prayer, faith and obedience), the church does live
in the world and is called to function in a dynamic and open way. Barth states that
the test of the church's true faith is the nature of the church's confession of Christ
to the world, a confession that at times must be concretely political. However,
Barth continues to remind Christians that in the face of an already redeemed history
(through the victory of Christ over evil), the outcome of history has previously
been decided. Thus, when facing political/ethical issues in the present, the
Christian must not speak of history in eschatological/apocalyptic terms. Rather, the
Christian is to understand and accept that
confronted in his life with many kairoi which call for
his decision; a decision which is not a matter of
indifference but takes on the quality of life and death,
of choice for or against God in the situation concerned,
[In spite of the crises that may ensue,] there is no
protection for the being of the Church against
such crises and temptations....Yet the security of the
Church lies in the fact that Christ is faithful when we
are unfaithful, and that he does not leave himself without
a witness in the world, that he can create and recreate
the congregation.34
Barth's position creates for the church a difficult dilemma: although the
church is called to make a decision, this decision is, in effect, taken away by
34West, 268.
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Barth's view of history and Christ's Lordship therein. Thus, while the church is
not to be distracted by changes in the political order (such as Communism in
Hungary), because of the great change of Jesus Christ, the church is to proclaim
the YES of God to the world by sharing the good news of reconciliation and by
interpreting historical events through the lens ofGod's eternal grace and judgment.
We believe this approach disarms the church. Faced with the challenges
of an unjust state as were the Hungarians in the 1950's, the church is called to
proclaim the truth of Jesus Christ — and we are not denying Christ as the ultimate
source of truth — yet the church is unable to inflesh this truth through specific
ethical action. The paradox of Barth's position is that although the church is to
uphold the sovereignty of God in history by fulfilling its role as a herald of the
revolutionary eschatology of Jesus Christ, the church is also able to declare
political crises within history such as Nazism, but can seemingly address them only
through prayer. In his attempt to maintain the sovereignty of God, Barth has, in
a sense, rendered the church impotent. This result is not necessary.
Charles West astutely suggests that Barth's doctrine of history and the
Lordship of Christ does not have to result in a powerless church. West argues:
On the one side we need treat no conflict in history
with anxious pride, as if the victory depended on us.
God is not so dependent on his creatures, that our
acts of disobedience or of foolishness bring him into
inner insecurity or risk the failure of his gracious
purposes with us....On the other hand our life and
death is involved whether or not we take this concrete
present seriously as participants in God's act....From
the one side comes freedom from illusion and anxiety....
From the other comes that inner participation, the critical
urgency of love, which can alone give this truth expression.35
35Ibid., 279-280.
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Had Barth applied this model to his approach to Communism, we might
have discovered a different application than the position taken by Barth: because
the Christian believes that God ultimately holds events in His hands, believers
could have been empowered to act independently and boldly within the Communist
society — even to the point of speaking the truth in love. Naturally, there is an
implicit risk involved in speaking out within the confines of an unjust state.
However, if Barth takes his eschatology seriously in making ethical decisions, then
this approach ought to be central in his thought. With a sovereign God who has
already decided the outcome of history, risk, in Barth's eschatology, takes on a
new meaning. But Barth does not elucidate clearly enough the practicalities of
implementing his eschatology to ethics. He does not take the step of application
far enough: focusing too intently on the theology, Barth overlooks the importance
of providing tangible handholds for application. In Barth's fear that the authority
of God might be challenged by valuing human participation in the ethical event,
it would seem that Barth discounts the significance of application.
George Hunsinger comments upon Barth's dilemma in the article, "Karl
Barth and Radical Politics: Some Further Considerations."36 Hunsinger argues
the important point that Barth assigns conceptual priority to meditatio37 over
applicatio. Accordingly, Barth's primary task was to ensure that explicatio
(exegesis) and meditatio were accomplished properly. Only then could and would
^George Hunsinger, "Karl Barth and Radical Politics: Some Further
Considerations," Studies in Religion 7/2 (Spring, 1978): 167-191. Hereafter stated
as "Some Further Considerations."
"Meditatio refers to a "critical and confessional reflection on the concepts
implicit in the language of the Church about the God who loves in freedom."
Hunsinger, "Some further considerations," 181-182.
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the applicatio proceed aright. However, as Hunsinger quite rightly argues, one
cannot assure that on the basis of 'right' theology, the right praxis will be
created.38
Barth seems to misunderstand that not all individuals are as quick or able
as he seems to be at making the transition from meditatio to applicatio. Perhaps
in Barth's mind the movement from one to the other is simple and occurs with
little or no thought. But in our opinion, the average human being would not take
the time nor the effort to produce the kind of work Barth upholds in the explicatio-
meditatio-applicatio model. We are not arguing that humanity is lazy or ignorant.
However, we do believe that Barth's expectation for humanity may not be realistic.
Therefore, Barth's doctrine of history fails us ethically because it does little
to aid in the kinds of crises human beings face each day. Ethical dealings are ones
that engage the question of both moral thought, and moral action. Surely in the
case of Hungary, the actions of the Communist government were not morally
upright. Clearly, Barth's sequence of explicatio-meditatio-applicatio did not stand
in Hungary: 'right' meditatio in the case of Hungary resulted in, incongruously,
a very different applicatio than in Germany in 1933. Barth cannot base his ethics
on ideology alone; he must also look to the act that arises from the ideology.
Furthermore, Barth's doctrine of history does little to help individuals find
a reference point for making ethical decisions. While it was helpful and certainly
appropriate and necessary to encourage Hungarian Christians to pray, Barth does
38Hunsinger continues by stating that Barth "never overcame his idealist notion
of sequence. One reason, then, why Barth neglected to state fully the ethical
criteria for political application would seem to be the irreversible sequence he
envisioned from meditatio to applicatio...Barth was so enamored with the primacy
of actualism that his political argumentation never reached its full fruition." Ibid.,
183.
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not provide much insight into how an individual Hungarian Christian might find
the starting point for his/her ethical action within an immoral and unethical
political structure.39 While his doctrine of history may be intellectually engaging,
it fails to wrestle with the very complex and complicated relationships which
humanity faces.40 Barth would have fared better by moving 'philosophical
systems and movements of culture' to concrete persons and their very real and
pressing problems — a move that we believe could have been achieved by Barth's
willingness to accept a revised form of norms within ethics.
III. The Place of Norms within Ethics
When discussing the place of casuistry and norms within ethics, and Barth's
aversion to them, we must first briefly define our terms. When speaking of
casuistry, we are referring to "the reasoned application of law to concrete cases
[which] determines with all possible exactitude the limitations of law or the bearing
39Robert MacAfee Brown presents the challenge in this way: "...do not the
moral indignities, the callous disregard for human life, the gradual warping of the
original Communist ideology...the rule of the few over many-do not these and a
dozen other realities of the communism of the 1950's make necessary a more
penetrating kind of criticism than anything Karl Barth has yet offered us?" Robert
MacAfee Brown, "Introductory Essay," in How to Serve God in a Marxist Land
(New York: Association Press, 1959), 36.
'"Helmut Gollwitzer presents a more satisfying conclusion in relating crisis and
history. According to Gollwitzer, while affirming the confessional element
inherent within Barth's approach to ethics, Gollwitzer calls individual christian's
to 'test the spirits' — to examine how different people and groups relate to the
command of God and see which confess or do not confess Christ. As the Christian
synthesizes theological commandments with political praxis, the Church will be
able to give direction for political life that moves forward, revitalizing forgotten
values. Gollwitzer thus refines, rather than replaces, Barth's thought. For further
discussion ofGollwitzer's position see Die Christliche Gemeinde in der politischen
Welt (Tubingen. 19541.
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of law upon particular cases."41 Norms, according to ethicist James Gustafson,
are "a source of principles and axioms, a transcendent point of criticism in living
out the actualities and ambiguities of life in history."42 In refuting casuistry43 as
an option within Christian ethics, Barth puts forth three principal arguments.
Those who adopt casuistry, Barth argues, make the following errors: (1) the
moralist sits himself/herself on God's throne, (2) the objectively untenable
assumption is made that the command of God is a universal and (3) Christian
freedom is destroyed.44
For Barth, casuistic ethics completely destroys the base of his theology:
God's revelation in Christ and sovereignty over humanity. Moreover, in Barth's
view, to adopt casuistry within ethics is to stand against God's command, for moral
generalities of any kind are not the command; in them, humanity seeks to be judge
41Henry Davis, S.J., Moral and Pastoral Theology. 4 vols. (London and New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), Vi. 2-3. This definition is obviously not all
inclusive. However, it provides a starting point for our discussion of casuistry.
Overall, casuistry functions in such a way that moral principles are applied to
particular cases in order to determine whether an action is morally correct.
42James Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1967), 234. Paul Lehmann defines the authentic
norm of ethics as "one which validates behavior in terms of its transvaluative
concreteness. The norm takes the form of validating judgment, the ethical force
of which is not its logical generality but its acknowledgement of the transforming
power of a concrete exception." Ethics in a Christian Context (New York: Harper
and Row, 1963), 242. Transvaluation means, for Lehmann, that the ethical
inadequacy of accepted norm and values has been exposed by ethical insights and
directives integrally related to the concrete situation of decision, (see 122, 243).
43Barth stated that "the way of casuistry is basically unacceptable, however
enticing it may seem and however convenient it would be both for spiritual
advisors and above all for troubled souls if this way could be followed." CD III/4,
8. Barth gives an interesting summary of the history of casuistry in CD III/4,
textual notes, page 7ff.
"CD III/4, 10-13ff.
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and master of their own lives and fate.45
We believe that in his attempt to 'protect' the sovereignty of God and the
'freedom' of the Christian life, Barth fails to answer this question adequately: how
does the command of God become concrete and specific in concrete and specific
ethical issues? Barth attacks universal moral principles, primarily because they
are too general. Yet in his own ethical position, Barth himself is general and
vague. In his concern to uphold God's ultimate and eternal first word to humanity,
Barth emphasizes that there is a divine power to which humanity must respond.
But does this reality render any human attempt to discern what God is saying
meaningless? We believe not, for norms of some kind are necessary not only to
provide a helpful means for ethical reflection and action but also to combat
relativistic tendencies.46 Surely Barth is not lobbying for relativism! But Barth's
45Ethics. 83. Barth continually discusses this point: the command of God is
not a principle of action revealed to humanity and imposed upon it. Nor is the
command a collection of principles that humanity must expound and apply to the
best of its knowledge or according to the persuasion of others. (See Karl Barth,
The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV/4. Lecture Fragments [Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1981], 33). Again Barth argues in the Church Dogmatics: "There is
no such thing as casuistical ethics: no fixation of the divine command in a great
or small text of ethical law; no method or technique of applying this text to the
plentitude of conditions and possibilities of the activity of all men; no means of
deducing good or evil in the particular instance of human conduct from the truth
of this text presupposed as a universal rule and equated with the command of
God." (CD III/4, 9-10).
46A question arising from Barth's disallowance of norms is this: if we have no
norms, are we indeed left with a form of relativism? Historically, ethical
relativism emerged under the "aegis of the positivist, pragmatist and instrumentalist
movements of the latter part of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries....The
original version of ethical relativism is that of Protagoras, who taught in effect,
according to Plato, that moral principles cannot be shown to be valid for everybody
and that people ought to follow the customs of their own group" Lehmann, 191.
For further discussion on ethical relativism, see the following: William James,
The Meaning of Truth (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), 190ff; R.B.
Perry, The Moral Economy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), 83ff;
Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950).
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dilemma arises over his strict adherence to an ethic of command that argues that
there is only one good: God's grace and sovereignty as exhibited in Christ and
communicated ethically in the command.47 However, in an attempt to clarify this
command, Barth develops what we believe to be his own type of casuistry: special
ethics.
Barth believes that special ethics provides the answer to the problem of
vagueness within his command ethic. Accordingly, special ethics
looks at man as this particular man at this particular
time and place, who yesterday selected and decided and
acted on the basis of the possibilities available, who
does the same today in different circumstances, and who
will do the same tomorrow in different circumstances
again. It is concerned to see and show how far this
specific, concrete, special and even very special action
of man can or cannot be called a good action, that is, an
action that corresponds to the divine claim, agrees with
the divine decision, and conforms to the divine judgment.48
Therefore, special ethics serves as a preparatory tool to the ethical event and
functions to display the sovereignty of the divine command, the faithfulness of God
to Himself and to humanity, and the uniqueness of each event as it takes place in
relation to other events in time and history. As special ethics performs this task,
argues Barth, the limits between God's sovereignty and human freedom will
become clear.49
""Relativism would argue that there is no "good" only "goods." See Lehmann,
191.
48The Christian Life. 4.
49Barth believes that special ethics not only deals primarily with the vertical
dimension of relationship with God but also examines the horizontal relationship,
i.e., the human to human ethical contact and conduct. In this connection between
the vertical and horizontal, humanity experiences the ethical event and the
constancy and continuity between divine command and human action. See CD
III/4, 17ff.
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Thus, whereas the question of general ethics deals with the fact and content
of human sanctification and action as affected by God's command, special ethics
deals with the varying emphases and standpoints within this sanctification and
action. Because for Barth the ethical event always takes place in varying spheres
and relationships, the historical outline of particular event must be traced and the
question, "what is the command of God and the corresponding right action" must
be asked.50 Where special ethics does its most illuminating work is as the pointer
to this historical outline; in so doing, special ethics provides "a definite lead in the
direction of the answer...not the answer itself; not a definition or determination of
this event...but a reference to it....a directive, or rather a series of directives,
which give guidance to the individual in the form of an approximation to the
knowledge of the divine command and right human action. "51
Barth's special ethics are, in reality, a form of casuistry.52 However,
because Barth's aversion to casuistry was so strong, he disguised his casuistry in
the form of special ethics. Perhaps his aversion was a part of his 'corrective'
theology.53 However, we believe a revised form of casuistry can operate within
50Ibid., 30.
51Ibid„ 30-31.
52While we are not arguing that Barth's special ethics are casuistic in the sense
of a system of 'reasoning,' we do believe they are casuistic in that they act as a
means to interpret God's command in all cases and the specific conditions of these
cases. For an interesting discussion on casuistry in Barth, see George Hunsiger,
"Karl Barth and Radical Politics: Some Further Considerations," Studies in
Religion July 2, 1978, 167-191.
53We believe that one reason Barth was so unyielding in his thought was his
self-adopted role as a 'corrector' of what he perceived to be a theology which had
gone awry.
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Barth's ethic. Dr. Nigel Biggar54 posits that had Barth acknowledged a form of
casuistry "properly engaged in the process of modifying old and generating new
rules in order to find appropriate ways to express a given principle in the light of
new, morally significant data"55 in a fresh and vital way, Barth might have
answered the charge of vagueness in his ethics.
This type of revised casuistry is what we believe Barth attempts to expound
in his special ethics but refuses to admit. Had Barth acknowledged this form of
casuistry, we believe he could have remained true to his theological position yet
opened the door to an ethic with a praxis to which individual can adhere, rather
than simply an etherial command that hovers in the tension between what is real
and what is ideal. Biggar argues, and we concur, that had Barth "conceived of
normative ethics as intrinsically open to revision and of the command of God as
corrective in relation to it...[Barth] could have conceived of God's command as
contradicting normative ethics, not in order to strike it dumb, but rather to teach
it to speak differently. "56
Barth's acceptance and utilization of a kind of casuistry informed and
refined by God's command would have made his ethics far less difficult to apply
54Dr. Biggar ofOxford University provides a helpful insight on this concept of
a revised casuistry. We are indebted to his article, "Hearing God's Command and
Thinking About What's Right: With and Beyond Barth," in Reckoning With
Barth. ed. Nigel Biggar (London: A.W. Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1988), especially
116-117.
55Ibid. Here Biggar cites Paul Ramsey's essay, "The Case of the Curious
Exception," in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, eds. Gene Outka and Paul
Ramsey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 67-135. See also K.E. Kirk,
Conscience and Its Problems: An Introduction to Casuistry (London: Longman,
Green, and Co., 1927) 106-129.
^Ibid.
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and would not, in our opinion, compromise Barth's basic adherence to the
sovereignty and freedom of God, for if God is truly sovereign over all, is not His
sovereignty great enough to accommodate an ethic that includes norms, no matter
how potentially human? Indeed, we believe that had Barth utilized a revised form
of norms and emphasized more clearly the role of the Spirit within ethics, this
question could be answered with a resounding yes.
IV. The Role of the Holy Spirit in Ethics
For Barth, the Holy Spirit functions primarily in the realm of revelation.37
Within revelation, the nature and work of the Spirit is two-fold: first, the Holy
Spirit is the Lord who sets humanity free; and second, the Spirit of God
appropriates to humanity its adoption as God's children. As humanity receives the
Spirit, humanity becomes children of God.38 For Barth, the Biblical concept of
revelation is "itself the root of the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the
Trinity is simply a development of the knowledge that Jesus is the Christ, or
Lord."39 Therefore, the Spirit's significance must, for Barth, be rooted in the
Word of God, in Christ. If the Holy Spirit does not have its grounding in the
Word of God, the Spirit cannot, for Barth, have significance for revelation and
consequentially for ethics.
In revelation, the work of the Holy Spirit is primarily to communicate the
57For a more in depth discussion of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity, see the
following in Barth's work: CD 1/1: 350ff, 450473; CD 1/2: 250 (especially
relating to the filioque clause) 781ff; CD II/l: 48, 141, 250ff, 326ff, 528; CD
II/2: 101, 227-250, 347f, 549; The Epistle to the Romans: 157ff, 315, 456ff;
Ethics: 49-61: The Gottingen Dogmatics: 125ff. 165. 215ff: The Holy Ghost and




message of God's grace: in the Holy Spirit humanity can grasp and comprehend
God and thus enter into fellowship with Him.60 The importance of the Holy Spirit
lies in what Barth describes as the contrast between grace and sin. Barth places
special emphasis on the reality of the Spirit as the Spirit of Christ, of God's Son
in the flesh, who was crucified for humanity — the Spirit of the Word of the Father
— spoken to humanity.61 Herein lies the work of the Spirit: humanity's eyes are
opened, and humanity is thus able to come before God in surrender and
acknowledge Divine lordship and sovereignty. Therefore, in light of the Spirit's
work, humanity is, according to Barth, (1) free to receive the work of God in its
life,62 (2) provided with the evidence and guarantee that the Spirit is participating
in God's revealing action,63 (3) claimed by God.64 The Holy Spirit's presence
also acts within the Church as the Gospel is proclaimed. As a result, Christians
are provided with an arena whereby, through the guidance of the Spirit, they are
able to understand and appropriate God's command as they seek to act ethically.
Clearly, for Barth, the Holy Spirit has no specific task (outside of its
revelatory role) within ethics because his doctrine of revelation forbids it. Thus,
the Holy Spirit acts only as an arm of revelation, which in turn, acts as an ethical
guide. In the lectures, "The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life,"65 Barth
"The Gottingen Dogmatics. 173.




65These lectures were given by Barth in response to the critique that he had no
theology of the Holy Spirit and that he had Roman Catholic leanings. They were
delivered at Elberfield on October 9, 1929.
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articulates the role of the Holy Spirit in this way: "the fundamental significance of
the Holy Ghost for the Christian life is, that this, our participation in the
occurrence of revelation, is just our being grasped in this occurrence which is the
effect of the Divine action."66
Despite the Spirit's sole connection to the Word of God, and thus to
revelation, Barth does believe that the Holy Spirit (as an agent of revelation) acts
in the ethical realm in several key ways. First, in order for humanity to hear the
Word of God, the Holy Spirit must give humanity the gift of faith.67 The Spirit,
therefore, is the operation of God in faith, providing faith with context which is,
for Barth, not a thing existing within the realm of time. The Spirit is the
miraculous factor in faith, which places the love of God in the hearts of men and
women and produces what Barth calls a 'human heart' that God is able to love.68
Faith cannot, for Barth, be possible except through Christ and the Holy Spirit —
faith is awakened by God's Spirit and therefore becomes true faith.69 Because the
Spirit functions to ignite within humanity the flame of faith, the Spirit also opens
humanity's ears to hear the Word of God.
For Barth, this action of the Spirit is highly significant for the ethical realm:
as people through the Holy Spirit hear the Word of God, the ethical reflection of
^he Holy Ghost and the Christian Life. 19-20.
67See The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life. 24. Barth argues that humanity
cannot embrace its life as a Christian life if the Holy Spirit is not at work: "In the
Holy Ghost the man exercises faith: the Scriptural proclamation of the revelation
of God meets him and points him his way as creature." Ibid, 27.
^The Epistle to the Romans. 158.
^Berkower, 148. Barth makes this clear when he says that "no one else but
the Holy Ghost will make faith, in its hiddenness, into actual faith. Certainly our
spirit will not." From The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life. 52.
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these listeners is, in Barth's words, "not lost in the darkness of human
ignorance. "70 The grasping of humanity by the Holy Spirit frees believers to hear
God's command and act ethically: only as a recipient of the Holy Spirit is
humanity able to come under the command and act accordingly.
Thus, Barth believes that as an arm of revelation, the Spirit grants to
humanity the awakening of faith, which in turns leads to the hearing of God's
Word, and thus His command, resulting in ethical reflection and action. In our
opinion, this progression of thought does not go far enough, nor does it take
seriously enough the role of the Spirit in the lives of individuals, particularly the
inner testimony of the Spirit as a means by which humanity gains a framework of
guidance in its ethical choices. We are not arguing that Barth ignored the inner
testimony of the Spirit — he did not. He explains the relationship between ethics
and the inner testimony of the Spirit in the following manner:
Even in this last form, then, the question what shall we do,
what is the good, leads back to the other question with which
all ethics must begin, the question of who we are, whether we
are those who have heard the Word, i.e., to whom it has been
told and who have let it be told them. If we are, then how can
we fail to tell ourselves and thus answer the problem of ethics
by pointing to the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit?71
Barth's approach to the inner testimony of the Spirit relegates the Spirit to
a means of underlining God's revelation that upholds the role of ethics. We
believe this thought falls short. Barth does not tell us, for example, how the inner
70Ibid., 27.
71Ethics. 516. Clearly, Barth acknowledges the inner testimony of the Spirit,
but it seems to be superseded by his insistence upon over-emphasizing ethics as
purely a reflection of God's grace, he states this later in CD II/2: "Do this ~ not
because...an inner voice now requires this of you....But because in so doing you
may and will again live of and by my grace." CD II/2, 587.
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testimony, the intercession of the Spirit, works for us in the practical day to day
ethical dilemmas. Barth seems to use the Holy Spirit as yet another reminder that
humanity is, through its own machinations, unable to discern ethical thought or
move towards ethical action.
Could Barth, instead, emphasize the role of the Spirit as a 'guide' to
humanity in its effort to make ethical choices? We believe that had Barth given
more attention to the way in which the Spirit acts as an intercessor and guide to
humanity, Barth's ethics could have functioned in both the eschatological realm and
the present: as God's Spirit guides humanity, humanity is able to engage in the
ethical decision making process — perhaps through a system of revised norms —
still honoring God's sovereignty. Barth's thoroughgoing Christology seems to limit
the role of the Spirit, a role that could be a significant link between Barth's
sovereign God and human ethical problems.
In order to complete our critique of Barth, we believe that in addition to the
four areas previously mentioned, one further area must be discussed: the Anglo-
Saxon misunderstanding of Barth. In discussing this 'misunderstanding,' we
believe it necessary to examine two major areas of thought: (1) the
historical/cultural factors that made the appropriation of Barth's theology to the
Anglo-Saxon world extremely difficult and (2) the seeming inability of Barth's
dialectical theology to translate into the Anglo-Saxon world.
A. Historical/Cultural Differences between Europe and the Anglo-Saxon
World.
When Barth emerged onto the theological scene in 1919, Europe was ripe
to receive his message. The transcendence ofGod and the distinction between time
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and eternity "shook the theological foundations of Europe. Emotional, energetic
and explosive...[it] fell like a bomb on the playground of the theologians."72 A
major factor that catapulted Barth into the center of the theological and intellectual
arena in Europe was, as we have mentioned previously in this work, the
devastation of the First World War. Post-war Europe, and particularly Germany,
was left disillusioned with liberal Protestantism. Not only had optimism been
shattered, but Europeans also began to question romanticism and ethical
idealism;73 ideas that had once been bastions of Europeans theology were now
being abandoned. Barth's theology provided one alternative.74
Despite its reception in Europe, Barth's theology did not take root in the
Anglo-Saxon world until the late 1920s. This time lapse is best understood by a
brief examination of the historical and cultural impact of World War One.
Naturally, the First World War left deep scars. The experience of the war
left Germany and Great Britain in a political state of alienation: Germany
underwent a social and cultural crisis;75 Britain also experienced a state of trauma
associated with the horror and loss involved in war. But most significant for Barth
72Voskuil, 61.
73For a very helpful discussion on post-war German attitudes, see Richard
Lempp, "Church and Religion in Germany," Harvard Theological Review 14
(1921): 30-52.
74Clearly, not all rationalist, idealist or other philosophical and theological
movements embraced Barth. However, Barth's strong attack on nineteenth century
liberalism did appeal to many.
75Richard Lempp, in chronicling the social consequences of the World War
One reparation for Germany, stated that many in the Anglo-Saxon world "have
little idea of the terrible sufferings of my country, or of the hopelessness of the
future which the peace of Versailles has set before us; nor can they easily imagine
the mood of the nation which...has at last been broken in body and spirit."
Lempp, 30-31.
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was the impact of the war on religion. The consequences of defeat for German
society and churches — Protestant and Roman Catholic — was devastating,
primarily because the war uncovered both these groups "unashamed
commitment...to the cause of German political and cultural imperialism."76 In
Britain, the war further contributed to the gradual marginalization of religious
belief in society
At a mere general level, the established Church, concerned
like all Christianity, with explaining the significance of
death in this world and life in the next - seemed unable to
cope when confronted with so much mortality and grief....But
to neither the soldier at the front nor to the bereaved at
home, baffled and numbed by the cataclysmic events in which
they were caught up, could the Church offer plausible
explanation or abiding comfort.77
For Americans, the war, while painful and certainly difficult, had less of
a sense of devastation — for America, the war was, in many ways, 'over there,'
and very few seemed to understand the tragic dimensions of the war. However,
with the Great Depression, a wider "range of thinkers began to see that a bourgeois
civilization was deep in crisis."78
Thus, the historical impact of the war left German theology ready for a
change: liberal theology had left theologians disenchanted and frustrated; the
ground was fertile for new theological input. In Britain and America, the soil still
76Roberts, 102. See also Klaus Scholder, The Churches and the Third Reich
(London: SCM Press, 1987). Chapter one especially gives an excellent description
of the disarray in the church that ensued after the loss of the war.
77David Carradine, "War and Death, Grief and Mourning in Modern Britain,"
in Mirrors of Mortality: Studies in the Social History of Death, ed. Joachim
Weley (London, 1981), 218-219.
78S.E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1972), 877.
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needed to be tilled and prepared: limitations of the post-war peace, as well as
cultural factors, delayed the transmission of Barth's work.79
The cultural considerations that detained the acceptance of Barth's theology
in the Anglo-Saxon world centered around differences in cultural and political
convention: in a letter to Karl Barth, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, Barth's primary English
advocate - adumbrates the possible barriers to Barth's theology:
We are separated by the very real barrier of a
different language, a different political
tradition, a different quality of piety and
impiety, a different structure even of
theological and untheological heritage. And
you well know that there are still wider
divergences lying behind all these things....
And yet...the problem of faith is the same
problem.80
In America, the cultural limitations were even greater than in Britain.
Simply stated, the nature of the American spirit impeded the transmission of a
tradition from Europe: America was far too interested in the practical and
pragmatic; unprepared for ponderous, deep thinking, the young nation of America
was hardly primed to receive or understand a distinct theological culture such as
Germany or Great Britain. Far removed from Reformation soil, the American
Christian sought a history that was unique and unrelated to European influences.81
The 'maverick' style and approach to life upon which America prided itself simply
did not lend itself immediately to Barth's thought.
79It should be noted that the reception of Barth's theology in Britain was
primarily due to Scottish enthusiasm for Barth's work. J.H. Morrison, Norman
Porteus, John McConnachie and others were key in promoting Barth's influence.
80Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, "A Letter from England," in Theologische Aufsatze Karl
Barths zum 50 Gehurtstag. ed. E. Wolf. (Miinchen, 1936), 525-527.
8IHomrighausen, 286-288.
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Both Britain and America's reception and assimilation of Barth's theology
occurred in its most mature form after Douglas Horton's translation of The Word
of God and the Word ofMan in 1928, Sir Edwyn Hoskyns translation of the second
edition of Per Romerbrief in 1933, and the appearance of the Church Dogmatics
on Anglo-Saxon soil. Previous to these events, historical and cultural differences
between Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world impeded the acceptance and cultivated
the misunderstanding of Barth's theology.
B. The Anglo-Saxon Struggle with Barth's dialectical theology.
Despite Barth's widespread reception in Europe, the response to his
theology in the Anglo-Saxon world was slow in coming.82 One reason for this lag
was Barth's dialectical method in his approach to theology: the paradoxical
message, coupled with strange language made it exacting to spur interest and
discussion of Barth's theology. The dialectical premise so central to Barth's
theology ~ his doctrine of revelation with its emphasis on the transcendent God -
was often interpreted as leading to skepticism and subjectivism, particularly within
American evangelical circles.83 Moreover, dialectical methodology proved to be
82In discussing the Anglo-Saxon world, we are limiting our discussion to Great
Britain and America. It should be noted that Barth's reception in Great Britain
came long before that in America. British journals began to publish assessments
of Barth's theology by the mid-twenties. See Adolf Keller, "A Theology of
Crisis," The Expositor 3 (March 4, 1925): 164-175, 245-260; H.R. Macintosh,
"Recent Foreign Theology,' The Expository Times 36 (November, 1924): 73-75;
John McConnachie, "The Teaching of Karl Barth: A New Positive Movement in
German Theology," The Hibbert Journal 25 (April, 1927): 385-400. Ghecffe
first theologians to initiate America to Barth was Gustav Kriiger, who delivered a
series of lectures on Barth at Union Seminary in New York in March, W&6. See
his lecture, "The 'Theology of Crisis': Remarks on a Recent Movement in
German Theology," The Harvard Theological Review 19 (July, 1926): 227-258.
"Howard John Loewen argues that evangelicals in America were particularly
suspicious of Barth's dialectical method because they believed it promoted
skepticism and subjectivism. Evangelicals believed that Barth's emphasis on the
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a stumbling block and source of misinterpretation: the paradox of "the 'Word of
God' as, at once, the necessary and impossible task of theology could not remain
a stark methodological proposal within the given structures and context of
assimilation. "84
Not only was the dialectical method difficult to incorporate, but the
language ofBarth's theology was also strange for Anglo-Saxon readers. Described
by Elmer Homrighausen, an American pastor who had cultivated an interest in
Barth, Barth's language was "like thunderclaps and lightening flashes;" Barth
"dazed his readers more than enlightened them."85 With language that was
philosophical and explosive, many in the Anglo-Saxon world (particularly in
primary transcendence of revelation resulted in an extreme disjunction between
eternity and time. Furthermore, this dialectical method rang of subjectivism:
Barth's view of revelation seemed to make the knowledge of God dependent
primarily on repeated personal decision.
We would argue that this evangelical constituency, represented by
theologians such as Carl Henry, Cornelius Van Til and Gordon Clark,
misunderstand Barth's dialectic — certainly in their suggestion that the dialectic
leads to a disjunction between eternity and time. Indeed, Barth's dialectic sought
to bridge the gap between eternity and time! For further discussion see Howard
John Loewen, "The Anatomy of an Evangelical Type: An American Evangelical
Response to Karl Barth's Theology," in Church. Word and Spirit, eds. James E.
Bradley and Richard A. Muller (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1987), 243-246.
"Richard H. Roberts, A Theology on its Way? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1991), 129. The philosophical constructs of paradox and dialectic convinced many
theologians that Barth's thought was "opaque, convoluted and irrational." [Dennis
N. Voskuil, "America Encounters Karl Barth: 1919-1939," Fides et Historia 12,2
(1980): 68. Most concerned in America about Barth's method were liberal
theologians who feared Barthianism was an uncritical return to traditionalism. See
Voskuil, 67ff. As early as 1929, American theologian H. Offerman suggested that
Barth's dialectical method was the greatest obstacle in understanding his theology.
With its contradictions, and antitheses, Offerman argued that Barth's theology was
simply untranslatable. See H. Offerman, "The Theology of Karl Barth: an
orientation," Lutheran Church Quarterly 2 (1929): 271-288.
85Elmer Homrighausen, "Barth and the American Theological Scene," Union
Seminary Quarterly Review 46 (August, 1936): 290.
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America) shut their theological doors to Barth.86
Therefore, not only historical/cultural barriers but also theological
conceptual barriers, such as the dialectic, made the transmission and acceptance of
Barth's theology arduous in the Anglo-Saxon world. However, while Barth may
have been misunderstood at some level by the Anglo-Saxon world, clearly his
theology gained a firm foothold, at the latest, by the late 1930s. Nevertheless, this
acceptance does not excuse what we believe to be shortcomings within his approach
to ethics. We do believe that Barth's ethic is helpful in reminding humanity that
in approaching the difficulties of ethical questions, there is a divine, eternal being
greater than ourselves who is for humanity and who possesses a greater plan for
its destiny than humankind might imagine or attempt to build. However, we
propose that Barth's doctrine of church and state, his view of history and his
unwillingness to work with a revised form of norms and accentuate the role of the
Holy Spirit within ethics seriously limits his ethical praxis. Barth's ethic calls for
a revision that incorporates some level of active human participation (other than
simply responding to the command of God) within ethics. We believe that in spite
of Barth's insistence on God's sovereignty (and thus,no human ethic), a 'human'
ethic guided and directed by a belief in God's sovereignty would not displace a
sovereign God. If Barth's commitment to God's absolute sovereignty and freedom
is as strong as he espouses it to be, then should not Barth accept God's ability to
work within humanity — and its attempt at solving ethical dilemmas — despite
human limitations? Or is Barth's sovereign God, not sovereign enough?
MIn America, Barth's language was particularly strange. Americans, with then-
emphasis on practicality, often viewed Barth's language as too complex and
strange, fraught with concepts untranslatable to the American mind. For further
discussion see Homrighausen, 290ff.
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Conclusion
In June of 1965, Karl Barth made the following remark regarding the
uncompleted Church Dogmatics: "There is a certain merit to an unfinished
dogmatics - it points to the eschatological character of theology!"1 Truly, the
content of Barth's theology can be described as an eschatological event whereby
God radically breaks into the world and makes his presence known in a saving
way. As such, Barth's theology points to God's sovereignty and authority, as well
as God's remarkable relationship with humanity, a relationship characterized by
God's grace.
Because Barth's theology revolves in such a significant way around his
eschatology, so too, do his ethics; in fact, ethics is dogmatics. Throughout his
writings on ethics one theme resounds: ethics as dogmatics is a working out of the
sovereignty, grace and command of God in our lives. No other discipline — not
philosophy, science, psychology or even ethics in and of itself — is able to make
accurate statements about God. Speaking about God's relationship to humanity and
humanity's response, this dogmatics is not based on human design or machination,
but is centered on God's initiation and cultivation of relationship with humanity.
Humanity's role is to respond and live according to the act of God. For Barth,
God's action is primary and humanity's reaction, while significant, is secondary
in approaching all of theology.
We would be incorrect to say that Barth arrived at this position quickly.
He did not. Barth's process of rejecting liberalism and religious socialism and
finding a new theology that adequately expressed his views required years of
'Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind (Edinburgh: The St. Andrew Press,
1969), 86.
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painstaking study, discussion and deliberation. However, we have argued that by
1924, Barth had framed within his work the structure of his theology that would
not, in its basic form, changed for his entire career. There have, however, been
modifications to Barth's theology. Two such examples are Barth's dropping of the
use of the concept of orders of creation as a result of the German Christian use of
the idea to promote National Socialism, and his attention on the human
characteristics of God, found in the book, The Humanity of God.
Based on a lecture given to an audience of Swiss pastors in Aarau in 1956,
The Humanity of God, did not say anything radically different that what had been
said in the Church Dogmatics but the piece of work did elucidate more clearly the
place of the characteristics of the 'human' God than what had been said in the
dogmatic lectures. The Humanity of God focused on one primary issue: "There
must be positive acceptance and not unconsidered rejection of the elements of truth,
which one cannot possibly deny to it, even if one sees all the weaknesses. It is
precisely God's deity which, rightly understood, includes his humanity."2 Barth's
discussion of God's humanity was a revision, but not a major change in thought.
Barth himself commented that "A genuine revision does not amount to a retreat
after second thoughts; it is a new advance and attack in which what was said before
has to be said again, but in a better way."3 In no way was Barth negating the
polemic — God is God — that he guarded since its inception in the late teens and
early twenties of the Twentieth Century. Rather, Barth modified and developed
a theology and ethic we believe to have been established by 1924.
2Karl Barth, The Humanity of God The Fontana Library, 1967, 42.
3Ibid., 38.
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We have argued that the key to understanding the unique relationship
between Barth's theology and ethics lay in his doctrine of revelation and his
theological ordering of gospel and law. The development of Barth's doctrine of
revelation culminated in his adoption of the anhypostasis-enhypostasis
Christological formula, in which Jesus was able to be fully human, and yet divine.
For Barth, this Christological formula allowed for God to enter into history fully,
yet still maintain the divine incognito so crucial for Barth's understanding of God's
sovereignty. With the newly found approach to Christology, espoused in the
Gottingen Dogmatics of 1924, Barth created the base for all of his theology, and
therefore, his ethics.
Barth's doctrine of revelation not only provides the key to unlock his
theology and ethics, but his ordering of gospel and law also establishes a means
to understand his thought.
Barth's inversion of gospel and law parallels the development of his
doctrine of revelation, providing a means to understand his theological ethics. In
approaching the question of law-gospel, gospel-law, Barth adopted the form of an
inversion: rather than espousing that the law brings humanity to a knowledge of
God, Barth argued that God's grace is what brings humanity to a place where it
can begin to know God through the pre-existent, eternal Son, Jesus. Barth had to
invert the classical Lutheran position, primarily because of his insistence upon
revelation as a purely God-initiated event: even the law, argues Barth, could be
manipulated by humanity to become a means to reach God on its own merits.4
Thus, the first word God must speak to humanity is one of gospel, of grace. This
4"Gospel and Law," 18-20.
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order maintains and protects God's sovereignty for Barth, and refuses to allow for
any human 'interference' in the revelatory event.
Because ethics is dogmatics, it must find its roots and meaning in theology,
and therefore for Barth, in God's revelation in Christ. Since God reveals Himself
to humanity through the pre-existent logos — the person of Christ - Barth argues
that God's first word to humanity is a word of grace — God speaks a Yes to
humankind long before a No is ever heard.
Barth's doctrine of revelation and ordering of gospel before law has two
major implications for his ethics. First, Barth must adopt a command form of
ethics. Because Barth is so vehement about God's sovereignty, he must espouse
and ethics that places God in a 'power position.' This position is best found for
Barth in the ethic of command: God commands humanity to act in such a way that
is reflective of the grace humankind has experienced in God's initiation and
cultivation of relationship. Because God is sovereign, states Barth, the command
is always fresh and specific for each situation, heard within the context of the
community of faith and the Creeds and Confessions of the Church.
Second, Barth's ethic implies that the word spoken to humanity is a
gracious one. Here Barth finds himself in the quandary of how to reconcile a
commanding God with an ethic of goodness. How can an ethic that seemingly
deprives humanity of choice, responsibility and freedom be a good ethic? For
Barth, the choice responsibility and freedom that God gives to humanity is found
in embracing the election - internalizing the covenant relationship that God has
initiated — and living life in such a way that human actions are a reflection of the
reality of grace. This concept works in the short run but in the long run leaves
humanity lacking when it is faced with difficult and complex decisions within the
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ethical realm. Barth's ardent adherence to defending the sovereignty of God limits
humanity's ability to make critical decisions rooted in the practical. Where Barth
fails us ethically is not so much in the command ethic, but in his unwillingness to
place beside it some kind of norms — norms that, we might add, could be
accountable to and refined by the sovereign command of God.
Barth seems to have taken us ethically to the edge of a cliff, without
instructions on how to cross the gorge in order to get to the other side. We are left
short of a solution, except that we know that there is a God who, according to
Barth, is involved in our daily affairs and is sovereign over them. While this may
be a suitable answer for Barth, not all of humanity are content to live in the tension
of knowing that God is interested and involved, but confused as to appropriate that
truth to their lives.
Reinhold Niebuhr elucidated this oversight of Barth's admirably. Insistent
that Barth's ethics were too eschatologically based and absolutist, Niebuhr argued,
primarily with reference to Barth's position towards communism in Hungary, that
Barth's ethics were olympian. Clearly Niebuhr's sensitivity to questions of
injustice drove his polemic against Barth. But Niebuhr raises the question of
Barth's inability or omission of application within the ethical realm. We have
argued that Barth's ethic fails us because it is based in a theology of revelation that
disallows for human participation in history (i.e. his doctrine of church and state).
Had Barth's doctrine of revelation, in its relation to ethics, allowed for a reformed
type of norms held under the scrutiny and sovereignty of God, we believe the
Barthian ethic might have completed the movement from explicatio to meditatio to
applicatio.
Could we have misunderstood the Barthian ethic? Are we incorrect in our
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interpretation that without a type of norms which stand in tandem with the
command of God, Barth's ethics work only on a very general level? We believe
not. While Barth is certainly a polemical theologian whose theology must, at one
level be seen as a corrective to the theology of the nineteenth century,5 he was not
simply a reactionary theologian — to call him such would be a misnomer. Barth
was a theologian of action, in the sense that he responded to what he perceived to
be askew in nineteenth century theology and attempted to improve upon it. But in
his attempt to improve upon what he deemed to be missing, Barth closed himself
off to any possibility that had even the slightest tone of human involvement in
revelation and thus in the ethical question.
The irony of Barth's position is found in his strict adherence to the
sovereignty ofGod. Barth continually argued that for theology to remain untainted
(although Barth would admit that human attempts to speak of God, even his own,
fall short of doing God justice),6 God's sovereignty must be protected.
Therefore, Barth cannot in good conscience, accept any form of ethical norms,
even if they act in correlation with God's command. But isn't God's sovereignty
great enough to handle norms created by humanity? Cannot God's sovereignty
work with or in some cases, despite the work of human minds and hearts?
We believe that in defending the sovereignty of God with such enthusiasm,
Barth in fact lessens God's sovereignty. God must be fully sovereign. But if, as
Barth argues, God is, how can any human machinations foil God's ultimate design
and plan for humanity? Would it not be better if humanity could, with a full
5We believe this corrective element accounts for the heavy tone of Barth's
work.
6See "The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry," 186.
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knowledge of its limitations and God's ultimate control, attempt to understand and
live ethically through means that might give more definition? Or is humanity
destined to waffle in the unknown and undefined? Assuredly, Barth's aversion to
norms and casuistry revolves around his concern that humanity not attempt to
define, box and limit God, but perhaps the use of the former does not always result
in the latter. Perhaps Barth ought to have had a bit more confidence in God's
sovereignty and ability to right what is wrong or work in any situation, for if God
is as sovereign as Barth defends him to be, then God ought to be able to inspire
and work within a humanity — even an imperfect one — that is seeking to live as
God intended to the best of its abilities. God must be able to work within this
context, or God is not the sovereign God that Barth upholds, for a truly sovereign
God is able to work in all situations, no matter how tainted or marred by human
failings. This is, we believe, the God in whom Barth believes, but in his attempt
to 'protect' this God, Barth, ironically, commits the very 'sin' he fought
throughout his entire career: human attempts to define, and at some level, control
God.
We would hope that God is bigger than Barth's defense seems to allow and
would uphold the truth spoken by Barth himself, that "the main thing is the
knowledge that God makes no mistakes and the proteus mirabilis has no chance
against him."7
7Karl Barth to John Godsey, January 25, 1966.
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